THE PINDARIC MIND

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THE PINDARIC MIND

A Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry

BY

THOMAS K. HUBBARD

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PREFACE

This work has a personal history, and two particular debts which need to be acknowledged. The first is to the late Elroy Bundy, under whose guidance I first encountered Pindar in the Fall of 1975. My period of study under him was very brief; it was my first term as a student of Comparative Literature at Berkeley, and his last. But his lectures deeply impressed me with the importance of viewing Pindar and early Greek poetry within the broader, synchronic framework of ancient rhetorical tradition. As will be clear to readers of my work, I have put this insight to a rather different use from Bundy's original intention; what he chose to view as conscious rhetorical formulae or conventions recurring throughout the course of ancient tradition, I prefer to analyze as deeply ingrained habits and categories of thought ("logical structures") which are assimilated from generation to generation and applied with increasing degrees of self-conscious definition. Accordingly, my methodology has swerved from the path of orthodox "Bundyism." Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that many of the problems and concepts which this work elaborates are flowers sprung forth from the seeds which he planted over eight years ago.

Bundy did not live to provide the nurture for those seeds. I moved on to Yale University for the completion of my doctorate, and in the literary-critical hothouse of New Haven, amidst the steamy vapors of structuralism, post-structuralism, and that fire-breathing dragon—"deconstruction"—I became firmly convinced both of the necessity for a well-articulated theoretical basis to interpretation of early Greek texts and of the illusory nature of New Critical claims to methodological objectivity. It is within this environment that my ideas on Pindar began to grow and take shape, finally blooming forth in 1979-80 as a dissertation—"Polar Structure in the Odes of Pindar: Toward a Dialectical Theory." The original project was envisioned as a treatment of Pindar's logic within the context of Pre-Socratic philosophy; constraints of time and patience sharpened the focus to stress the central relation of Pindar's thought to Heraclitus' *coincidentia oppositorum.*

It is here that I must acknowledge my second, and perhaps greatest debt, which is to the director of that dissertation—Thomas Cole. I found in him a sympathetic and enlightened advisor, who is to be commended not only for his many hours of painstaking analysis and discussion of the work in at least three stages of execution, but also for his countless constructive insights and suggestions which have led to its betterment at

more places than I can remember. Only those who have worked with him in such an undertaking can appreciate the extent of his patience, generosity, and acuity.

After considerable refinement and condensation, that dissertation has developed into the present monograph. Here, I must express my thanks for the encouragement and advice of the many friends and colleagues who have read all or part of the work at one of its stages—including Ann Bergren, Victor Bers, Kevin Crotty, Andrew Ford, Michael Simpson, Heinrich von Staden, and David Young. I feel that I have gained even from the criticism of those who may disagree with my approach. I extend my gratitude to Professor W. J. Verdenius for his comments, and for agreeing to publish this work in the *Mnemosyne*-series. Acknowledgement is made to Dr. Eric J. Weller, Dean of the Faculty of Skidmore College, for Faculty Development Grants in support of the book's preparation and production. And lastly, my thanks go to Brill's for their cooperation. Needless to say, any remaining faults are exclusively my own.

December 13, 1983
Saratoga Springs, New York

INTRODUCTION

Pindar is a "difficult" poet. He is well known for his lexical and metrical innovations, density of metaphor, flexibility of word order, tangential digressions, obscure connections, contradictory gnomes, ambiguous references, and frequent ellipses of thought and syntax; many critics have also seen in him a degree of political, literary and religious allusiveness quite without parallel in archaic Greek poetry. Pindaric criticism of the last two centuries[1] has therefore understandably viewed its task as one of simplification. The historical allusion, key idea (= *Grundgedanke*), key word, key symbol, and even the objective "victor-praise" have all served as critical strategies for centering the text and thus reducing its structural elaboration into a more tractable comprehensibility. But these methodologies, while often calling attention to important aspects of a poetic text, tend to privilege one of its sections or elements to the neglect of others, and so to leave more unaccounted for than accounted for. A survey of the salient problems of Pindaric interpretation will, I believe, justify this conclusion.

Criticism since the time of Boeckh has focussed on the question of the ode's unity amid the competing claims of its "subjective" and "objective" programs or intentions—the "subjective" personal intention of the poet (his historical or literary allusions, personal admonitions to the victor, or didactic lessons) and the "objective" generic function of the poem (glorification of the victor, his family, his city, and the athletic contest).[2] Critical trends over the past two centuries have distinguished themselves largely in terms of the varying emphasis which they have chosen to place upon one or the other of these programs. Much nineteenth-century scholarship favored the subjective aspect; more recently, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction.

Schadewaldt's *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* proposed to show the formal mediation of subjective and objective programs. But Schadewaldt fails to reveal a logical nexus which establishes the relevance of the subjective intention to the objective encomiastic context, and *vice versa*. The

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[1] For a more complete survey of past scholarship than it is possible to offer here, cf. Young (1970) 1-95.

[2] Fundamentally, the "subject" is the poem's first person (= the poet, or *laudator*), while the "object" is the poem's second person (= the addressee, or *laudandus*). Cf. Boeckh (1821) II:2, 6f., and Boeckh (1872) VII, 384ff. For a broader theoretical treatment of the subjective and objective modes of interpretation, see Boeckh's *Encyclopaedia* (= Boeckh (1968) 49-51).

conventional apparatus which Schadewaldt catalogues and analyzes is too often only a series of apologetic formulae attempting to rectify what is still felt as a fundamentally awkward dualism.

Bundy's *Studia Pindarica* has fulfilled a valuable corrective function by encouraging critics to turn their attention away from the historical explanations which had until his time provided the basis for much "programmatic" interpretation. Bundy's radical innovation was twofold: (1) he denied the existence of any subjective program (= expression of the poet's own political, literary, ethical, or religious attitudes) unless strictly subordinate to the objective program (= praise of the victor), and (2) he rejected the paradigmatic, or metaphorical basis of previous traditions of unitarian criticism (which saw the ode and its constituent parts as metaphorical translations or expansions of an overdetermined center, whether it be Dissen's *Grundgedanke*, Norwood's "symbol," Mezger's key word, or whatever) in favor of a theory of interpretation which seeks to show the ode's unity in purely linear, syntagmatic terms.[3] This second aspect of Bundy's work can be seen as a constructive outgrowth of Drachmann's brilliant and devastating *Moderne Pindarfortolkning* (which sharply condemned nineteenth-century unitarian theory) and Schadewaldt's analysis of the conventional apparatus.

Bundy's work has provided a more sophisticated terminology for the analysis of conventional elements and their sequential connection. This systematization has been furthered by the work of Thummer, Hamilton, Greengard, and Pavese. Yet Bundy himself recognized the theoretical limitations of his system. "Conventional" criticism may run the risk of becoming a breed of neo-analyticism which views the poem strictly as a chain of rhetorical formulae, but denies it any intellectual depth or value.

Literary convention should not be regarded as an autonomous entity in itself; it is necessarily compounded out of many individual decisions by individual artists, and these individual decisions may progressively deviate from inherited practice. Even when a poet stays strictly within the bounds of tradition, he still has a broad range of choice as to how he uses convention and what particular content he will infuse into that conventional framework. Since Bundy and his followers are interested primarily in charting the horizontal axis of contiguity (= line-by-line progression), they have neglected this vertical axis of selection:[4] although "Bundyist"

[3] For the distinction between the "paradigmatic" (= metaphoric) and "syntagmatic" (= metonymic) functions of language, cf. Saussure 122-131, and Jakobson 58ff. The distinction is that between the vertical substitution of equivalent or contrary linguistic elements for one another (also called "selection") and the horizontal sequence of linguistic elements which group together into a syntactical unit (also called "contiguity").

[4] The important, but largely neglected work of Pavese (particularly Pavese (1968) and Pavese (1979)) has made some impressive steps in the direction of helping us understand

criticism may be able to account for the formulae or elements of an ode occurring in a certain order, it does not address itself to the problem of why the poet has selected any given instance of a formula or element above the wide array of other potential choices (e.g., why, in *P.* 10, the poet has chosen to tell the myth of Perseus among the Hyperboreans rather than some other episode from Perseus' career, or from some other hero's career). To regard a given myth, gnome, or allusion as a "foil" to the victor-praise is not sufficient explanation of why that particular myth, gnome, or allusion is present in this particular poem.[5]

Similarly, Bundyist theory has not proven altogether adequate in assessing the significance of the subjective persona. Bundy has emphasized (rightly, in my opinion) that the first-person is the voice of the poet *qua* poet and not of Pindar *qua* political or ethical commentator. But the *Studia Pindarica* do not tell us much about the particulars of Pindar's view of his own poetry, or the reason for his texts' persistent auto-referentiality. To assert, as Thummer does,[6] that references to the poet's own activity elevate the value of the praise being bestowed, although valid so far as it goes, is insufficient to explain why poems such as *P.* 2 and *N.* 7 seem almost obsessed with the first-person. Indeed, any attempt to account for the process of selection (the particulars of an ode's content, as opposed to its purely formal outline) seems almost inevitably to drift back into the domain of subjective intention which the Bundyist "new criticism" seeks to discount.[7] In the final analysis, Bundy and his followers are still confronted with the unresolved question of the unity of subjective and objective programs; one has the feeling that they have simply side-stepped the problem by limiting the scope of critical inquiry to objective criteria, and by favoring contiguity over selection.

Bundy's objective functionalism may be just as much a centering strategy as the theories of subjective intention which he rejected. It analyzes the ode as a series of rhetorical foils climaxing in the focal victor-

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the categories of selection from which the Pindaric ode is built. But even this extension of Bundy's theory does nothing to explain the actual dynamics of selection.

[5] Young and Köhnken have made useful contributions to the study of Pindar's selection of myth, but their works are useful precisely insofar as they transcend strict Bundyist principles.

[6] Thummer (1968) I, 11f.

[7] It is important to remember that Bundy's work was an intellectual outgrowth of the New Criticism regnant in the American literary establishment of the late 1940's and 1950's, when Bundy was educated. But more contemporary phenomenological theory has demonstrated the complete futility of the New Critical enterprise to eliminate subjective intentionality as an operative force in the literary text. This need not, however, signal a return to the crude reductionism of the earlier intentionalist criticism against which the New Criticism reacted. Cf. Doubrovsky 239-302; Freedman 137-159; Derrida (1978) 3-30, 154-168.

praise, while previous theories centered the ode's constituted identity around a key idea, symbol, historical event, or personal circumstance. All these approaches subordinate the text to a unitary *telos*, whether this end is viewed as the poem's ultimate "meaning" or its ultimate function. But this teleological metaphysics is of questionable validity when applied to Pindar or early Greek poetics in general. There is considerable question to what extent *telos* as "intention" was even a contemporary concept.[8] If someone were to ask Pindar, "What is the *telos* of the *Second Olympian*?", or even, "What is the meaning of the *Second Olympian*?", Pindar would probably not have understood the query. If Pindar could respond to such questions, critics (following Bundy) would postulate that he might say, "to praise Theron." Others might have him say, "to allude to the Pythagorean doctrine of the afterlife," or "to allude to my own quarrel with Simonides and Bacchylides," or "to show that good fortune in the future is the lot of good men, even if they suffer in their present life." Regardless of whether Pindar himself would articulate them, any or all of these may well be valid intentions of the poem; but none of them is alone sufficient as an explanation of the totality of the text. Nor have past approaches made it clear how or whether these several intentions may coexist. The analysis of intentional plurality requires a more flexible hermeneutics.

Since Pindar himself probably had no consciously formed concept of literary "intention," and moreover since the "intentions" which we may legitimately posit in a text are plural (and often conflicting), it is arguable that the whole notion of programmatic intention or unitary *telos* is best bracketed from our critical vocabulary, at least when we are dealing with poetic texts of this period. One recalls Socrates' experience in examining the poets for wisdom (*Apology* 22b-c): when Socrates would ask a poet what he might "learn" from a given poem, the poet was unable to tell him anything. "To put it briefly, almost all the bystanders would have spoken better than the poets themselves concerning what they had written." Plato understood, both here and in the *Ion*, that poetry (at least for the Greeks) was not so much a product of conscious intention and deliberate communication, as of unconscious and seemingly autonomous associative processes ("enthusiasm") which the poet himself was in no position to explain.

Many critics have followed this lead in concluding that "meaning" in archaic poetry is best approached as an implicit fabric of subliminal con-

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[8] See the semasiological study of Holwerda 337-363. On the general irrelevance of intentionalism to classical criticism, see the just remarks of Silk 59-64. The idea of unitary intention in works of literature does not really surface until the Neoplatonic notion of *skopos* (for which, cf. Coulter 77ff.).

stellations and preoccupations. These implicit preoccupations can be uncovered only through close and rigorous examination of repetitions and transformations embedded within the structure of each text. According to this mode of reading, criticism must move beyond the simple reformulation of surface content: the key idea, word, or symbol, the victor-praise, and any other programmatic intention, subjective or objective, should be viewed more as *archē* than *telos*, more as occasion than as all-consuming purpose. What we must ultimately probe is the cognitive structure of Pindar's mind, in all its complexity; this depth-analysis must therefore drive beneath the superficial intentionality of the ego into the more revealing (and infinitely more fascinating) associative patterns of the unconscious.

Disciplines such as psychoanalysis and structural anthropology have made us aware that empirical categories may reify abstract notions, and moreover that they may be interwoven, whether consciously or unconsciously, into "texts" (e.g., dream-texts, myth-texts, or literary texts) which express symbolically a complex propositional logic of abstract notions. Ideally, the task of structural interpretation is (a) to identify all the significant empirical categories of the text (or corpus of texts), (b) to survey the range of abstract notions implied by each of these categories, and (c) to articulate the logical relations among the abstract notions. The array of propositional relations which we have decoded in step (c) may then legitimately be called the "meaning" of the text (or corpus of texts).

This hermeneutic process can be initiated in various ways, and there is obviously no one exhaustive list of "significant empirical categories" or single shape to the logical relations which we designate as "meaning" after step (c). The approach adopted in the present study takes as its starting point the importance—now generally recognized—which polarity and analogy possess for archaic Greek thought,[9] as opposed to the syllogistic structures and subordination of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian logic. We have observed that intentionalist criticism unifies the text into a *telos* or meaning through analogy: various images, gnomes, *exempla*, and wishes in the text bear some resemblance or metaphorical relation to a key idea. Bundy, however, emphasized that elements in the ode could also stand in a relation of difference, or antithesis: the priamel and foil are devices for the clarification of a key idea through contrast.

[9] See the works of Lloyd, Fraenkel (1975), Kemmer, and Prier. Their interest is primarily in polarity and analogy as tools of conscious philosophical argumentation. As will be seen, my own approach extends to them the status of deeply ingrained habits of mind. Psychoanalysis has made us aware just how difficult it is to draw a firm dividing line between the processes of the conscious and unconscious mind. The two are mutually interpenetrating, and in the end it may not matter much to which of them we choose to attribute a given textual phenomenon.

The importance of antithesis for the syntagmatic surface-text with which Bundy deals suggests the possible importance of polarity for Pindar's thought on its deeper levels of structuration as well.[10] Structural interpretation of Pindar might therefore proceed by (a) cataloguing the sequence of antitheses which appear on the surface-text (borrowing from Bundy's methodology of syntagmatic analysis), (b) exploring the semantic and associative range of these polarities (where appropriate by a synchronic study of parallels both in Pindar and throughout the Greek tradition), and (c) determining the precise analogical connections among the involved polarities (through a synthesizing methodology of paradigmatic comparison). Such an approach would seek to avoid dependence on either analogy or polarity by itself, but would attempt to explore their complex process of interaction: interpretation must articulate the underlying analogical chain of differential relations—the logical building-blocks out of which the text has been generated.

The primary risk which structural analysis runs is that it too may inadvertently become another version of teleological criticism. Naively applied, structural interpretation might reduce each poem to a key polarity (instead of the key idea, symbol, or word which other forms of paradigmatic comparison yield). But the poem is better seen as a dynamic confrontation of opposed ideas which remain in perpetual tension without any final resolution. There is no "key" polarity, but a "chain" of different polarities linked together among themselves by polarities and analogies. Even this chain does not constitute a final and total account of the text's meaning, since the chain may encompass increasingly minute linguistic antitheses in and behind the text, and can as a result be extended to a potentially infinite degree of associative elaboration. The level of magnification at which we choose to halt our microscopic analysis is necessarily arbitrary.

Such open-endedness is understandably disquieting to those of us—and I include myself here—who have been trained to think of literature primarily from the rhetorical, performative standpoint. It is much easier, and much more comforting to imagine the *presence* of the poet's voice communicating meaning to us directly. We can then feel secure in separating "right" from "wrong" interpretations and can regard our professorial functions as fulfilled. Structural analysis, on the other hand, implies the poet's *absence* from a seemingly autonomous text which does not execute any *a priori* intention, but crystallizes an array of

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[10] By the term "antithesis," I shall throughout this work denote a binary opposition in its actualized, surface-textual form; by the term "polarity," I shall designate the opposition in its archetypal, deep-structural form.

unconscious perceptions and ingrained semantic relations. On this level of meaning, contradiction and ambiguity may be rampant, and the distinction between "right" and "wrong" interpretations becomes more difficult. Since there is no unqualified voice of final authority, we may be able to judge interpretations only for their consistency and acuity, rather than their correctness.

Nevertheless, the penchant for fixed and determinate meanings may infect structural analysis itself. Not only is there the aforementioned critical inclination to privilege a key polarity, but there also exists a natural temptation for critics to favor one side of a polarity or polar chain. Past criticism of Greek thought (and some would contend, the whole history of Western metaphysics) has especially tended to favor terms of presence and limitation. The consequence is that many polar tensions (like near/far, *peras/apeirōn*, *physis/technē*) have been devitalized into simple evaluations (and thus potentially into intentionalist *Grundgedanken*).[11]

In Pindaric criticism, this critical bias has resulted from an overemphasis on individual gnomic statements. "Everything is mightiest by nature" has one meaning when quoted in isolation as a key idea, but possesses a rather different set of resonances when read inside the *Ninth Olympian*; the logical sequence both of the immediate context and of the ode as a whole suggests that nature is by no means sufficient by itself, and that art is, in its own way, just as important. Structural analysis can help make us aware of the provisional character of all such gnomic statements: a professed intention or program may in fact be undercut and reversed by the text's development. It is precisely this oscillating process of reversal or modulation which engenders the complexity and unfinality of the text's meaning. The text is perpetually engaged in a back-and-forth dialogue with itself; analysis of the text must to some extent follow this contrapuntal movement.

But there are dangers in this direction too. Criticism of an explicitly "deconstructive" bent has produced much challenging and provocative work on texts which put their own rhetorical identity into question.[12] Many texts have been found to disclose a tangled skein of self-contradiction, antithetical "breakdown," structural failure and *aporia*: the relations of polarity and analogy are often thwarted by deviations, in-

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[11] This devitalizing movement actually has its origins in the ancient tradition itself, particularly as crystallized in the philosophical texts of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, and later of Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Detienne (1967) 132-147. But the archaic poetic texts are not so rigidly tied to ideological programs.

[12] Exemplary applications of this methodology to classical texts are to be found in Brenkman, Pucci (1977), Pucci (1980b), Hubbard (1984).

concinnities, and asymmetries, and their logic may become a sort of "il-logic." The notion of a "self-destructive" text has great potential in the analysis of those dramatic, narrative, or even lyric texts which bracket their elements ironically, but seems out of place in a fundamentally pre-ironic text such as Pindar's. It is possible for texts to be "self-revising" and "self-qualifying," without properly being "self-destructive." The relational network of a Pindaric ode does not "break down" or "fail," but becomes more elaborate as successive levels of difference are taken into account. What is called for here is not deconstruction, but a mode of critical reconstruction which in addition to charting the interstitial ambiguities of the poetic text, is also cognizant of its own provisionality and necessary incompleteness.

Within the limits suggested by these theoretical assumptions and caveats, the present study is designed to fill the need for an articulated "grammar" of the dominant polar infrastructures through which the Pindaric text is constituted. Polarity was as fundamental to early Greek thought as *men* and *de*; analysis of the structure of Pindar's thought can usefully begin with an analysis of his use of opposition.[13] Close examination of any Pindaric ode will yield numerous antitheses and underlying polarities. I have chosen to group them into three general classes—(1) relations of measure, (2) relations of manner, and (3) relations of transformation.

This scheme is offered merely as a useful framework for analysis: in no way is it meant to be definitive or inflexible. In the dynamic structuration of an ode, polarities of one class may be related analogically to polarities from another class. Nevertheless, this tripartite division serves to highlight what I perceive as the principal lines of affinity among polarities. The individual polarities which this work will examine within each class are not intended to be exhaustive, but suggestive. We might, for instance, also include *glukus/pikros* among the relations of manner, or *ponos/dapana* among the relations of transformation. But I have chosen as illustrative those polar structures which appear most complex and/or pervasive, and have subordinated to these my discussions of related polarities.

Each polarity discussed will be exemplified through an analysis of one or more odes in which it figures. This will illustrate how each side of the polarity has the potential for positive or negative valuation, and how the polarity as a whole may thus be dialectically ambivalent. Pindar often

[13] Antithesis has been analyzed as a rhetorical surface-structure by Thummer (1968) I, 135-137, and Frener *passim*. But neither study deals with polarity on the deep-structural level. More in the direction of my own approach are the recent observations of Crotty (1982) 1-32.

sets up traditional polarities with traditional valuations, and then turns these valuations inside-out. The Pindaric text constantly appears to check and contradict itself. It will be observed that polarity in Pindar is seldom a matter of simple disjunction: it may include structures of doubleness, ambiguity, mutual supplementation, alternation, transition, or even dialectical mediation (= a third term uniting contraries). Our examination of polarities as they function in Pindar's odes will also help us see how a polarity is instantiated into related antitheses, and bears affinity to other polarities. It will also be observed that many polarities are crystallized with both subjective and objective applications: in this sense, the poem's form (= subjective identity) comes to mirror its content (= objective identity).

The organization of our discussion may lead some to suspect, despite all disclaimers, that we are in fact reducing each text to a favored central polarity, since it is analyzed under a single polar rubric. But the "origin" of analysis is not necessarily a "center" of analysis: the observed antithesis with which any analysis begins is merely used as an arbitrary take-off point, or *foyer virtuel*, from which we may proceed to a progressively more complex unravelling of the text's relational chain. The analysis could very well begin at any point in the text's relational network and eventually yield the same unravelled product.[14] This is not to suggest that all polarities are equally important; some polarities may become especially prominent in a text, either due to their frequency, degree of dialectical elaboration, or degree of explicitness. These polarities will by their prominence become obvious choices as origins of analysis. What we must always bear in mind, however, is that no one polarity (and no side of a polarity) is ever "central," but is meaningful only by interaction with other polarities in the text. All meaning is relation, and exists only in relation to other relations.

It is hoped that such a structural method will yield a fresh and fruitful approach to some of the unresolved problems of Pindaric criticism, while incorporating and synthesizing the merits of past approaches. The study of polarity may provide us with a better understanding of Pindaric unity both on the syntagmatic axis (= linear, surface-textual connection of ideas) and on the paradigmatic axis (= metaphorical, deep-structural analogies). An appreciation of the contemporary parameters of Pindar's relational logic may show the underlying sense of many transitions and connections heretofore considered "illogical" by the standards of our post-Aristotelian logic. It may also aid the structural integration of myths, prayers, *prooimia*, and other "decorative" elements of the epini-

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[14] On the arbitrariness of the *foyer virtuel*, cf. Lévi-Strauss 2.

cian which are often regarded as mere "foils" by Bundyist criticism; such elements may be seen as metaphorical realizations of one or both poles of an opposition.

Structural analysis may also allow us to evaluate Pindar's poetics in the terms which Pindar himself used (*brachus/makros*, *malthakos/trachus*, *phya/sophia*). The same polarities may be crystallized both subjectively and objectively: i.e., they may set up a homology in which formal tensions (characterizing the structure or genesis of the poem) reflect conceptual tensions (chararacterizing the victory and the objective world in which it occurs). Analysis of "difference" may offer a way to demonstrate the unity of the Pindaric text in a non-reductive manner, giving equal weight to syntagmatic and paradigmatic, contiguity and selection, objective and subjective, form and content.

Meaning at this time may not have been strictly conceived in terms of communicated messages, but in somewhat looser and less consciously programmatic terms—as problems, concerns, tensions, ambiguities, paradoxes.[15] To understand the conditions of meaning in Pindar's time is to understand the logical substrate of language—the conditions of thought. What we must ultimately confront is the question of how the mind organized and therefore expressed its perception of reality; our analysis of texts must expand into an examination of the cognitive structure of the early Greek mind—and not just Pindar's mind, but also the minds of his contemporary audience.

Of course, the present study can only make a very tentative and preliminary gesture in the direction of this rather grandiose project. Here, I only hope to suggest that part of the reason modern readers find Pindar so difficult is because they have not been trained to read him according to his contemporary cast of mind. It is easy to forget that Pindar lived, thought, and wrote in an intellectual environment for which the law of contradiction did not exist, and in which Heraclitus was able seriously to explore and propound radical notions like the coincidence of opposites.[16] Our analysis of polarity and other relational structures in Pindar is merely an attempt to recapture this framework of mind, and thus to help rechart the universe which it perceived.

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[15] On this theme, see the seminal essay of J.-P. Vernant, "Tensions et ambiguités dans la tragédie grecque," in Vernant (1972) 19-40.

[16] On the general relationship of Heraclitean logic to Pindar, cf. Snell (1959) 81f.; Fraenkel (1938) 326 n. 38; Reinhardt 73; Hubbard (1980) 303-352 and 358-361.

CHAPTER ONE

RELATIONS OF MEASURE

1. Near/Far

Oppositions of the "distant" (τὸ πόρσω) and that which is "at hand" (τὸ πὰρ ποδός) are common throughout Pindar and early Greek poetry.[1] Associated with the near and far are a host of other polarities with significant ramifications—the domestic (τὸ οἰκεῖον or ἐπιχώριον) and the foreign (τὸ ἀλλότριον or ξείνιον), the present (τὰ παρέοντα) and the absent (τὰ ἀπέοντα), possible (δύνατον) and impossible (ἀδύνατον), limitation and transcendence, finitude (πέρας) and infinity (ἄπειρον). Given this clustering propensity, the near and the far may provide a good point to commence our examination of antithetical logic in Pindar.

There has been a tendency for Western thought ever since Plato to privilege presence and all the antithetical terms linked with it, and this predispostion has unquestionably been reflected in the history of Pindaric criticism. We have been given a quietist poet who will serenely admonish even the most powerful of princes to curb his desires to what is at hand and wisely heed the Delphic "know thyself." This view of Pindar is not altogether wrong, but neither is it altogether adequate.

Close examination of the near/far polarity and its dynamic transformation in the text of several poems may suggest that it is not nearly so univocal and transparent as the "metaphysics of presence" would insist. Pindar's *laudandi* are of course exhorted to retain what is at hand and not to overstep their mortal limitations (crystallized by the pillars of Heracles and a number of other topoi),[2] yet at the same time it is only through past desire for what was beyond that their present glory is possible; this desire may be the victor's enterprise in essaying the contest or it may be metaphorized paradigmatically as the transcendence achieved by a mythical ancestor who has enhanced the victor's glory. The *laudandus*' athletic and socio-political *areta* may be seen as a complex dialectical tension between pursuit and restraint (cf. *I*.6.71 μέτρα μὲν γνώμᾳ διώκων,

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[1] For the various forms and specific verbal formulations which this opposition takes in Greek literature, cf. Ramnoux 439-459, and Young (1968) 116-120. Notable instances occur even before Pindar—cf. Hesiod *Op.*, 365ff.; Theognis 1151; Bacch. 1.174ff. The polarity becomes a common topos in tragedy—cf. Aesch., *Pe.* 825f.; Soph., *OT* 130f.; Eur., *Bacch.* 298f., *Hipp.* 184., *Rh.* 482.

[2] For direct and implicit imperatives to the victor to limit his desire to the prosperity at hand, cf. *O*.1.113f., *O*.5.27, *P*.3.61f., *P*.8.78, *N*.7.90-92, *I*.5.14-16, *I*.6.12f. This formulation has appropriately been called the "*ne plus ultra* motif" by Gianotti (1975a) 129f.

μέτρα δὲ καὶ κατέχων); it is the custom of the victory ode to mediate this tension. Analogously, the poet's own act consists of an interplay between the *makros* and the *brachus*—continued elaboration of a tangential theme (= paradigmatic digression) and self-limitation to the present theme at hand (= return to praise of the victor). The epinician loses considerably in its polyvalent resonance if either term is unduly privileged above the other.

O. 3 provides a fairly elementary illustration of this dialectical process. After he has completed the myth (on Heracles' importation of the olive to Olympia), Pindar closes the poem by returning to the praise of the victor:

ἐμὲ δ' ὦν πᾳ θυμὸς ὀτρύνει φάμεν 'Εμμενίδαις
Θήρωνί τ' ἐλθεῖν κῦδος εὐίππων διδόντων Τυνδαριδᾶν, ὅτι πλείσταισι βροτῶν
ξεινίαις αὐτοὺς ἐποίχονται τραπέζαις,
εὐσεβεῖ γνώμᾳ φυλάσσοντες μακάρων τελετάς.
εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιὰν
Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν ἱκάνων ἅπτεται
οἴκοθεν 'Ηρακλέος
σταλᾶν. τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον
κἀσόφοις. οὔ νιν διώξω. κεινὸς εἴην.

(*O.* 3.38-45)

Theron is praised and rewarded not only for his piety, but most specifically for his hospitality and generosity: he exceeds all other mortals πλείσταισι ξεινίαις τραπέζαις. He is willing to open up his *oikos* to the *allotrion*, and it is only by transcending narrow domestic limits in this way that he can open himself up to the divine visitation of the Theoxenia and the agonistic glory which results from the hosting of the "host-loving" (v.1 φιλοξείνοις) Dioscuri. This passage finds an apt analogue in the similar ending of *I.* 2, written for Theron's brother Xenocrates:

καὶ θεῶν δαῖτας προσέπτυκτο πάσας· οὐδέ ποτε ξενίαν
οὖρος ἐμπνεύσαις ὑπέστειλ' ἱστίον ἀμφὶ τράπεζαν·
ἀλλ' ἐπέρα ποτὶ μὲν Φᾶσιν θερείαις,
ἐν δὲ χειμῶνι πλέων Νείλου πρὸς ἀκτάν.

(*I.* 2.39-42)

Both Theron and Xenocrates can reach the ends of the earth without having to leave their *oikos*: poetic fame can produce a universalizing dissemination of their domestic virtue (which in the form of hospitality is itself a microcosmic dissemination).

It is precisely in this sense that we can best understand the controversial οἴκοθεν in v.44. The majority of commentators follow the scholia in watering down οἴκοθεν to mean "on account of his own virtues" (διὰ τῶν

οἰκείων ἀρετῶν).[3] But even if οἴκοθεν can bear this distantly metaphorical connotation (which is dubious),[4] the word οἴκοθεν itself undeniably means "from one's home" or "at one's home" and cannot fail to evoke the literal image of the *oikos*, and all the domestic virtues associated with the *oikos*. By saying that Theron "grasps the pillars of Heracles from his home" (i.e., without even going there), Pindar is surely bringing into play a near/far dialectic.

There are two relevant parallel passages which will illuminate our discussion of οἴκοθεν here. The first and most obvious is *I.*4.9-13:[5]

> ὅσσα δ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἄηται
> μαρτύρια φθιμένων ζωῶν τε φωτῶν
> ἀπλέτου δόξας, ἐπέψαυσαν κατὰ πὰν τέλος· ἀνορέαις δ' ἐσχάταισιν
> οἴκοθεν στάλαισιν ἅπτονθ' Ἡρακλείαις,
> καὶ μηκέτι μακροτέραν σπεύδειν ἀρετάν·

It is not by a literal voyage, but within the framework of their "evidences of boundless fame" (μαρτύρια...ἀπλέτου δόξας) that the Cleonymids are able to reach the pillars of Heracles even from their home.[6] Here, as in *O.*3 and the parellel passages of *N.*3.19-23 and *N.*4.69-72, the pillars of Heracles are employed as a formula of limitation—a far point beyond which human virtue (whether of the athlete or the poet) cannot pass.[7] This idea of limitation is all the more reinforced in *O.*3 and *I.*4 by the paradox that the *laudandus* is able to reach this far extreme only from the near-term vantage of the domestic sphere (οἴκοθεν).

This interpretation of οἴκοθεν as the dialectical nexus of near and far, limitation and transcendence, *oikos* and Gadeira, is still more clearly supported by the other parallel, *N.*7.50-53:

> θρασύ μοι τόδ' εἰπεῖν
> φαενναῖς ἀρεταῖς ὁδὸν κυρίαν λόγων
> οἴκοθεν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργῳ· κόρον δ' ἔχει
> καὶ μέλι καὶ τὰ τέρπν' ἄνθε' Ἀφροδίσια.

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[3] Σ *O.*3.79a Drachmann.

[4] On the deficiencies of this interpretation, see Norwood (1915) 1f. Norwood's own translation of οἴκοθεν as "on the near side" is advanced without the support of a single parallel use of the word. Péron 77, argues that οἴκοθεν merely denotes the origin of Theron's trip; but in this case, the word would be superfluous, colorless, and flat. ἅπτεται does not strictly refer to a trip in any event. Pindar uses οἴκοθεν in a locative as well as the originary sense (cf. *P.*8.51, *N.*3.31, *Paean* 4.32).

[5] For the more obvious parallels of language which link the two passages, see Péron 76.

[6] As in *O.*3.44, the οἴκοθεν would be otiose if taken to mean διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρετῶν, since this is already expressed in the ἀνορέαις.

[7] This dialectic of transcendence and limitation merely translates that of the immediately preceding verses—that between the Cleonymids' glory (v.7 τιμάεντες) and their simultaneous humility (v.8 ὀρφανοὶ ὕβριος). For the antithesis, see Fraccaroli 669.

The image described is a path of fame which the Aeginetans have paved, extending directly from their home into some unspecified and remote aetherial domain.[8] But the fact that this path of glory originates in the domestic sphere, and from the domestic virtues, implies a more limited focus of concern; the Aeginetans' fame begins with and is centered upon a microcosm within the macrocosm. Their glory is not something which can extend indefinitely, or be the object of indefinite poetic celebration. Limitation enhances the sweetness of all transcendent pleasures, even "honey and the winsome flowers of Aphrodite."

To return to the passage under discussion in *O.*3, we can readily see that all the motifs associated with the pillars of Heracles and the οἴκοθεν-topos are fully present here. As in *I.*2, it is clearly by fame that Theron reaches the ends of the earth, and more specifically, by poetic fame. Such is surely the implication of the preceding protasis which authenticates the praise of the victor—εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος.....(v.42). This sequence is an abbreviation of the opening to *O.*1; in both passages water may evoke the refreshing, nurturing fluidity of poetic discourse,[9] while gold embodies the splendid beneficence and generosity of the victor who has commissioned the poem, in addition to hosting the bounteous Theoxenia with its ξεινίαις τραπέζαις.[10] The μέν and δέ of the protasis lend themselves to this division of the respective contributions of subject (*laudator*) and object (*laudandus*); the fame imaged in the apodosis is predicated upon the coexistence of both. Flowing water is the supreme process, gold the supreme possession; the water is active (inasmuch as it metonymically represents the subject) and hence takes a verb, while the gold is purely nominal (inasmuch as it metonymically represents the object) and hence merely takes a predicate adjective. It is the stream of poetry which actively creates the fame, and thus ἀριστεύει,[11] but it is the gold which is itself famous, and thus αἰδοιέστατος. In effect, we can paraphrase the sentence: "If poetry is the most powerful herald of human fortune, and if wealth is the thing most worthy of respect (in its

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[8] For the same image, also with reference to the Aeacids, cf. *I.*6.22f.; here, the paths of glory extend even beyond the furthest known extremities of the earth—the source of the Nile in the south, the Hyperboreans in the north.

[9] The "stream" and "draught" of poetry are commonplaces in Pindar. Cf. Finley 52f., Gianotti (1975a) 113, our n. 76 *infra*, and the discussion of the proem to *O.*1 on pp. 154-156 *infra*.

[10] One should also mention here that substantial wealth was required for anyone to sponsor an entry in the Olympic chariot-race. See Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 20.1; Gardiner 466.

[11] This verb is normally used in a very active sense by Pindar, referring not just to innate excellence, but to excellent deeds of heroes and victors (cf. *O.*10.64, *O.*13.43, *P.*3.74, *N.*11.14, *I.*8.25, fr.199.2).

capacity to sponsor poems, chariot races, and bountiful feasts), then Theron's fame will reach the ends of the earth (through this very poem of praise) without his leaving home."[12] Read in this way, the condition is a typical Pindaric vaunt which concludes the poem by placing upon it an authoritative seal which warrants the necessity and efficacy of its praise.[13]

Theron balances his attainment of athletic glory in faraway Olympia with attention to domestic beneficence (as represented by the ξεινίαις τραπέζαις);[14] this doubleness of Theron's nature is paralleled by the same doubleness in the twin Dioscuri, who are gods both of the athletic festival (vv. 34-38) and of the Theoxenia (v.1, 39f.). In fact, Theron's success at Olympia is precisely on account of his domestic virtues as witnessed by the Dioscuri (vv. 38-41). By thus integrating the far (the pillars of Heracles) with the near (οἴκοθεν), Theron has avoided the danger of τὸ πόρσω (the far negatively valorized). The ἐσχατίαν of v.43 mediates the near and far on the ideational level; it is far inasmuch as it is the ultimate limit of human achievement (identifiable with the pillars of Heracles), but it is also near, precisely because it is a limit.[15] The "wise" of v.44b refers not only to Theron, but equally to the poet,[16] as the following "I shall not pursue it" clearly demonstrates; in fact, the limitative impetus of this whole sequence is not only an objective praise of Theron's mediation of near and far, but is now revealed also to be a subjective break-off device, justifying the praise rendered as adequate and criticizing the dangers of excess in praise, as well as in life.[17] For Pindar to continue the poem and his praise beyond this point would risk breaking the delicate

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[12] For the same condition, cf. *I.*6.10-13:
εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνᾳ τε χαρεὶς
καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτους ἀρετάς,
σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐσχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβου
βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἐών.
The dual protasis posits the activity of the object (δαπάνᾳ τε χαρεὶς καὶ πόνῳ), parallel to the "gold" of *O.*3, and that of the subject (creation of δόξαν ἐπήρατον), equivalent to the "water" of *O.*3; the apodosis, as in *O.*3, then carries the *laudandus* to the ἐσχατιαῖς, both as a literal nautical image, and as a metaphor for the height of prosperity.

[13] For the convention of a protasis introducing general qualities which are undeniably praiseworthy in a *laudandus* and/or *laudator*, and an apodosis which applies these to the specific praise of the *laudandus* at hand, see Bundy (1962) II, 54-59, and with regard to the present passage, 59 n.55.

[14] For the same complementary dyad in reference to Theron, cf. *O.*2.5f.

[15] This ambivalence characterizes the concept of ἔσχατον throughout Pindar. Cf. *O.*1.113, *P.*10.28, *N.*3.22, *I.*4.11, *I.*6.13, Also, see Renehan 225.

[16] On the general ambiguity of σοφός, see p.117 *infra*.

[17] On the general theme of encomiastic propriety (the avoidance of prolixity which will cause tedium and hyperbole such as might encourage jealousy), cf. *P.*8.29-34, fr.180; Gundert 67f.; Bundy (1962) II, 73-76; and Bundy (1972) 88-91.

balance of near and far, falling into τὸ πόρσω. Overdone praise might lose substance and credibility; it would become "empty" (κεινός).[18]

This limitative check is a natural diminuendo for a poem's close. We observe the same dialectical operation of near and far on both subjective and objective levels in the body of the poem, only with a more expansive and less limitative bias. The allusion to the pillars of Heracles at the end of the poem is particularly apt in that the preceding myth has already dealt with Heracles' journey to the ends of the earth. The Heracles-myth moves between the poles of Olympia (the near) and the land of the Hyperboreans (the far). The treeless athletic site was originally "bare" (v.24 γυμνός), a natural desert exposed to the wasting rays of the sun;[19] it is only through a fructifying act of culture—the importation of the olive from the distant land of the Hyperboreans—that the games are able to take place with the full accoutrements of civilization. And the olive has a double function, redounding to the benefit both of ordinary men (v.18 σκιαρόν τε φύτευμα ξυνὸν ἀνθρώποις) and of the outstanding few (as a στέφανόν τ' ἀρετῶν of the victors): it provides protection and comfort for those who keep to the near, while providing recognition for those who have sought and attained the distant. The myth thus provides powerful evidence against the common assumption that Pindar's ethic was one of self-satisfied quietism, unilaterally privileging the near above the far. It is precisely the sort of γλυκὺς ἵμερος (v.33) or "desire" which Heracles conceives upon seeing the olive trees in the land of the Hyperboreans, that is responsible, in the final analysis, for all human creativity.[20]

Pindar's notion of "desire" as the supreme force of heroic transcendence and creativity is perhaps most eloquently expressed by *P.*4.184-187:

> τὸν δὲ παμπειθῆ γλυκὺν ἡμιθέοισιν πόθον ἔνδαιεν Ἥρα
> ναὸς Ἀργοῦς, μή τινα λειπόμενον
> τὰν ἀκίνδυνον παρὰ ματρὶ μένειν αἰῶνα πέσσοντ', ἀλλ' ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ
> φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς ἅλιξιν εὑρέσθαι σὺν ἄλλοις.

Desire (γλυκὺν πόθον) prefers life-risking pursuit of the distant (represented by the Argo and its voyage in quest of the Golden Fleece) to

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[18] The word should retain its literal overtones here and not be watered down. Overextension implies absence and hollowness. The potential optative εἴην reinforces this implication, as contrasted with the positive factuality of the indicative.

[19] One cannot help but also see in γυμνός an allusion to the state of the athletes; for the sun's heat associated with athletic toil, cf. *N.*7.73 (and our discussion of *O.*1.1f. on p.154 *infra*).

[20] And, one might add, ἵμερος is responsible for divine beneficence to mortals as well. Cf. *O.*1.41, and Segal (1964) 216ff.

the domestic safe-mindedness of remaining at home.[21] The active pursuit of this desire will provide for the ephebe heroes proof of their manliness (φάρμακον ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς) among their peers; remaining at home beside the mother would signal a most unheroic and self-enclosed regression. The marriage of Jason and Medea comes to be the ultimate symbol in *P.*4 of the actualization of this exogamous desire and the rejection of the home-bound endogamy which derives from narrow limitation of one's energies to the already near and domestic.

But desire (the impetus to make present the absent, to render near the far) cannot extend itself unchecked. All desire is inevitably caught up in a complex self-cancelling tension of cathexis and repression, transcendence and limitation. The gods in Pindar, even while they engender desire (as Hera does in the Argonauts), also stand as glorified symbols of the superego—the limiting force of morality which provides an implicit countervalence to all desire; consciousness of mortal limitations is possible only when set against the antithetical backdrop of a myth of immortality (and *vice versa*). The gods are guarantors of *dikē*, which is to say that they maintain an ultimate equipoise among all the contraries of which the post-Anaxamandrian universe is composed: they at once elicit mortal desires, and where necessary, dampen them. The gods provide an ideal of transcendence, but never allow that transcendence to become total (witness the case of Bellerophon) or permanent (witness the cases of Pelops and Ixion). In *O.*3, we see this tension elaborated in Artemis' ambivalent reaction to Heracles and his pursuit of the Keryneian hind (vv.26-30).[22]

Heracles' journey to the Hyperboreans and introduction of the olive is paradigmatic not only for the *laudandus*, but equally well for the *laudator*. Heracles is not only the model athlete, but is here presented also as the model man of words, δᾶμον Ὑπερβορέων πείσαις...λόγῳ (v.16). The garland (which owes its origins to Heracles' introduction of the olive) is first described as crowning the poet (in the first antistrophe), and is only

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[21] We are reminded here of the destiny of Achilles—the paradigmatic "hero" of Greek poetic tradition. He could choose between early death with glory and old age without glory. Like all heroes, he of course chose the former.

[22] See Devereux 289-298. He argues that δέξατ' in v.27 is ambiguous, reflecting both a hostile ("awaited the attack") and friendly ("welcomed") reception of Heracles by Artemis. On this assumption, Pindar leaves it up to the reader to decide whether he wishes to dwell upon the sin of sacrilege involved in Heracles' seizure of the hind (and thus view the gods as suppressive) or upon the rewards of heroism (and thus view the gods as encouraging). The former emphasis is more faithful to the traditional version of the story, the latter to Pindar's revisionist treatment of the myth in the present context. Lozza 167-169, accepts the ambiguity but modifies the interpretation by suggesting that Artemis' initial reception was hostile but that her attitude subsequently changed.

Figure 1. The antithetical structure of *Olympian* 3.

		desire	
	near	------------------------------→	far
	Olympia	------------------------------→	Hyperboreans
Second Column Valorized	33 Heracles		olive
	18 σκιαρόν τε φύτευμα ξυνὸν ἀνθρώποις (*koinon*)		στεφανόν τ' ἀρετᾶν (*idion*)
		Artemis (a twin)	
	27 δέξατ' ("awaited the attack") repressive (the old version)		δέξατ' ("welcomed") stimulative (the new version)
	4 literary tradition		μοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον
Neutral Valorization	40 τραπέζαις (*oikeion*)		ξεινίαις (*allotrion*)
		Theron	
	domestic virtues		athletic triumph
		Dioscuri (twins)	
	gods of Theoxenia		gods of Olympia
		ἅπτεται	
First Column Valorized	44 οἴκοθεν	------------------------------→	Ἡπακλέος σταλᾶν
	44 (τὸ ἔγγυς)		τὸ πόρσω
	45 οὔ νιν διώξω		κεινὸς εἴην

then transferred to the victor (in the first epode).[23] Pindar's own role as an innovator (v.4 μοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον) is clearly parallel to that of Heracles; just as Heracles established the Olympic festival and brought the olive-tree to Greece to form the victory-wreath, so Pindar has discovered a new way of celebrating victory in song. It is only through the hero's and poet's controlled venturesomeness and "desire" that Theron's present glory is possible.

We also find the Hyperboreans as a symbol of cathected distance in *P.* 10, Pindar's earliest dateable epinician. The relevance of the myth to the encomiastic context has long been a source of controversy; often quoted is the scholiast's comment—"Up to this point Pindar writes the epinician well; but after this he missed the mark by using a senseless digression."[24]

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[23] The terms in which the two crownings are described are similar: χαίταισι ζευχθέντες ἔπι στέφανοι (v.6) and ἀμφὶ κόμαισι βάλῃ γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας (v.13).

[24] Σ *P.* 10.46b Drachmann.

There are two basic schools of critical opinion—those who believe that the paradisiacal world of the myth is antithetical to the real world of the victor,[25] and those who believe that Perseus' journey to the Hyperboreans may offer a glorified paradigm to the victor.[26] What we have learned already about the dialectical nature of Pindar's employment of the near/far opposition suggests that there may be a sense in which both views are correct.

The traditional view takes the myth as a representation of the far-absent-impossible, and therefore as antithetical to the near-present-possible world of the victor. This view derives its support from the verses which immediately precede the myth's introduction (*P.* 10.22-30):

εὐδαίμων δὲ καὶ ὑμνητὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ γίνεται σοφοῖς,
ὃς ἂν χερσὶν ἢ ποδῶν ἀρετᾷ κρατήσαις
τὰ μέγιστ' ἀέθλων ἕλῃ τόλμᾳ τε καὶ σθένει,
καὶ ζώων ἔτι νεαρὸν
κατ' αἶσαν υἱὸν ἴδῃ τυχόντα στεφάνων Πυθίων.
ὁ χάλκεος οὐρανὸς οὔ ποτ' ἀμβατὸς αὐτῷ·
ὅσαις δὲ βροτὸν ἔθνος ἀγλαΐαις ἁπτόμεσθα, περαίνει πρὸς ἔσχατον
πλόον· ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὕροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν.

Pindar appears to be praising domestic prosperity (represented by the father who sees his son follow in his own footsteps) and claiming that this near-term fulfillment is the highest possible human fortune, while any higher prosperity is impossible. The traditional interpretation presumes that "the bronze heaven" and the "assembly of the Hyperboreans" are parallel as objects beyond men's grasp. This view assumes that because the land of the Hyperboreans cannot be reached by ship, it is beyond the ἔσχατον πλόον; it also assumes that "neither by ships nor by foot" is a universalizing doublet which means "in no way." On this interpretation, we are again presented with Pindar as the serene apostle of admonitory quietism.

Against this interpretation can be raised the very serious objection of encomiastic propriety: how can it possibly enhance the praise of the victor to present a myth which is significant only for its remoteness from him? An ode of praise should excite and exalt the victor; being told that the blissful life of the Hyperboreans (described at such great length and in such alluring detail) is inaccessible would only depress him. The recent studies of Köhnken and Péron call for a reevaluation of the traditional

[25] This is the traditional opinion. Cf. Rauchenstein 138f.; Schmidt 54; Bieler 119; Schwenn 44-49; van Groningen 350; Burton 7; Pavese (1975) 237; Crotty (1982) 131f.

[26] See Köhnken 156ff. He is in some respects foreshadowed by Mezger 261, and Illig 91f. Also, cf. Péron 69f.

presuppositions. Movement to heaven is necessarily vertical, whereas movement to the Hyperboreans is horizontal,[27] and thus fundamentally not different from the πλόον of v.29. Indeed, the antithesis may be between heaven and the land of the Hyperboreans (the one inaccessible to mortals, the other visited by the mortal Perseus; the one inhabited by gods, the other inhabited by very prosperous human beings), not between the ἔσχατον πλόον and the Hyperboreans. In fact, the land of the Hyperboreans may be the ἔσχατον πλόον; but paradoxically, this πλόον to the Hyperboreans does not take place by ship, or by foot, or by any other conventional mode of travel. It takes place through election by the gods, and metonymically, through election by the poet.[28] Köhnken is well-advised in comparing the land of the Hyperboreans with the Isle of the Blest in *O.* 2;[29] the point may be precisely that mortals *can* go to the land of the Hyperboreans (the people who live "beyond the North Wind," and thus beyond the travails and stormy vicissitude of the familiar world), if rewarded by the gods, and more especially if (through divine favor) rewarded by the poet. The Muse's presence among the Hyperboreans is prominent (vv.37-39), as is the victory-garland (v.40); the land of the Hyperboreans may be seen as a symbolic projection of the very encomiastic celebration which is being effected by this poem.

But this resolution of the myth does not become fully apparent to us until the end:[30]

ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάσαι
θεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδέν ποτε φαίνεται
ἔμμεν ἄπιστον.

(*P.* 10.48-50)

The gnome not only refers to what immediately precedes (Athena's aid to Perseus in slaying the Gorgon), but, in view of its position at the very end of the myth, is probably to be referred to the entire myth; surely the θαυμάσαι at the end of the third antistrophe must be referred back to the θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν at the end of the second.[31] Since this gnome prepares for the break-off formula and return to praise of the victor which follow, it should also be taken as referring to the victor, and thus serve as a bridge

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[27] See Schwenn 40.
[28] Cf. Illig 91f.; Péron 70; Köhnken 186. Man's role is not totally passive; presumably his election both by god and by poet has something to do with his own θρασείᾳ καρδίᾳ (v.44), as in the case of Perseus.
[29] Köhnken 170f. He also notes the analogy of Bacchylides 3.58-62, where the worthy Croesus is taken to the Hyperboreans by Apollo.
[30] See Illig 91, on the gradual revelation of the myth's significance; he compares *P.* 3 and *P.* 4.
[31] See Schroeder (1922) 92.

between the mythical paradigm and the ode's primary *laudandus*. This paradigmatic relation of myth and reality is reinforced by the explicit reference to the victor of a similar gnome (also employing a genitive absolute) earlier in the poem: γλυκὺ δ' ἀνθρώπων τέλος ἀρχά τε δαίμονος ὀρνύντος αὔξεται (v.10).

The fact that the myth does not unravel itself until the end is notable; our first impression of the myth, based primarily upon the verses which introduce it, might well be closer to the traditional view. The fact that so many critics have "misread" the myth in this way confirms such a contention. I would argue that v.29f. are in fact ambiguous; depending on whether we take the assembly of the Hyperboreans as reachable or unreachable, we can have either the quietist favoring of the near or a much more assertive valorization of the far.[32] As we observed in our analysis of *O*.3, the role of the gods in human affairs is essentially ambivalent; they suppress men (by not allowing them near the bronze heaven), but they also help men accomplish things (as Athena did for Perseus).

Vv.48-50 map the myth's dialectic onto the subjective as well as the objective realm with the emphatic turn to ἐμοὶ δὲ; the poet's consciousness is itself caught up in the process. The break-off formula which follows, as we observed in the conclusion of *O*.3, completes this subjective transumption of the near/far dialectic:

> χώπαν σχάσον, ταχὺ δ' ἄγκυραν ἔρεισον χθονὶ
> πρῴραθε, χοιράδος ἄλκαρ πέτρας.
>
> (*P.* 10.51f.)

The poet exhorts himself to go no further, to drop anchor at this point, and to cut off digression here, lest the poem shipwreck. This appears to be a standard evocation of the *brachus/makros* polarity, avoiding undue length in the myth, and mediating the digression's "distance" from the object with the "nearness" of a return to praise of the victor. This integration of the break-off with the dialectical tension of the myth itself is surely preferable to the traditional view that the poem's break-off represent the young Pindar's sincere embarrassment at the immaturity of technique which forces him to introduce such "irrelevancies."[33]

In the final triad, the poet returns to the praise of the victor:

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[32] But even this valorization of the far is deceptive, proving to be itself a mediation. The Hyperboreans are distant, but not as distant as heaven; they occupy a mediated distance.

[33] See Schmidt 56. Critics have made similar charges against the break-off formula at the poem's opening (cf. Wilamowitz (1922) 124, Burton 2):

> Ὀλβία Λακεδαίμων,
> μάκαιρα Θεσσαλία. πατρὸς δ' ἀμφοτέραις ἐξ ἑνὸς

ἔλπομαι δ' Ἐφυραίων
ὄπ' ἀμφὶ Πηνεϊὸν γλυκεῖαν προχεόντων ἐμὰν
τὸν Ἱπποκλέαν ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον σὺν ἀοιδαῖς
ἕκατι στεφάνων θαητὸν ἐν ἅλιξι θησέμεν ἐν καὶ παλαιτέροις,
νέαισίν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα. καὶ γὰρ
ἑτέροις ἑτέρων ἔρωτες ἔκνιξαν φρένας·
τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὀρούῃ,
τυχὼν κεν ἁρπαλέαν σχέθοι φροντίδα τὰν πὰρ ποδός·
τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀτέκμαρτον προνοῆσαι.

(*P.* 10.55-63)

Again, as in *O.* 3, we observe that the near/far dialectic is expressed specifically in terms of desire, or *erōs*. Pindar's poetic celebration will render Hippocleas even more θαητόν; the connotations of this word distinctly refer to physical beauty,[34] and one can imagine that crowns would enhance the victor's appearance even further. Hippocleas' beauty is valued both among young (ἅλιξι) and old (παλαιτέροις), both among men and women (νεαίσιν παρθένοισι); these three terms almost certainly form a priamel of different erotic relationships, as is suggested by the summary priamel which directly follows. One should perhaps not reject out of hand Schroeder's hypothesis that the boy-victor Hippocleas was the *erōmenos* of Thorax, which would explain the strange situation of the ode's being comissioned by a non-relative.[35]

But the summary priamel encompasses more than just the various *erōtes* of the two preceding lines. It also implies the forms of desire peculiar to the subject and object, poet and athlete—namely the love of poetry and

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ἀριστομάχου γένος Ἡρακλέος βασιλεύει.
τί κομπέω παρὰ καιρόν;

But here again we are clearly dealing with the near/far polarity. The poem opens triumphantly with a geographical panorama of all Greece, embraced by Lacedaemon in the far South and Thessaly in the far North; these two antithetical extremes are unified in that they are πατρὸς ἐξ ἑνός. The distant vista is used as a foil, or focussing perspective which allows us to zoom in on the domestic praise of the victor (the near view). The poem's opening thus prefigures its total structure, in which the distant perspective of the Hyperboreans allows us to focus upon the near-term perspective of the final victor-praise. The παρὰ καιρόν of v.4 does not reflect a genuine feeling that the allusion is inappropriate here (for if so, the allusion would have never been made). Rather, καιρός is what mediates the near and the far, and all other oppositions. Cf. *O.* 8.23-25, *O.* 13.47f., *P.* 8.7, *N.* 1.18, *I.* 2.22; Plato, *Politicus* 284e; Brancato 45-63; Burton 46-48; Detienne (1967) 120; Bundy (1972) 82 n.100. It is only if the poet lingered exclusively on the distant perspective that his utterance would be παρὰ καιρόν.

[34] We should not water it down to merely "splendid" or "wonderful." Derived from θαέομαι, the sense of the word is fundamentally visual. Pindar most often uses θαητός of human beings, to describe physical beauty (cf. *P.* 4.80, *P.* 9.108, *N.* 11.12), or of buildings, to describe architectural beauty (cf. *O.* 6.2, *P.* 7.12). In fact, there is no place in literature of this period in which θαητός is used of a human being to refer to anything but physical beauty.

[35] Schroeder (1922) 91; Coppola 29.

of athletic competition.[36] The lines which immediately follow are generally understood as privileging the near (φρόντιδα τὰν πὰρ ποδός) above the far (τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτόν); a limitative restraint is in fact desirable toward the end of the poem, as we oberved in *O.*3. But all that vv.61-63 really say is that the distant and absent is less easily foreseen than the near and present; the same is true of all future prosperity (cf. vv. 17-21), which does not make future prosperity any less desirable.[37] The near/far opposition resists unilateral valorization even here. The final emphasis on Thorax's "kindly guest-friendship" (v.64) further mediates near and far: as we have observed in *O.*3, the host-relationship opens up the near-term interests of the *oikos* to the foreign and distant guest. Pindar is a guest feasted by Thorax just as Perseus was a guest from afar at the feast of the Hyperboreans (vv.31ff.). We thus see that the myth's application is subjective as well as objective; the θεῶν τελεσάντων who can make anything believable in v.49f. include not only the δαίμονος ὀρνύντος (Apollo) responsible for Hippocleas' victory in v.10, but also the Pierides who assist Pindar's song in v.65.

This integrating movement of the poem's conclusion is carried further by the chariot metaphor (v.65), which identifies the poet himself as an athlete; just as Thorax has fostered the athletic interests of the victor Hippocleas, so he has yoked the Muses' chariot which Pindar guides. The reciprocating "loving one who loves, being kind to one who is kind" (v.66 φιλέων φιλέοντ', ἄγων ἄγοντα προφρόνως) completes the integration of subject and object.[38]

*P.*3 is a text to which scholars defending the quietist view of Pindar have long appealed. Young's detailed study of the poem[39] has traced the polarity of the near and the far as a central preoccupation; but, like much past criticism, his study tends to privilege the near as a favored term. Such a valorization is in fact warranted by the bulk of the poem; only the final stanza cancels it. We have observed already very sophisticated manipulations and reversals of the polarity even in so early a poem as

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[36] Cf. Σ*P.*10.93a, 93b Drachmann, and Farnell II, 219, who compares *O.*9.105.

[37] We have already noted the gnome of v.10: γλυκὺ δ' ἀνθρώπων τέλος ἀρχά τε δαίμονος ὀρνύντος αὔξεται. The ἀρχά/τέλος-antithesis is clearly parallel to the near/far: the future end is throughout predicated as a positive amplification to the present beginning (cf. v.17f. as opposed to v.15f., or v.20f. as opposed to v.19f., or v.25f. as opposed to v.23f.). Each pole of the antithesis carries equal weight.

[38] Such reciprocating formulae are often used by Pindar to identify subject and object; cf. *P.*2.83f. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν·/ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἅτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐών..., *N.*4.22 φίλοισι γὰρ φίλος ἐλθών, *P.*3.107f. σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις/ἔσσομαι. Note also the οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε-formula (*O.*6.99, *O.*7.4) used of the poem as a gift sent from the poet's house to the victor's.

[39] Young (1968) 27-68. This schematization of *P.*3 bears a very close resemblance to the earlier study of Ramnoux 441-445, although her article is nowhere cited by Young.

P. 10. We should accordingly not be misled by the apparent bias of the polarity in *P.* 3, and must always bear in mind the underlying ambivalence which this structural constellation may entail.

It is undeniable that the myth which opens the poem is framed by a wish for the absent (v.3 ζώειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον), and that this wish is ultimately rejected, privileging the near (v.62 τὰν δ' ἔμπρακτον μαχανάν) above the far (v.61 βίον ἀθάνατον). It is equally undeniable that the twin myths which prepare for this valorization employ negative *exempla* of distant desire—in the case of Coronis, literal and sexual, in the case of Asclepius, economic and ultimately metaphysical. Coronis' desire, like that of Ixion in *P.* 2 or Clytemnestra in *P.* 11, is an overreaching lust which sunders the bonds of marriage (the culturally legitimated channel for desire). She rejects the present relationship to Apollo, whose child she carries, in favor of absence (v.20 ἤρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων); she rejects the near (v.22 ἐπιχώρια) for the far (τὰ πόρσω). This rejection is quite literally embodied in the fact that Ischys is a "stranger from Arcadia" (v.25f.), one from abroad.[40] But as we have observed elsewhere in Pindar, the *xenos*-relationship is certainly no vice, and *xenia* is in fact one of the most praiseworthy virtues; so, for that matter, is *erōs*. Coronis' fault is not so much a failure to favor the near as a failure to balance the near and far in her desire: she fails to realize that her relationship to the god Apollo is already quite as "far" as any mortal woman should aspire.

The same can perhaps be said of Asclepius. Certainly his medical *technē* and the progress of civilization which it represents are in themselves good. And even gold by itself is a positive value for Pindar, particularly as a synecdoche for the victor's beneficence. But when pursued too far, gold can become "greed" (v.54 κέρδος); and *technē*, if it seeks directly to overcome the bounds of *physis* (as in Asclepius' attempt to resurrect a man already dead in v.56f.), can itself become a means of reaching too far.[41] Only the gods have a right to shoot from afar, as when Zeus' thunderbolt destroys Asclepius (v.57f.), or when Apollo perceives the lovers' adultery (vv.27-30). Man cannot arrogate unto himself the right to confer immortal life or any other form of unmediated distance.

The limitative restraint of the myth is applied to the subjective activity of the poet in v.61f.,[42] as prepared gnomically by the valorization of τὸ

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[40] See Young (1968) 36. It is generally agreed that making Ischys a foreigner was Pindar's innovation.

[41] On the relation of *physis/technē* to near/far and similar polarities, cf. p.34 *infra* and our discussion of *N.* 3.

[42] The application of v.61f. could equally well be objective; Hieron is just as much to be dissuaded from seeking βίον ἀθάνατον as Pindar. The reference of the φίλα ψυχά is ambiguous.

πὰρ ποδός in v.59f. The poet now doubts the possibility of his initial wish that Cheiron were alive to offer some *pharmakon* for Hieron's sickness. He refuses to appear as an ἀστέρος οὐρανίου τηλαυγέστερον φάος (v.75) from across the sea;[43] he limits his prayers to the nearby goddess παρ' ἐμὸν πρόθυρον (v.78), rather than worrying himself any further with the impossible and absent Cheiron.

But this limitation is not absolute. What Pindar is encouraging here is not so much limitation *per se* as mediation. Men must learn how to balance good and evil (the ἐσλά and πήματα of v.81f.), externalizing the former (v.83) and internalizing the latter in the form of endurance. There follow two positive examples of endurance, offsetting the negative examples of Coronis and Asclepius. Emphasis is placed on the element of marriage in the stories of both Cadmus and Peleus (v. 91f.). Marriage is symbolic of synthesis and mediation; this is expressed in the very name of Cadmus' wife Harmonia. Marriage also affirms culture and convention, in contrast to Coronis' libidinal self-indulgence unchecked by regard for the constraints of propriety and custom. Marriage in both cases mediates man and god: i.e., it witnesses divine immanence in human affairs, whether symbolized by the Muses on Pelion (v.90f.) or the Olympians at the respective wedding feasts (vv.93-95). Peleus himself weds a goddess (v.92); Cadmus' daughter is chosen by a god (v.98f.). Again, this contrasts with Coronis' failure to mediate the polarity by duly preserving her relationship (at least metaphorically a *gamos*—cf. v.13) to Apollo.

But it is not until the final stanza of the poem that the mediating movement is fully actualized and that the unilateral valorization of presence is completely overturned (*P.*3.107-115):

> σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις
> ἔσσομαι. τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασὶν
> δαίμον' ἀσκήσω κατ' ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν.
> εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἁβρὸν ὀρέξαι,
> ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.
> Νέστορα καὶ Λύκιον Σαρπαδόν', ἀνθρώπων φάτις,
> ἐξ ἐπέων κελαδεννῶν, τέκτονες οἷα σοφοὶ
> ἅρμοσαν, γινώσκομεν· ἁ δ' ἀρετὰ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς
> χρονία τελέθει· παύροις δὲ πράξασθ' εὐμαρές.

Pindar will be σμικρός (i.e., *brachus* and near-minded) when necessary, but he will also be μέγας (i.e., *makros* and far-minded) when appropriate. It is his sense of *kairos* which mediates this oscillating tension. He will not exceed his lot (τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ'...δαίμον'), but at the same time he will

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[43] The word τηλαυγής elsewhere bears very positive connotations for Pindar, both subjectively (*O.*6.4) and objectively (*P.*2.6, *N.*3.64).

fulfill it to the fullest extent of his abilities (κἀτ' ἐμὰν μαχανάν). But in the event that his lot is augmented by wealth,[44] Pindar will not hesitate to grasp the grandiose and distant, as expressed by ἐλπίδ' and πρόσω (words repeated from v.22f., where they connote unattainability and absence):[45] "towering fame" is the one distant modality open to mortals. Of course, the subjective application of the first person in these statements is a foil for objective application to the situation of Hieron,[46] who actually is situated ἐν μεγάλοις, who does possess wealth, and who has been elevated to κλέος ὑψηλόν by ἐπέων κελαδεννῶν and κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς—most specifically, those of the present poem. Thus Pindar's own role as one of the τέκτονες σοφοί who can provide immortality through the word is superior to that of a medical τέκτονα (v.6) such as Asclepius, whose attempt to produce physical immortality simply resulted in his own death. Only through song can distance be gained legitimately: i.e., only in this way can κλέος become truly ὑψηλόν and virtue truly "long-lived." This vaunt justifies the efficacy and completeness of the poem which has preceded, and thus allows it to terminate with a final admonition (παύροις δὲ πράξασθ') which both modifies the vaunt and consummates the ultimate unification of subject and object.[47]

We also find the near/far polarity in Pindar's non-epinician genres, although it may be crystallized in a simpler way. *Paean* 4 is exemplary. Since the primary "function" of the ode is to praise Ceos for its devotion and piety toward Delian Apollo, rather than to praise the individual excellence and energy of an athlete, it is not surprising that the ode favors the domestic virtues (of men who recognize their inferiority to the gods) above any form of metaphysical transcendance which might seem to equate man with god.

The ode's myth furnishes two examples of men who preferred private life on Ceos to empire overseas—i.e., who preferred near and *oikeion* interests to the distant and *allotrion*. The seer Melampus refuses "to be a monarch (μοναρχεῖν) over Argos" (v.29); this example is capped by a gnome favoring "the city at home...and kinsmen" (v.32f. τὸ δ' οἴκοθεν ἄστυ...καὶ συγγένει') above "things far away" (v.35 ἑκὰς ἐόντων). This gnome is followed by the more extended example of Euxantius, who refuses "to rule (αὐταρχεῖν) over the Cretans who desired him" (v.36f.),

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[44] The mere fact that this sentence is phrased as a condition implies distance and absence. But this condition is possible, as opposed to the unreal and impossible wish for Cheiron's return to life.

[45] See Young (1968) 61.

[46] On the first person indefinite in Pindar, see pp.145-148 *infra*.

[47] The παύροις is ambiguous, referring either to victors or poets (cf. Wilamowitz (1922) 284). Subject and object are together placed into a privileged aristocracy of merit.

thus favoring the "native" (v.46 ἐπιχώριον) above the "great lot elsewhere" (v.48 μέγαν ἄλλοθι κλᾶρον); his rejection of the tyrant's lot is due to his fear that it might excite the sort of divine jealousy which destroyed the rest of his family. Desire for the foreign and distant is seen as desire for turmoil and trouble, πενθέων and στασίων (v.53); Euxantius will prefer his ὀλίγον θάμνου (v.52). The reasoning is analogous to that of Pindar's rejection of wealth and tyranny in *P.* 11.52f.

The mythic action is thus parallel to the preference voiced by the chorus earlier in the poem: they will not exchange the ἐλαχύνωτον στέρνον χθονός (v.14), *brachus* though it may be, for distant Babylon and all its riches.[48] Yet even in this poem, the valorization of the near is not altogether unilateral.

> ἦτοι καὶ ἐγὼ σ[κόπ]ελον ναίων διαγινώσκομαι μὲν ἀρεταῖς ἀέθλων
> Ἑλλανίσιν, γινώσκ[ο]μα[ι] δὲ καὶ μοῖσαν παρέχων ἅλις·
> [ε]ἰ καί τι Διω[νύσ]ου ἄρο[υρ]α φέρει
> βιόδωρον ἀμαχανίας ἄκος,
> ἄνιππός εἰμι καὶ βουνομίας ἀδαέστερος·
>
> (*Paean* 4.21-27)

Even while remaining in the domain of the near (σκόπελον ναίων) the Ceans are conspicuous to all Greece (διαγινώσκομαι) and thus reach afar through fame of their deeds. Their fame is possible only as a synthesis of nature ("virtues in the Greek contests") and art ("fostering the Muse in abundance"). Even if they do not possess or desire the lot of grandiose empire, being "without horses" and "unfamiliar with cattle-raising," the Ceans do offer Dionysus' fruit of inspiration and the *technē* necessary for its cultivation. This *technē* will provide a greater warrant against ills than even the greatest empire; just as the prophet Melampus prefers his *technē* of divination (v.30) to the Argive empire, so the *technē* of poetry extends Ceos further than any empire on earth.

2. *Brachus/Makros*

One of the most common verbal crystallizations of the near/far polarity in Pindar is the antithesis βραχύς/μακρός.[49] Its frequency and ambivalence, on both subjective and objective levels, make it notable. Its own special set of connotations is such as to call for independent consideration.

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[48] Although this part of the papyrus is lacunose, clearly some sort of negation is to be supplied before ἀμείψομαι. See the reconstruction of Sitzler 700.

[49] This polarity has been noted, but not treated extensively, by Bernardini (1967) 841. Also, cf. Pavese (1968) 398-402.

It may be convenient to begin our discussion with the four passages in Pindar where the terms *brachus* and *makros* are brought into explicit confrontation.

ἐμοὶ δὲ μακρὸν πάσας ⟨ἀν⟩αγήσασθ' ἀρετάς·
Φυλακίδᾳ γὰρ ἦλθον, ὦ Μοῖσα, ταμίας
Πυθέᾳ τε κώμων Εὐθυμένει τε· τὸν Ἀργείων τρόπον
εἰρήσεταί που κἀν βραχίστοις.

(*I.*6.56-59)

Here, the antithesis constitutes a typical subjective limitation, such as we have observed already in *O.*3.45 and *P.*10.51-54. The passage in question serves as a break-off formula, putting a close to the mythological "digression" on the Aeacids which has preceded, and instead focussing our attention upon the victor-praise to which the poet now returns. Not to close the myth here (i.e., to continue narrating the virtues of the Aeacids) would result in a digression (and a poem) which is excessively *makron.* Praise of the victor is best made κἀν βραχίστοις, so as to be most poignant, striking, and effective;[50] the prolixity of excessive praise could result in loss of point, tedium, and even *phthonos.*[51] Furthermore, the programmatic announcement that a statement will be *brachus* amplifies it by paralepsis: the audience will assume that the "briefness" of the praise has been effected only through the omission of numerous details, and that there are many other praiseworthy qualities or accomplishments which the *laudator* could have mentioned, but for the sake of brevity did not.

We accordingly see a positive valuation of the *brachus* (which says less than it could, and thus implies that the object may actually be greater than as praised), and a corresponding negative valuation of the *makros* (which says more than it should, and thus implies that the object may actually be less than as praised). This relation parallels the traditional valorization of the near above the far, which we have observed. We see this ratio modified somewhat in *P.*4, a poem for which the concepts of "long" and "short" must possess special significance:

μακρά μοι νεῖσθαι κατ' ἀμαξιτόν· ὥρα γὰρ συνάπτει· καί τινα
οἶμον ἴσαμι βραχύν·

(*P.*4.247f.)

Pindar can hardly pretend to have avoided length altogether, having just spent over 200 lines on the Argonaut-myth (a quite unprecedented

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[50] Compare *I.*1.63, which justifies the song's βραχὺ μέτρον (v.62) by claiming ἦ μὰν πολλάκι καὶ τὸ σεσωπαμένον εὐθυμίαν μείζω φέρει. On Pindaric formulae of praeterition, see Pavese (1968) 411.

[51] See Gundert 68-76; Bundy (1962) II, 73-76; Bundy (1972) 88-91; Bernardini (1967) 86f. For the specific association of the *makron* and κόρος, cf. *P.*8.30-32.

digression). Nevertheless, he knows a shortcut, which will allow him to summarize the remainder of the myth in less than 15 lines. Accordingly, the antithesis here does not feature a simple valorization of the short above the long, but is more complex: the myth up to this juncture has undeniably been long, but after a certain point it becomes appropriate to take another road and shift back into a sketchier mode of narrative discourse. Pindar is not just apologizing for the length of his utterance, but is also saying something about his manner of utterance. We therefore see that the *brachus* and the *makros* are not simply terms of quantification, but are moreover descriptive of modality: we might translate them not only as "short" and "long," but more precisely as "short-winded" and "long-winded." Surely, if the myth were continued with the explicit fullness of detail featured in the first 200 lines, the result would be a poem which is monstrously long (overextended) and fat (overly replete), like the dragon described just before this break-off formula (v.245 "who in width and length exceeds a fifty-oared ship"). But at the same time, a certain amount of length and breadth is necessary in order to deal with so grand and heroic a theme.

The opposition is mapped onto the objective plane by *P.* 4.286, which recommends the secondary *laudandus* Damophilus:

...οὐδὲ μακύνων τέλος οὐδέν. ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς πρὸς ἀνθρώπων βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχει.

The *makros* is negatively valued as μακύνων, "making long" or "delaying" beyond what is *kairos*. This does not, however, positively value the *brachus*; the thought that *kairos* is of short duration is a pessimistic reflection. In fact, *kairos* is precisely what mediates the *makros* and *brachus*: although itself of "short" duration for men, it is the moment of ripeness which requires "long" anticipation, as the exiled Damophilus himself has experienced. The same is also true for the *laudandus* Arcesilas and the *laudator* Pindar, to whom this statement has at least secondary reference, Not only is the *kairos* ripe for Damophilus' appeal to Arcesilas, but it is also ripe for Arcesilas' repatriation of Damophilus and resultant healing of past wounds.[52] And by analogy with v.247f., which we have analyzed above, the evocation of the *brachus/makros* polarity must also have some reference to the *kairos* of Pindar's concluding appeal to the king.

The final passage to be considered is *I.* 7.43f.:

τὰ μακρὰ δ' εἴ τις
παπταίνει, βραχὺς ἐξικέσθαι χαλκόπεδον θεῶν ἕδραν·

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[52] This secondary application of the gnome is to be inferred from v.270f., where Arcesilas is called an ἰατὴρ ἐπικαιρότατος.

The gnome here appears to be general and objective in function: it is illustrated by the Bellerophon-myth which follows. Nevertheless, the statement must have a subjective dimension as well, since the immediately preceding verses (vv.37-42) refer to the first-person, albeit a generalized first-person which is clearly paradigmatic for the *laudandus*.[53] The overall argument, both of what precedes and what follows, is that of limitation to the present and avoidance of over-reaching desire for the absent, such as would excite "the envy of the immortals" (v.39). But the μακρὰ are not necessarily stigmatized (it is surely not Pindar's intention to rule out all pursuit of achievement); and the βραχύς, connoting here inadequacy and inability, is not valued positively. This passage, like all other instantiations of the near/far polarity, is unquestionably dialectical in its implications: as in the apt analogue of *P.* 10.27, the assertion that heaven cannot be scaled not only implies mortal limitations, but also human potential (to do everything short of that). Man may desire and even obtain the *makra*, but in comparison with the gods he is inevitably *brachus*; by a sort of Heraclitean ratio, man embodies within himself both extremes of the polarity.

The opposition of *brachus* and *makros* is so much a part of Pindar's thought that he could not employ either term without implying the other, and thus evoking the antithesis. We find *brachus* and *makros* used by themselves in both objective and subjective contexts, with both positive and negative overtones. A brief examination of the semantic range of these terms in Pindar should therefore illuminate their dialectical nature, and moreover, the dialectical structure of the polarity.

On the subjective level, we are accustomed to regard brevity as a virtue: this valuation is borne out by the positive connotations of *brachus* which we have observed in *I.* 6.59 and *P.* 4.248, and may in addition be inferred from *P.* 1.82 ("twining together in brief (ἐν βραχεῖ) the threads of many themes").[54] But the *brachus* may also be devalued as a loss of opportunity (cf. *I.* 1.62 "but our song's short measure (βραχὺ μέτρον) takes away the opportunity to say all") or a statement of inadequacy (cf. *N.* 10.19 "my mouth is too short (βραχύ) to say all"). The fact that

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[53] On the generalized first person here, see Young (1971) 30, who notes that a scholium to this passage (Σ*I.* 7.55b Drachmann) even goes so far as to state that these lines are spoken in the persona of the victor himself. See our discussion of this trope on pp. 145-148 *infra*.

[54] The only contemporary use of *brachus* in subjective contexts is found in Aeschylus (*Pe.* 713, *PV* 505), where it possesses the same association with brevity. *Brachus* and *makros* come to be commonplace as programmatic rhetorical terms in Attic prose. On the polarity, cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 276B, *Protagoras* 335B, *Politicus* 283C-286C; Aristotle, *Rhet.* III, 1416b33-36.

"short" utterance may be necessary does not mean that "long" utterance is without its value.

Although the *makros* often has negative overtones, as can be observed in break-off formulae like *O.* 13.41, *P.* 8.30, *P.* 9.77, *N.* 4.33, and *N.* 10.46,[55] it can also encompass positive resonances, sometimes even in the same passage: to claim that a story is too "long" to tell actually magnifies the theme and its heroic grandeur.[56] As we concluded from our study of the near/far dialectic, distance (and "length") may also constitute a positive poetic quality: it is only by moving some distance from his object that the poet can gain sufficient perspective to highlight its qualities paradigmatically. Hence, one can understand the distinctly positive overtones accorded to the *makros* in Pindar's athletic metaphors for poetry, as in the broadjump of *N.* 5.19 ("someone should dig for me here long props (μακρά...ἅλμαθ') beneath my feet") or the spear-casts of *P.* 1.45 ("throwing at length (μακρά)"), and *I.* 2.35 ("whirling it, I should shoot at length (μακρά) the javelin").[57]

As we might expect, a similar ambivalence can be discerned in objective contexts. We have already observed the obviously negative overtones of *I.* 7.44, where *brachus* denotes inadequacy and insufficiency; this devaluation may be compared with *I.* 4.53, where Heracles' deficiency in external appearance (μορφὰν βραχύς, literally "short of stature") is contrasted with his internal strength of spirit. We have also observed *brachus* associated with briefness and transience in *P.* 4.286; similar is the implication of *O.* 10.93, where the "brief (βραχύ) delight" of the athlete who has died without song is contrasted with the abiding fame of the victor Hagesidamus, who is celebrated by Pindar's verse. But this temporal dimension of the *brachus* can have its positive aspects as well, in relation to

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[55] One may also compare Semonides fr.10 and Bacchylides 10.51f. (τί μακρὰν γλῶσσαν ἰθύσας ἐλαύνω ἐκτὸς ὁδοῦ;).

[56] That is, the same μακρά can be subjectively negative (as relates to Pindar's telling of the deeds) while objectively positive (as relates to the deeds themselves). For instance, the assertion of μακρὰ μὲν τὰ Περσέος ἀμφὶ Μεδοίσας Γοργόνος (*N.* 10.4) is a positive description of the grandeur of Perseus' deeds and the resulting glory for Argos, but when rejected, along with the other themes sketched in the poem's first 18 lines, by βραχύ μοι στόμα πάντ' ἀναγήσασθ' (*N.* 10.19), the "length" is rendered a subjectively negative factor (this is too lengthy a theme to talk about).

[57] All three passages build up to praise, of the victor in *P.* 1 and *I.* 2, of the Aeacids in *N.* 5; the "length" refers to the poet's surpassing of all opposition, just as the *laudandi* have done through their respective athletic feats. But the distance valorized in these passages is not unmediated: *P.* 1.44f. makes it quite clear that accuracy is just as much a concern as distance, since the spear-cast must stay within the lateral boundaries on each side of the field. This is evident also from the other uses of the spear-cast as a metaphor for poetry (cf. *O.* 13.93-95, *N.* 9.55); for the importance of accuracy to the analogous bow-metaphor, see Simpson 449ff. Maximum "length" is a desirable objective only so long as the dart of praise does not veer athwart the sidelines of *kairos*.

the swiftness and ease of accomplishment; compare *P.*9.68 ("swift is the accomplishment and brief (βραχεῖαι) the roads of gods hastening on their course").

In objective contexts, *makros* generally possesses the temporal sense of "long-enduring," and is hence positive when referring to positive virtues such as wealth or fame (cf. *P.*2.26 μακρὸν ὄλβον; *P.*11.52 μακροτέρῳ ὄλβῳ), negative when referring to negative conditions such as toil (cf. *P.*8.73 σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ). But even when referring to positive qualities, the *makros*, like any other form of unmediated distance, can imply excess and the overriding of due limitations; so we can see the *makros* as a violation of *kairos* in *I.*4.13 ("and no further is it fitting to be eager for more far-reaching (μακροτέραν) prowess"), immediately following the limitative allusion to the pillars of Heracles in v.12.

The conclusion of this examination must therefore be that the individual concepts *brachus* and *makros* mingle positive and negative connotations both in subjective and objective contexts, and accordingly that the opposition of the *brachus* and *makros* does not *a priori* privilege one pole above the other, but leaves the two in a delicate semantic balance. Plato makes the polarity the object of a rather extensive discussion in the *Politicus* (283C-286C):

> First let us examine all excess (ὑπερβολὴν) and shortfall (ἔλλειψιν), so that we may appropriately praise and blame in such discussions things said longer than fitting (μακρότερα τοῦ δέοντος) and the opposite... I declare that we ought to remember what was just now pronounced about praising and blaming shortness (βραχύτητος) and length (μήκους) in what we say. We should not judge lengths in comparison with each other, but according to the part of measurement (τῆς μετρητικῆς) which we then said it was necessary to remember—namely, according to the fitting (τὸ πρέπον).

The *brachus* will always bring to the opposition the positive qualities of brevity, economy, and speed, but also the negative implications of insufficiency and shortfall (= ἔλλειψις); similarly, the *makros* will always bring to the opposition the positive qualities of magnitude, grandeur, and enduring fame, while also entailing the dangers of long-windedness, prolixity, overreaching, and extravagance (= ὑπερβολή). *Brachus* and *makros* cannot be valorized absolutely, or even in comparison, but must be praised and blamed according to what is fitting (= τὸ πρέπον). The *kairos* of Pindar's poetic act, like the athlete's judgment in the fray of the contest, consists in the appropriate mediation of these extremes such as to produce a result which avoids the demerits of each pole, while embodying the virtues.[58]

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[58] On *kairos* as the mediation of antithetical extremes, see n. 33 *supra*.

3. *Oikeion/Allotrion*

Also closely related to the near/far polarity is that of the οἰκεῖον and the ἀλλότριον—what is properly one's own and what is foreign.[59] But as in the case of near/far, the valorization of the first term is not absolute; it is Pindar's technique to transform traditional polarities into much more complex dialectics. As we observed in our examination of *O.*3.44 and parallel passages, the οἶκος or "home" also represents a narrow domestic limitation which must in at least some sense be transcended. And correspondingly, the ἀλλότριον is not only that which properly belongs to someone else, but can be anything which pertains to someone else, or is in any sense "other" from the subject. Closely linked with this polarity is the common antithesis of fellow-citizen (ἀστός, ἐπιχώριος, πολίτης) and foreigner (ξένος).[60] But for Pindar, whose poetry reflects the first stirrings of a pan-hellenic consciousness in the fifth-century, even this traditional opposition loses its one-sidedness: foreigners (of whom Pindar himself was usually one) are by no means devaluated in comparison with "one's own" fellow-citizens. And as Crotty has argued in his elegant study of the "returning athlete,"[61] there is a sense in which even the athletic victor is no longer part of the community whence he came, but through his transcendent achievement comes to occupy a liminal position as neither ἀστός nor ξένος.

In later rhetoric, the οἰκεῖα come to be constrasted not only with things foreign, but also with τὰ πολιτικά:[62] the polarity is revealed as a variant of that between "private" (*idion*) and "public" (*koinon*).[63] While one might

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[59] This positive valuation of the first term is the typical force of the opposition as it is used in later literature and gnomology. Cf. Thucydides 1.70.6, 1.78, 3.13.4, 3.65.3, 3.74.2, 4.98.3, 6.69.3; Plato, *Euthyphro* 4B, *Leges* 666C, *Protagoras* 320B, *Republic* 376B, 463B, 470B, *Sophistes* 266C, *Theages* 126B; Andocides 4.15; Isocrates, *Areopagiticus* 24, *Plataicus* 51; Aeschines 2.77; Demosthenes 9.73. It is also the clear implication of passages such as Bacchylides 1.165-174 (which contrasts ζώειν τ' ἀπ' οἰκείων ἔχειν with ἱμείρει μεγάλων). For a less positive valuation of *oikeion*, cf. Hesiod, *Th.*599. The notion of "other people's possessions" (ἀλλότρια κτήματα) as illicit objects of desire is almost a stock formula in earlier literature (cf. Hesiod, *Op.*34, 315; Theognis 1149); neither *oikeion* nor *allotrion* could be used without at least an implied antithesis.

[60] Cf. *O.*2.6, *O.*7.90, *O.*13.2f., *P.*3.71, *P.*4.78, 118, *P.*5.56f., *P.*9.107f., *I.*1.51, *I.*2.37-40, *I.*4.7f., *I.*6.69f. On the traditional background of this opposition, see Benveniste I, 341f.

[61] Crotty (1982) 120.

[62] Cf. Thucydides 2.40.2; Plato, *Apology* 23B. Although we do not find the *oikeion/politikon* as a specific verbal formulation in earlier texts, it is clearly the concept behind such passages as Theognis 45f. (juxtaposing οἰκείων κερδέων and the δῆμος) and Archilochus fr.93a.7 (οἰκείῳ δὲ κέρδει ξύν' ἐποίησαν κακά), both of which accord the *oikeion* a strongly negative valuation (= "selfishness") opposed to the interests of society as a whole.

[63] We find the ἴδιον and ξύνον as early as Heraclitus (fr. 2, 89 DK), as well as in Pindar himself (*O.*13.49). For the relation of *oikeion/allotrion* to *idion/koinon*, cf. Plato, *Rep.* VII, 535B; Aristotle, *Rhet.* II, 1396b10.

say that τὰ οἰκεῖα possess in general a higher ethical status than τὰ ἀλλότρια, it is clear that they possess an inferior ethical status to that of τὰ πολιτικά (and the ἀλλότρια, insofar as they are πολιτικά). It is this potentially ambivalent status of the term οἰκεῖον in Greek tradition (and the corresponding ambivalent reference of the term ἀλλότριον) which frames the dialectical character of the opposition's employment in Pindar. The *oikeion* can be either something to be content with or something to be transcended, while the *allotrion* can be either something to restain oneself from or something which is a worthy pursuit; the opposition as a whole can thus imply either limitation or expansion. The athletic achievement, as well as the poetic achievement, necessarily entails the interplay of both tendencies.

We can associate with Pindar's use of the *oikeion/allotrion* antithesis an array of other relations. We have already observed that the *oikeion* can be linked with the near, the *allotrion* with the far; we can by analogy also say that the *oikeion* is to be associated with the *brachus*, the *allotrion* with the *makros*.[64] More generally, all the first terms can be subsumed under the contemporary Pythagorean notion of *peras* (limitation), all the second terms under the notion of *apeirōn* (indefinite transcendence of limitation).[65] We have already observed the countervailing connection of the *oikeion* with the *idion*, and the *allotrion* with the *koinon* (= *politikon*). One also finds germinating in Pindar an association of *physis* (that which natively belongs to someone) with the *oikeion*,[66] *technē* (that which is acquired from another by learning) with the *allotrion*; we can equally well identify *physis* with *ergon*, *technē* with *logos*.[67] Finally, to use another Pythagorean antinomy, all the first elements are essentially static (entailing limitation to an abiding present state) and all the second elements dynamic (transcending that present state into new frontiers).

It may be best to initiate our discussion with one of the passages where the *oikeion/allotrion* antithesis is most explicit:

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[64] For the relation of these three oppositions, cf. Gundert 65f., and Aristotle, *Rhet.* II, 1396b10, *EN* VIII, 1162a3.

[65] *Peras/apeirōn* was the first of the ten central oppositions popularized by the Pythagoreans (cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* I, 986a22-27), the others being odd/even, one/many, right/left, male/female, rest/motion, straight/crooked, light/dark, good/bad, square/oblong. Note that all of the first terms are positively valorized. On the critical role of *peras/apeirōn* in linking Pythagorean ethical and mathematical doctrine, cf. Heidel 386-399; on its importance in contemporary Greek literature, see the works of Levin and Bergren (1975), and with particular reference to Pindar, see Hubbard (1980) 91-102.

[66] The identification of the *oikeion* as what is "natural" (= κατὰ φύσιν) is commonplace in scientific terminology. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* VII, 246b10, *De Caelo* I, 276a12, *Meteorologica* IV, 379b19.

[67] We shall further discuss the dialectics of these oppositions in Chapter Three.

θυμέ, τίνα ἀλλοδαπὰν
ἄκραν ἐμὸν πλόον παραμείβεις;
Αἰακῷ σε φαμὶ γένει τε Μοῖσαν φέρειν.
ἕπεται δὲ λόγῳ δίκας ἄωτος, "ἐσλὸν αἰνεῖν",
οὐδ' ἀλλοτρίων ἔρωτες ἀνδρὶ φέρειν κρέσσονες·
οἴκοθεν μάτευε. ποτίφορον δὲ κόσμον ἔλαχες
γλυκύ τι γαρυέμεν.

(*N.*3.26-32)

Even the scholiasts perceived that the juxtaposition of ἀλλοτρίων and οἴκοθεν is clearly evocative of the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity;[68] this relation is reinforeced by the preceding ἀλλοδαπάν. Although the context is primarily subjective,[69] it has been recognized that the gnome and exhortation of v.30f. bear an objective application as well.[70] Hence it may be profitable to explore more deeply the implications of these lines for *N.*3 as a whole.

*N.*3 is not a widely studied text; past interpretation leaves one with the impression that the poem is trite and conventional, and thus not worthy of much attention. Critics have generally located the poem's *Grundgedanke* either at v.40 (privileging inborn talent above learning) or at v.75 (commanding that we keep to what is at hand).[71] On the former hypothesis, critics have read the ode as a polemic against literary opponents;[72] on the latter hypothesis, they have assumed that Pindar's intention was to dissuade Aristocleides from further athletic efforts, either because he was too old[73] or because he was not a very good athlete.[74] Leaving aside the questionable nature of such historical rationalizations, it can be objected that none of these explanations makes any serious attempt to deal with *both* v.40 and v.75, let alone articulate their relation.

A valid interpretation of *N.*3 must attempt to account for the entire text, and the entire range of associations evoked by every element in the text. No interpretation can fulfill this goal completely, but we can aim to approximate it. Critics have rightly regarded v.40 and v.75 as important; our analysis of the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity (surfacing in v.30f.) and its associations permits us to see that the implicit oppositions of v.40 (*physis/technē*) and v.75 (near/far) may participate in the same logical net-

[68] Cf. Σ*N.*3.45b, 51, 54a Drachmann.

[69] We find an analogous subjective use of *oikeion* and *allotrion* in Attic oratory (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* III, 1414a13, 1415a7; Isocrates, *Evagoras* 77, *Philip* 113; Demosthenes 3.23, 13.21), referring to relevant and less relevant paradigms.

[70] This application is made evident by v.75. Cf. Schmidt 467; Bury (1890) 51; Gianotti (1975b) 31f., 47.

[71] For the first view, see Mezger 391, and Bury (1890) 39. For the latter view, see Schmidt 464ff., and Erbse (1969) 289.

[72] Cf. Σ*N.*3.143 Drachmann, and Fraccaroli 543.

[73] See Dissen (1821) II:2, 378.

[74] See Schmidt 468.

work. Taking these three related oppositions as our starting point, and progressively assimilating to them other thematic and logical elements in the text, we may arrive at a deeper understanding of the underlying logical structuration of *N.*3. The results are presented in tabular form in Figure 2.

The *oikeion/allotrion* is in fact crystallized from the very first line of the poem:

Ὦ πότνια Μοῖσα, μᾶτερ ἁμετέρα, λίσσομαι,
τὰν πολυξέναν ἐν ἱερομηνίᾳ Νεμεάδι
ἵκεο Δωρίδα νᾶσον Αἴγιναν· ὕδατι γὰρ
μένοντ' ἐπ' Ἀσωπίῳ μελιγαρύων τέκτονες
κώμων νεανίαι, σέθεν ὄπα μαιόμενοι.
διψῇ δὲ πρᾶγος ἄλλο μὲν ἄλλου,
ἀεθλονικία δὲ μάλιστ' ἀοιδὰν φιλεῖ,
στεφάνων ἀρετᾶν τε δεξιωτάταν ὀπαδόν·

τᾶς ἀφθονίαν ὄπαζε μήτιος ἁμᾶς ἄπο·
ἄρχε δ', οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι θύγατερ,
δόκιμον ὕμνον· ἐγὼ δὲ κείνων τέ νιν ὀάροις
λύρᾳ τε κοινάσομαι. χαρίεντα δ' ἕξει πόνον
χώρας ἄγαλμα, Μυρμιδόνες ἵνα πρότεροι
ᾤκησαν, ὧν παλαίφατον εἶραν
οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας τεὰν
ἐμίανε κατ' αἶσαν ἐν περισθενεῖ μαλαχθεὶς

παγκρατίου στόλῳ· καματωδέων δὲ πλαγᾶν
ἄκος ὑγιηρὸν ἐν βαθυπεδίῳ Νεμέᾳ τὸ καλλίνικον φέρει.

(*N.*3.1-18)

The relationship of the Muse to the poet is characterized as a genetic tie ("our mother"), and therefore *oikeion*; the Muse's genetic character is reinforced by her identification as daughter to Zeus (v.10). On the other hand, the island of Aegina (who is also an eponymous nymph, daughter to Asopus in v.4, and thus parallel to the Muse in rank as another female divinity) is characterized as πολυξέναν, i.e., willing to accommodate the *allotrion*. We therefore see the first two lines of the ode bringing into juxtaposition the kinship-code and the host/guest-code,[75] which are perhaps the two most prominent social codes in the historical development of Greek aristocratic values; the movement from the former code to the latter represents the development from a narrow clan-mentality to a broader political consciousness which accommodates elements from outside the clan (or οἶκος). The kinship-code is basically determined by nature (although it comes to be influenced by culture), whereas the

[75] For a more detailed evaluation of the host/guest-code and its significance as an incorporation of the *allotrion*, see our discussion of *N.*1 on pp.52-55 *infra*.

host/guest-code is purely an innovation of culture. But a host is also like a mother, in providing nurture; in fact, the host is a surrogate (i.e., culturally substituted) mother. The antithetical terms are similar even while different.

As we have observed above, the *oikeion* is in a sense limited and incomplete, whereas the *allotrion* is unlimited and offers fulfillment to the desire engendered by the incompleteness of the *oikeion*. The following series of homologies in the text expresses this relationship. The victory-chorus is at rest and in a state of unfilfilled desire (μένοντ'); this desire can be satisfied only by the inspiration of an external (*allotrion*) element, here represented by the Muse. The waiting chorus is externally static, whereas the Muse is in a state of external motion (ἵκεο); but on the other hand, the chorus experiences internal motion in their desire (μαιόμενοι), while the Muse embodies internal rest in her capacity as a fulfillment.

This fundamental relationship of incompleteness and desire is figured in v.6 by the image of thirst (διψῇ).[76] *Physis* ("athletic victory") thirsts after *technē* ("song"), just as the victory-chorus (the material element of the performance) thirsts after the Muse (the formal element of the song).[77] The same relationship is expressed by the "virtues" (= *physis*) and the "crowns" (= *technē*)[78] which celebrate them, balanced on the subjective level by the "voices" of the victory-chorus (= *physis*) and the "lyre" of the musician (= *technē*). The poet's *technē* is synthetic: it makes *koinon* (κοινάσομαι) what without it would be merely *idion*.[79]

The physical achievement of victory is by itself a πόνον,[80] but transformed by the *technē* of the hymn it will become an ἄγαλμα.[81] The

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[76] This thirst is ultimately fulfilled only once the poem has come to an end (with the πόμ' ἀοίδιμον in v.79); for parallels to the draught-poetry equation elsewhere in the Pindaric corpus, see Dissen (1821) II:2, 378, and in general, cf. Schadewaldt 277 n.1, and Bundy (1962) I, 10-12. It is foregrounded by the water-imagery present in v.3f., where Aegina is an island surrounded by water and the victory-chorus waits beside the water of the Asopus; for the general water-poetry association, see Finley 52f.

[77] The connection between the Muse and ἀοιδάν is reinforced by the ὄπα (v.5)—ὀπαδόν (v.8)—ὄπαζε (v.9) play encompassing them.

[78] The στέφανος is a product of weaving (cf. *O*.2.74, *N*.7.77, *N*.9.53, *I*.8.67) and therefore of *technē*.

[79] I take ὀάροις and λύρᾳ as instrumental datives, and translate the verb as "communicate" (one of the most common meanings of κοινάω in both the active and middle, especially in poetry). The frequent translation of κοινάσομαι here as "entrust" is totally unsupported by the word's use elsewhere in Greek.

[80] Commentators usually interpret this πόνον as that of song, but it can equally well be that of the athletic victory, if we take the ὕμνος as subject of ἕξει; in this case, the χαρίεντα is a prolepsis rather than an oxymoron. What we are dealing with here is probably a typical subject/object-ambiguity, on which see Chapter Four. On *ponos* in general, see Bundy (1954) 47f.

[81] ἄγαλμα can also mean "statue," "monument," or any "representation" (cf. *N*.5.1, *N*.10.67, fr.195, and Kerenyi 170f.), and hence is an appropriate term to describe a product of poetic *technē*.

pain of brute nature (χαματοδέων πλαγᾶν) can be assuaged only by the medical *technē* (ἄκος ὑγιηρόν) brought by the "victory-song."[82] With the mention of the ancestors in v.13 ("the ancient Myrmidons"), the *physis/technē* polarity is translated onto another level: in fact it is translated back into the genetic terms with which the poem began. And the athletic contest, which has represented nature in the above antitheses, now comes to represent a form of culture. The ancestors settled and dwelt in Aegina (ᾤκησαν), i.e., they set up an *oikos* there, and defined a sphere of the *oikeion*. Aristocleides transcended this sphere by competing in the athletic contests, but he did not negate it (οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν...ἐμίανε), since the *oikeion* and *allotrion* do not set up an absolute contradiction, but are subject to dialectical mediation. The *allotrion* simply represents an expansion of the *oikeion*. The victor's dynamic *technē* (v.19 ἔρδων τ' ἐοικότα μορφᾷ) logically follows upon his static *physis* (v.19 ἐὼν καλός).

> εἰ δ' ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ' ἐοικότα μορφᾷ
> ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα παῖς 'Αριστοφάνεος, οὐκέτι πρόσω
> ἀβάταν ἅλα κιόνων ὕπερ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές,
> ἥρως θεὸς ἅς ἔθηκε ναυτιλίας ἐσχάτας
> μάρτυρας κλυτάς· δάμασε δὲ θῆρας ἐν πελάγεϊ
> ὑπερόχους, ἰδίᾳ τ' ἐρεύνασε τεναγέων
> ῥοάς, ὁπᾷ πόμπιμον κατέβαινε νόστου τέλος,
> καὶ γᾶν φράδασσε.
>
> (*N.*3.19-26)

Up to this point in the poem, the terms of distance and *technē* have all been privileged over those of proximity and *physis*: they are fulfillments, projections, or expansions of fundamentally incomplete elements in the realm of the *oikeion*. But this metaphysical valuation is reversed with v.19 and the ensuing Heracles-digression. The rhetorical order is reversed also: up to v.19, the terms of distance generally capped those of proximity whereas after v.19 the contrary is more often the case.

The Heracles-myth figures the establishment of absolute limitations and a resultant return to the origin. The pillars of Heracles are introduced here as objective limitations upon the victor's excellence[83]—his projection into the heretofore unlimited realm of the *allotrion*. The victor's entrance into the contest and the world of lofty attainment (ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα) is balanced by Heracles' return (πόμπιμον κατέβαινε νόστου τέλος); everything which moves ἐπί must eventually move κατά. In fact, Heracles' own movement parallels that of the victor—projection in-

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[82] Cf. *N.*4.1-8, and the general contrast between song and medicine which we have discussed above in *P.*3.

[83] They play the same role in *O.*3.44f., *N.*4.69, *I.*4.12f.

to the uncharted and unknown, followed by the erection of limits and the *nostos* back to his *oikos*.[84]

At the same time, underlying Heracles' *nostos* is the progression from body (δάμασε θῆρας implies physical strength) to *nous* (ἐρεύνασε; φράδασσε).[85] Heracles' intellectual side makes him equally a paradigm for the poet; the progression from body to mind thus lays the way for the transition from object to subject. The myth's limitative bias not only checks the victor, but foregrounds Pindar's application to himself of the principles of limitation and return with the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity which we have seen in vv.26-31. The poet limits the expansive urge toward digression on an external theme, and instead returns to the objective program (v.29 ἐσλὸν αἰνεῖν); although actual praise of the victor is again deferred, it is this time deferred in favor of the victor's *oikos*, represented by the Aeacids.

Yet the fact that we have still not returned to the victor himself, but have embarked upon another "digression" (albeit one that is more *oikeion*), indicates that the interplay between *oikeion* and *allotrion* is still alive, and has not yet been resolved. In fact, the Peleus and Telamon myths again show us the structure of projection and pursuit which dominated the first triad up to v.19:

> παλαιαῖσι δ' ἀρεταῖς
> γέγαθε Πηλεὺς ἄναξ, ὑπέραλλον αἰχμὰν ταμών·
> ὃς χίαολκὸν εἷλε μόνος ἄνευ στρατιᾶς,
> καὶ ποντίαν Θέτιν κατέμαρψεν
> ἐγκονητί. Λαομέδοντα δ' εὐρυσθενὴς
> Τελαμὼν Ἰόλᾳ παραστάτας ἐὼν ἔπερσεν·
> καί ποτε χαλκότοξον Ἀμαζόνων μετ' ἀλκὰν
> ἕπετό οἱ, οὐδέ νίν ποτε φόβος ἀνδροδάμας ἔπαυσεν ἀκμὰν φρενῶν.
>
> (*N.*3.32-39)

Like Aristocleides (vv.14-16), Peleus possessed the "ancient virtues" of his forebears (his inheritance of *physis*), but sought to add to them by creating an implement (a reflection of culture and *technē*) which exceeded everything before it—his ὑπέραλλον spear. By exertion, he moved his state of isolation and incompleteness (μόνος) into union with Thetis. The Telamon-myth both parallels and contrasts with that of Peleus. Both heroes undertake quests for the distant. But whereas Peleus is a lonely

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[84] This ambivalent movement may reflect the general ambivalence of the ancient attitude toward sailing, which is seen both as a mark of civilizing progress and as a hybristic violation of nature; see Heydenreich 13-55.

[85] On the etymological connection of *noos* and *nostos* (both from the root **nes*-), and the status of this connection as a deep structure embedded in Indo-European mythical consciousness, see Frame *passim*.

and at first unsocialized figure who sacks Iolcus μόνος, Telamon sacks Troy in the company of others; his myth may be meant to represent a higher stage of social organization. Whereas Peleus' struggle results in union with a woman (Thetis), Telamon's struggle results in conflict with women (the Amazons) which is not resolved into a union. Peleus' marriage represents the initiation into civilization of a previously unacculturated hero, whereas Telamon's confrontation with the Amazons reveals an already socialized hero whose civilization is threatened by reactionary forces inimical to marriage (and therefore culture). Just as Peleus' union with Thetis looks forward to the Achilles-myth, Telamon's companionship with Iolaus looks back to the Heracles-myth.[86] As we shall see, Achilles (like Peleus) undergoes a progression from nature to culture in his own career; Heracles (like Telamon), on the other hand, was presented in v.23f. as a culture-hero who defends civilization against the primeval forces of nature inimical to it (the "monstrous beasts"; cf. *N.*1.62-66).

> συγγενεῖ δέ τις εὐδοξίᾳ μέγα βρίθει.
> ὃς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει, ψεφεννὸς ἀνὴρ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα πνέων οὔ ποτ' ἀτρεκεῖ
> κατέβα ποδί, μυριᾶν δ' ἀρετᾶν ἀτελεῖ νόῳ γεύεται.
>
> (*N.*3.40-42)

Just as a gnomic interlude in vv. 19-21 reversed the positive valuations of the preceding verses, so a second gnomic interlude in vv. 40-42 (the same metrical position in the second triad) does the same, only in slightly different terms: whereas vv. 19-21 play upon the near/far polarity, vv.40-42 invoke the *physis/technē* opposition. But as we have observed throughout our exegesis, these polarities are part of the same fabric; both gnomic interludes check the cultural and metaphysical expansiveness of what precedes by affirming the limitations imposed by nature. Here we see *oikeion*-near-*physis* (συγγενεῖ) identified with abiding substantiality (μέγα βρίθει) and positive reputation (εὐδοξίᾳ), while *allotrion*-far-*technē* (διδάκτ') is associated with insubstantial fluidity (ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα πνέων) and obscurity (ψεφεννός). The man of natural talent is described by one short line in very simple and straightforward terms; but the man of learning is described with a consciously confused array of images, and is presented as a figure of futile multiplicity (μυριᾶν δ' ἀρετᾶν ἀτελεῖ νόῳ γεύεται). Two

[86] Pindar does wish to allude to Heracles here, and thus place Telamon in the company of several heroes, but he makes the allusion only *sotto voce* (by mentioning his constant companion Iolaus, who is almost a metonymy for Heracles himself); to bring in Heracles by name would be awkward just after having promised not to talk about him any further. There is no need for the usual explanation that Heracles would overshadow everyone else's accomplishments (cf. Erbse (1969) 279); if this were a genuine fear, Pindar would have omitted the Heracles-myth altogether.

verbal parallels specifically connect this passage with the pillars of Heracles sequence:[87] whereas Heracles κατέβαινε (v.25), the man of learning never securely κατέβα (v.42), and while Heracles attained the τέλος (v.25) of his return, this man is by nature without *telos* (v.42 ἀτελεῖ νόῳ). As we observed, Heracles combines both *sōma* and *nous*, whereas this man is sure neither in body (ποδί) nor mind (νόῳ): the man of mere learning is qualified neither as athlete or poet, object or subject.[88]

We shall have occasion to consider more fully the dialectics of *physis* and *technē* in Chapter Three; for the present, we can only reemphasize that it is mistaken to overprivilege gnomic passages such as these and to assume that they can embody the unqualified *Grundgedanke* of a poem. Gnomes offer partial and often one-sided interpretations of reality which must be qualified by other gnomes and the broader antithetical tensions set up by the text as a whole. We saw above that the Peleus- and Telamon-myths return to the pursuit of the distant which had just been checked by the preceding gnomic passage, Heracles-myth, and poet's self-rebuke; similarly, the Achilles-myth introduces certain qualifications to the gnomes of vv.40-42. All gnomes in Pindar are at best provisional, and therefore subject to self-criticism and "erasure" by the text.

ξανθὸς δ' Ἀχιλεὺς τὰ μὲν μένων Φιλύρας ἐν δόμοις,
παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε μεγάλα ἔργα· χερσὶ θαμινὰ
βραχυσίδαρον ἄκοντα πάλλων ἴσα τ' ἀνέμοις,
μάχᾳ λεόντεσσιν ἀγροτέροις ἔπρασσεν φόνον,
κάπρους τ' ἔναιρε· σώματα δὲ παρὰ Κρονίδαν
Κένταυρον ἀσθμαίνοντα κόμιζεν,
ἑξέτης τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλον δ' ἔπειτ' ἂν χρόνον·
τὸν ἐθάμβεον Ἄρτεμίς τε καὶ θρασεῖ' Ἀθάνα,

κτείνοντ' ἐλάφους ἄνευ κυνῶν δολίων θ' ἑρκέων·
ποσσὶ γὰρ κράτεσκε. λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο προτέρων
ἔπος ἔχω· βαθυμῆτα Χίρων τράφε λιθίνῳ
Ἰάσον' ἔνδον τέγει, καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκλαπιόν,
τὸν φαρμάκων δίδαξε μαλακόχειρα νόμον·
νύμφευσε δ' αὖτις ἀγλαόκολπον
Νηρέος θύγατρα, γόνον τέ οἱ φέρτατον
ἀτίταλλεν <ἐν> ἁρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων·

ὄφρα θαλασσίαις ἀνέμων ῥιπαῖσι πεμφθεὶς
ὑπὸ Τροΐαν δορίκτυπον ἀλαλὰν Λυκίων τε προσμένοι καὶ Φρυγῶν
Δαρδάνων τε, καὶ ἐγχεσφόροις ἐπιμείξαις

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[87] These have been noted by Bury (1890) 54.

[88] The phrase κατέβα ποδί probably refers to entering the broadjump (see Kayser 70), and may be another of Pindar's familiar athletic metaphors for poetry. We are surely dealing here with an additional subject/object-ambiguity. Cf. Bundy (1962) I, 15.

Αἰθιόπεσσι χεῖρας, ἐν φρασὶ πάξαιθ', ὅπως σφίσι μὴ κοίρανος ὀπίσω
πάλιν οἴκαδ' ἀνεψιὸς ζαμενὴς Ἑλένοιο Μέμνων μόλοι.

(*N.* 3.43-63)

The myth starts out by appearing to reinforce the *physis*-doctrine of vv.40-42: the boy Achilles rejects the devices of *technē* in his hunting ("without dogs or treacherous snares"), preferring instead to assert a purely physical superiority in fleetness (v.52) and battle (v.46). His competence with respect to the feet ("for he surpassed them with his own feet") is clearly in contrast with the unsure foot (οὔ ποτ' ἀτρεκεῖ ποδί) of the learned man. His βραχυσίδαρον javelin represents limitation in comparison with his father's ὑπέραλλον spear (which sought to exceed all precedent).

But Achilles must grow up. With his coming of age, he must be acculturated, and move beyond the childlike innocence of pure *physis*. The figure of Cheiron is central in this context: half-man, half-beast, the centaur represents the perfect mediation of nature and culture in his role as Achilles' tutor. Immortal and yet mortal, he is a fitting sponsor for the marriage of the goddess Thetis and mortal Peleus (v.56f.); the child born of this marriage incorporates a mixture equal to Cheiron's own. Cheiron's primordial wisdom is the civilizing principle without which natural talent is raw and unformed. As such, Cheiron evokes the figures both of the athletic trainer and of the poet;[89] what is more, since this trainer is like his trainee, he synthesizes the roles of subject and object. The figure of Cheiron suggests to us that vv.40-42 were not a devaluation of art and learning simply, but criticized specifically art and learning without a basis in nature: great accomplishments must be founded on the proper mediation of *physis* and *didaxis*.[90]

Cheiron reasserts the necessity of art despite the primacy of nature. He is also the foster-parent who rears as his own (the *oikeion*) other men's sons (the *allotrion*).[91] This role is defined by the twin examples of his former pupils Jason and Asclepius.[92] Like the twin figures of Peleus and

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[89] Just as the poet's mother (the Muse) was presented as such in the first line of the poem, so is Cheiron's mother (Philyra) presented in the first line of the Achilles-myth (= first line of the third triad). Indeed, the name Φιλύρα itself could be construed to mean "loving the lyre" (cf. Finley 86). The figure of the mother, both in the case of Pindar and Cheiron, emphasizes the natural, genetic basis out of which their art must emerge, and which art must take as its starting point (hence the presence of the mother in the first line). On the general parallel of Cheiron's *mētis* and the poet's, see Gianotti (1975b) 55f.

[90] For this general conclusion about the Achilles-myth, cf. Schadewaldt 287 n.2.

[91] For the terms *oikeion* and *allotrion* in reference to genuine and adopted children, cf. *N.* 1.53f. and our discussion on p.51 *infra*.

[92] Commentators have disagreed about the reading and even reference of the phrase λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο προτέρων ἔπος ἔχω (v.52f.), but what has not been debated is the

Telamon, both represent quest and pursuit of the distant: Jason sought the Golden Fleece, while Asclepius sought to make men immortal. Cheiron provides nurture (τράφε) to Jason's nature, as he later does for Achilles (γόνον φέρτατον ἀτίταλλεν); similarly, Asclepius' art is the positive result of his learning from Cheiron (δίδαξε). The *technē* of medicine is properly *malthakos* (μαλακόχειρα νόμον), inasmuch as it assuages the pain derived from *ponos*. As we saw above in v.17f., the *technē* of song serves an analogous medicinal role.[93] Whereas *malthakos* was a negative term before (v.16f. μαλαχθεὶς ἐν παγκρατίου στόλῳ), when referring to the athletic contest (which is properly *trachus*), it now becomes a positive term in the context of relief from pain: we can perhaps say that *physis* is properly *trachus*, *technē* properly *malthakos*.

With the paradigms of Jason and Asclepius as immediate background, and those of Peleus and Telamon as more remote background, Achilles now becomes a questing hero as well: he sets off in order to sack Troy (as Peleus sacked Iolcus, and as Telamon sacked Troy before). Achilles' static and restricted domain as a child, described in the first verse of the strophe ("remaining at the home of Philyra"), must give way to his movement on the restless and boundless sea, described in the first verse of the epode ("being sent by the blasts of the sea-winds"): the *oikeion* is supplanted by the *allotrion*.[94] His hunting (killing animals) gives way to war-making (killing men):[95] his solitary childhood play in the midst of nature gives way to the complex social interaction of war. We see the

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reference of the προτέρων, even though it is the central point of the line; commentators universally refer προτέρων to "previous poets," and the scholiasts (cf. Σ*N*.3.92 Drachmann) even suggest a couple of names. This reference would map onto the subjective plane the theme of *didaxis* emphasized in the present myth. But προτέρων could also be an objective genitive which refers to Jason and Asclepius ("I have this story told of men previous to Achilles"). We are no doubt dealing with another case of intentional subject/object-ambiguity, paralleling the learning which is necessary to the poet's own work with the learning of his *laudandi* Jason and Asclepius (and Achilles).

[93] See Gianotti (1975b) 56.

[94] This breaking out of domestic confines has already been foregrounded in the childhood-idyll. Commentators have disagreed about the antithetical complement of μέν in v.43. I would argue that it must be the δέ of v.47. The contrast is between rest at Philyra's cave (when he shoots the animals) and the movement which is necessary to retrieve their bodies. Rest is correlated with Philyra and feminity (μέν), movement with Cheiron and masculinity (δέ). The responding δέ cannot be that of v.49 as Mezger 388 and Bury (1890) 54 contend, since ὅλον δ' ἔπειτ' ἂν χρόνον is clearly antithetical to the immediately preceding ἑξέτης τὸ πρῶτον. Nor can it be that of v.52; this antithesis would be pointless. Dissen (1821) II:2, 372f., Fennell (1883) 26, and Farnell II, 258f., contend that the antithesis is with the grown-up Achilles in v.59ff.; to this it must be objected that there is no δέ in v.59, and that there are no less than four δέ's between v.43 and v.59 which would confuse so extended an antithesis. It is easiest to take the μέν as responding to the first δέ which follows it.

[95] On hunting as the intermediate stage in masculine development between the feminine-populated *domos* of childhood and fully adult warfare, see Detienne (1979) 24f.

same progression recapitulated even within the description of Achilles at Troy: first he uses his χεῖρας, which is reminiscent of his childhood reliance upon *physis* (v.44 χερσί), but he then uses his φρασί, indicating a more advanced, intellectualized mode of warfare which combines *physis* with *technē*. What Achilles decides in his φρασί is that Memnon, after becoming involved in the *allotrion*, should never return to the *oikeion* (οἴκαδ'); this decision equally reflects on the fact that Achilles himself never will. It is significant that all three myth-sequences in the poem end with reference to the φρένες; this is especially clear in the Heracles- and Peleus/Telamon-myths, where it is the very last word of each myth (v.26 φράδασσε; v.39 φρενῶν). The myths all move from body (genetic *physis*) to intellect,[96] and thus prepare us for the gnomes which conclude them by referring to the poet's activity (vv.26-32, 40-42, 64-67); this preparation tends to synthesize the poet with his mythical *laudandi* (who are paradigmatic for the actual *laudandus*), and therefore promotes the dual reference of the gnomes to both subject and object.

τηλαυγὲς ἄραρε φέγγος Αἰακιδᾶν αὐτόθεν·
Ζεῦ, τεὸν γὰρ αἷμα, σέο δ' ἀγών, τὸν ὕμνος ἔβαλεν
ὀπὶ νέων ἐπιχώριον χάρμα κελαδέων.
βοὰ δὲ νικαφόρῳ σὺν Ἀριστοκλείδᾳ πρέπει,
ὃς τάνδε νᾶσον εὐκλέϊ προσέθηκε λόγῳ
καὶ σεμνὸν ἀγλααῖσι μερίμναις
Πυθίου Θεάριον. ἐν δὲ πείρᾳ τέλος
διαφαίνεται ὧν τις ἐξοχώτερος γένηται,

ἐν παισὶ νέοισι παῖς, ἐν ἀνδράσιν ἀνήρ, τρίτον
ἐν παλαιτέροισι, μέρος ἕκαστον οἷον ἔχομεν
βρότεον ἔθνος· ἐλᾷ δὲ καὶ τέσσαρας ἀρετὰς
ὁ θνατὸς αἰών, φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκείμενον.
τῶν οὐκ ἄπεστι· χαῖρε, φίλος· ἐγὼ τόδε τοι
πέμπω μεμειγμένον μέλι λευκῷ
σὺν γάλακτι, κιρναμένα δ' ἔερσ' ἀμφέπει,
πόμ' ἀοίδιμον Αἰολῇσιν ἐν πνοαῖσιν αὐλῶν,

(*N.* 3.64-79)

V.64 summarizes the myths of the two preceding triads with the image of the τηλαυγὲς φέγγος of the Aeacids: this far-shining glory is not the product of limitation to the *oikeion*, but is the result of adventure into the *allotrion* and attainment of the distant. Their luminescence is clearly meant as a contrast to the ψεφεννὸς ἀνήρ of v.41, who is dark and obscure both in the sense of not perceiving light (subjective application) and in the

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[96] Accordingly, the myths all recapitulate the nature-to-culture movement which we observed in the first two lines of the poem.

sense of not producing light (objective application).[97] The φεφεννὸς ἀνήρ is surely of the same class as the daws of v.82: he lacks the vision and scope for transcendence, but keeps to the near, and is thus conspicuous to no one (objective) and at the same time able to see no one (subjective).

The ensuing fourth triad returns to the themes and relations of the first triad.[98] Genetic *physis* (αἷμα) thirsts for wider manifestation in the cultural arena (ἀγών); success in the ἀγών thirsts for even broader celebration by the *technē* of the ὕμνος.[99] The activity of the object ("victory-bearing Aristocleides") calls for the activity of the subject (βοά). This series of desiderative relationships culminates in the return of the thirst-imagery in vv. 76-79, where the poem is called a "draught of song."[100] The glorification extends to the public realm as well. Vv.68-70 restate in a boldly positive form the circumspect litotes of vv.14-17: the victor's achievement and the resultant song expand the island with εὐκλέϊ λόγῳ, the Thearion with ἀγλααῖσι μερίμναις. The movement overall is that of expansion and projection: the victor has transcended the domestic position available to him in the Thearion at Aegina, specifically through his ambition (μερίμνα involves care, anxiety, desire for what is beyond—the word embodies on the emotional level the projective movement which we have seen developed throughout the poem). This sequence is summed up by the gnome of v.70f.: in whatever domain one is born excellent, one's natural excellence achieves fulfillment only through dynamic manifestation ("the accomplishment (τέλος) is revealed in the attempt").

But the very existence of a τέλος implies that there is some sort of limit, just as the pillars of Heracles were associated with his νόστου τέλος (v.25). Hence, the expansive movement is again checked by a gnome—"mortal

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[97] For the ambiguity, see Farnell II, 258. It is not clear whether Farnell considers it intentional.

[98] On ring-composition in this poem, see Fraccaroli 547, and Gianotti (1975b) 31. The triadic division of this poem is very clear-cut: the corresponding first and fourth triads are programmatic, while the second and third triads are both mythical. In the second triad, the Heracles-myth is an abbreviated foil for the twin Peleus-and Telamon-myths, while in the third triad the twin Jason- and Asclepius-myths are abbreviated foils for the Achilles-myth.

[99] Whereas the ὕμνος was still problematic in the deliberative opening of the poem, with the formal element of the Muse and the material element of the victory-chorus not yet united, the two have by now formed a satisfactory synthesis: whereas before the νεανίαι awaited the Muse's ὄπα (v.5), the two terms are now brought together (v.66 ὀπὶ νέων).

[100] The πόμα continues the synthesizing movement in evidence here at the poem's conclusion: it is μεμείγμενον (v.77) and χιρναμένα (v.78). As a scholiast acutely notes (Σ*N*.3.134a Drachmann), the honey and milk of which the draught is synthesized are allegorical for the poem's status as sweetness after toil (cf. *N*.4.1-8 and our discussion on p.76 *infra*): honey is produced by bees after much labor, milk by females after the labor of childbirth. On the general significance of μείγνυμι and the concept of "mixture" in Pindar, particularly as relevant to his own poetic act, see Hoey 236-243.

life...bids us to heed what lies near." But on the basis of what we have seen in our preceding discussion, we can surely avoid turning this passage into the *Grundgedanke* which so many generation of Pindaric criticism have wanted to see in it; it is simply part of the oscillating dialectical tension between the relations of projection and return which have structured the text throughout.

> ὀψέ περ. ἔστι δ' αἰετὸς ὠκὺς ἐν ποτανοῖς,
> ὃς ἔλαβεν αἶψα, τηλόθε μεταμαιόμενος, δαφοινὸν ἄγραν ποσίν·
> κραγέται δὲ κολοιοὶ ταπεινὰ νέμονται.
> τίν γε μέν, εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελοίσας, ἀεθλοφόρου λήματος ἕνεκεν
> Νεμέας 'Επιδαυρόθεν τ' ἄπο καὶ Μεγάρων δέδορκεν φάος.

(*N*.3.80-84)

The poem is presented as if it were late: the enjambment of ὀψέ περ into the epode maps this lateness onto the syntactical and metrical levels. The significance and implications of the early/late polarity are something that we shall discuss later in this chapter; for the present, let it suffice to say that we need not interpret the poem's belatedness literally (as the commentators since antiquity almost universally do), but that it may be part of the same antithetical network we have observed heretofore, inasmuch as the late represents the distant perspective, the timely the *oikeion*. The belatedness may refer primarily to the rendering of praise to the victor (not the poem as a whole): the praise is "late" in that it comes only after much digression. As such, the apology for belatedness is of the same fabric as the self-rebuke for digression in vv.26-31.[101]

The eagle/daws antithesis with which the poem concludes counters any negative implications associated with belatedness by turning it into a virtue. It is only from a distance (τηλόθε μεταμαιόμενος) that the eagle can gain sufficient perspective both to espy and pounce upon his prey. Analogously, it is only through moving away from his theme (by paradigmatic digression) that the poet can in the end render the most effective and universal praise to his object; the *oikeion* is illuminated only by comparison with something *allotrion*. The daws who keep close to the ground ("cultivate the lower reaches/the base") represent mediocre poets who lack the vision to transcend and enrich the theme at hand. As in the similar antithesis of the eagle and the crows at *O*.2.86-88, the mediocre birds represent those who have merely learned (like the ψεφεννὸς ἀνήρ of v.41), whereas the eagle combines *physis* and *technē*. We thus see the eagle as a figure of synthesis: his grand swoop integrates the late and the timely, the far and the near, the *allotrion* and the *oikeion*, art and

[101] The same general line of argumentation with regard to ὀψέ περ has been advanced by Ruck 153-158.

nature, mind and body, movement and return to rest. The eagle at once asserts the vitality of the distant, projected terms and the necessity of ultimate return to the proximate, limited terms: as such the eagle leads to a mediation of the poem's polarities without privileging any one side of the antithetical network.[102]

Moreover, the eagle mediates the final polarity—that of subject and object—insofar as the image is applicable to both.[103] The final two words of the poem (δέδορκεν φάος) clearly recall the first words of the triad, referring to the Aeacids (v.64 τηλαυγὲς ἄραρε φέγγος); the effect is to identify the achievement and glory of the victor with that of the mythical *laudandi* who are in a sense his ancestors, and who, inasmuch as their common light is one that shines from afar, are analogous to the far-swooping eagle. The victor, like the poet, wins glory only by transcending the *oikos*, but at the same time, this transcendent and far-flung glory is meaningful only in that it redounds to the *oikos*.

In the final analysis, the *oikeion* and *allotrion* can be seen as paradigms for the existence of subject and object(s), self and other. The relationship of self and other was never a matter of selfless altruism for the Greeks, nor of selfish egoism, but always embodied a self-interested extroversion. The *oikeion* "I" is dependent upon having an *allotrion* "thou." The victor as "I" can win glory only by appealing to the poet as "thou" ("by the grace of fair-throned Clio") and the reading-listening public as other "thou*s*."[104] Correspondingly, the poet as "I"' can write a poem, and win glory for himself, only by appealing to the victor as "thou" (V.83 τίν).

This relation is also clear in the other ode in which the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity surfaces—the *First Nemean*. *N.* 1 is a much more widely discussed text than *N.*3, but criticism has come to no consensus on the interpretation either of the ode as a whole or of the numerous cruces within it. Analysis of the text's underlying structural network may illuminate these problems:

τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον πιέζει πάνθ' ὁμῶς·
εὐθὺς δ' ἀπήμων κραδία
κᾶδος ἀμφ' ἀλλότριον.

(*N.*1.53f.)

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[102] This mediation is foreshadowed by the progression of v.72ff. The idea of proportionality (= *kairos*) leads to a homologous framing of young and old, rather than the antithetical construct which the text has reflected before (as in v.14 and v.32). For the same young/old proportion at the end of the poem, cf. *P.*4.281f. We may also compare *P.*3.107 for the similar use of a proportional sequence to overcome antithetical stalemate.

[103] On the ambiguous reference of the eagle-metaphors in Pindar, cf. pp. 149-152 *infra*.

[104] Cf. *P.*1.34 for the relationship of victor and audience in terms of the *oikeion/allotrion* antithesis. Also, cf. Plato, *Rep.* X, 606B.

Fig. 2. The antithetical structure of *Nemean* 3.

oikeion ----------extension, projection--------→ *allotrion*

	I	II	III	IV
	near----------------→far		*physis*----------------→*technē*	
	presence	absence	merit	reward
	peras	*apeirōn*	*ergon*	*logos*
	brachus	*makros*	body	mind
	idion	*koinon*	nature	culture
	rest	movement		
Even Columns Favored			1 μᾶτερ ἀμετέρα	2 πολυξέναν
	chorus (4 μένοντ')	Muse (3 ἵκεο)		
	thirst (6 διψῇ)	draught (79 πόμ' ἀοίδιμον)	victory (7 ἀεθλονικία)	celebration (7 ἀοιδάν)
			8 ἀρετᾶν	8 στεφάνων
	11 δόκιμον ὕμνον	12 κοινάσομαι	11 ὀάροις	12 λύρᾳ
			12 πόνον--------ὕμνος--------→	13 ἄγαλμα
	14 ᾤκησαν	15 οὐχ...ἐμίανε		
			13 Μυρμιδόνες πρότεροι	17 παγκρατίου στόλῳ
			17 πλαγᾶν	18 ἄχος
			17 χαματωδέων	18 ὑγιηρόν
			18 ἐὼν καλός	19 ἔρδων τ' ἐοικότα μορφᾷ

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	I	II	III	IV
Odd Columns Favored	25 κατέβαινε	20 ἐπέβα		
			23 δάμασε θῆρας	24 ἐρεύνασε, 26 φράδασσε
	31 οἴκοθεν	26 ἀλλοδαπάν, 30 ἀλλοτρίων		
	28 Αἰακῷ γένει τε	21 Ἡρακλέος		
	29 ἐσλὸν αἰνεῖν	digression		
Even Columns Favored	31 παλαιαῖσι δ' ἐν γέγαθε	33 ὑπέραλλον	32 ἀρεταῖς	33 αἰχμὰν ταμών
	34 Πηλεὺς μόνος	35 Θέτιν		
	37 Τελαμών	38 χαλκότοξον Ἀμαζόνων		
Odd Columns Favored	40 μέγα βρίθει	41 ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα πνέων	40 συγγενεῖ τις εὐδοξίᾳ	41 διδάκτ'... ψεφεννὸς ἀνήρ
	25 κατέβαινε	42 οὔ ποτ'...κατέβα		
	25 τέλος	42 ἀτελεῖ		
	45 βραχυσίδαρον ἄκοντα	33 ὑπέραλλον αἰχμάν		
			46 μάχᾳ	51 κυνῶν δολίων θ' ἐρκέων
			52 ποσσὶ γὰρ κράτεσκε	41 οὔ ποτ' ἀτρεχεῖ κατέβα ποδί

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	I	II	III	IV
Even Columns Favored	43 τὰ μὲν μένων	47 σώματα δὲ...κόμιζεν		
			15 μαλαχθεὶς ἐν παγκρατίου στόλῳ	55 μαλακόχειρα νόμον
			57 γόνον φέρτατον	53 τράφε, 55 δίδαξε 58 ἀτίταλλεν
	43 μένων ἐν δόμοις	59 πεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τροίαν		
			62 χεῖρας	63 φρασί
	41 φεφεννὸς ἀνήρ	64 τηλαυγὲς φέγγος		
			65 αἷμα	65 ἀγών
			65 ἀγών	65 ὕμνος
			67 νικαφόρῳ Ἀριστοκλείδᾳ	67 βοά
			68 νᾶσον	68 εὐκλέι λόγῳ
			70 Θεάριον	69 ἀγλααῖσι μερίμναις
	71 ὧν τις ἐξοχώτερος γένηται	70 ἐν πείρᾳ τέλος		
Odd Columns Favored	75 τὸ παρκείμενον	76 ἄπεστι		
	early	late (80 ὀψέ περ)		
Even Columns Favored	81 μεταμαιόμενος	81 δαφοινὸν ἄγραν		
	81 ταπεινὰ νέμονται	81 τηλόθε	82 κραγέται κολοιοί	80 αἰετὸς ὠκύς

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This gnome is situated in the midst of the Heracles-myth, at the moment of Amphitryon's discovery that the infant Heracles has throttled the twin serpents. Commentators have no difficulty applying the first part of the gnome to Amphitryon's feelings at the moment (v.53 ὀξείαις ἀνίαισι τυπείς), but they usually write off the second part as complementary padding with no relevance to the context.[105] Much to be preferred is a recent critic's interpretation,[106] which identifies the οἰκεῖον as the relation to Iphicles (Amphitryon's own son), the ἀλλότριον as the relation to Heracles (the son of another). This interpretation fits in well both with the immediate context,[107] and with the general ambiguity which we have observed in the polarity before. On the conventional gnomological level, we can readily accept the favoring of the *oikeion* term. But when we see that the *allotrion* is Heracles and the *oikeion* the lesser Iphicles, this favoring strikes us as misconceived: it is in fact the *allotrion* son who is responsible for the preservation of the *oikeion* son. Our resulting impression of Amphitryon is that of a foolish, confused mortal, who did not recognize the short-sightedness of his own selfish favoritism.[108] Only the seer Teiresias can comprehend the profundity of the events taking place and perceive the importance of the hero Heracles, whose life will benefit mankind (the interests of the *koinon*) rather his own, narrow domestic interests (the *idion*).

Once we have established the ambivalence of v.53f., we can turn to a reevaluation of the other point in the text where the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity explicitly figures—the vexed second strophe and antistrophe:

ἔσταν δ' ἐπ' αὐλείαις θύραις
ἀνδρὸς φιλοξείνου καλὰ μελπόμενος,
ἔνθα μοι ἁρμόδιον
δεῖπνον κεκόσμηται, θαμὰ δ' ἀλλοδαπῶν
οὐκ ἀπείρατοι δόμοι
ἐντί· λέλογχε δὲ μεμφομένοις ἐσλοὺς ὕδωρ καπνῷ φέρειν

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[105] See Wilamowitz (1922) 256 n.3. For full bibliography on the question, see Radt (1966) 172f.

[106] Rosenmeyer 241 n.35.

[107] Amphitryon is the subject both before and after the gnome. But whereas vv.51-53 (leading up to the οἰκεῖον member) are full of paternal sollicitude and apprehension, vv.55-59 (following the ἀλλότριον member) focus the attention on Heracles, and reflect relief. The implication is that Heracles is a κᾶδος ἀλλότριον for Amphitryon, and this, at least in part, is why his heart is now "without pain." We should remember that κᾶδος does not refer to any affliction, but specifically to sorrows associated with a family-relation (cf. *P.*4.112, *O.*7.5).

[108] Rosenmeyer 242, is well taken in emphasizing the humor and gaiety of the scene here, which afforded Theocritus the inspiration, in tone as well as in content, for *Idyll* 24. We should not make the mistake of regarding Pindar as monolithically humorless; see Jurenka 91-98, Rome 524-532.

ἀντίον. τέχναι δ' ἑτέρων ἕτεραι· χρὴ δ' ἐν εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς στείχοντα μάρνασθαι φυᾷ.

πράσσει γὰρ ἔργῳ σθένος,
βουλαῖσι δὲ φρήν, ἐσσόμενον προϊδεῖν
συγγενὲς οἷς ἕπεται.
Ἁγησιδάμου παῖ, σέο δ' ἀμφὶ τρόπῳ
τῶν τε καὶ τῶν χρήσιες.
οὐκ ἔραμαι πολὺν ἐν μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν,
ἀλλ' ἐόντων εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι φίλοις ἐξαρκέων. κοιναὶ γὰρ ἔρχοντ' ἐλπίδες
πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν.

(*N.* 1.19-33)

The tautometric responsion of ἔσταν (v.19) with ἔστα (v.55) has been noted before;[109] but the relationship between Pindar in v.19 and Amphitryon in v.55 is not one of similarity (in that they both value the *oikeion*),[110] but of contrast. Amphitryon stands at the threshold in a state of befuddlement (for he has confused values by his overneat categorization of *oikeion* and *allotrion*), whereas Pindar stands at the door in a state of supreme self-assurance (since he knows the true relation of *oikeion* and *allotrion*). "There is a fitting feast laid out for me, as the rooms within are not unfamiliar with strangers." It is incredible that so many scholars have thought that these lines could form part of a criticism of Chromius for entertaining foreigners (instead of his own countryman).[111] Aside from the obvious Bundyist objection that odes of praise do not criticize the person whom they are supposed to be praising, one must object that Pindar himself could hardly avoid being one of the ἀλλοδαπῶν, since he was not a Syracusan or even a Sicilian; the feast readied for Pindar (whether it is literal or figurative) is inevitably an example of the entertainment of foreigners, and it is thus inherently unlikely that Pindar would be criticizing Chromius for hosting him. This interpretation derives from a fundamental misunderstanding of the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity.

In fact, Pindar is praising Chromius for his outstanding implementation of the *xenos*-relationship, illustrated by the present feast; even the commissioning of the present victory-ode is a result of Chromius' generosity to *allodapoi*. The fact that Chromius' *oikos* is open to and willing to accommodate the *allotrion* is reciprocated by the fact that his guests

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[109] It was first noted by Mezger 110. This responsion is particularly emphatic in that it involves the first word of the triad.

[110] For this view, see Bury (1890) 5.

[111] This view was fully articulated by Wilamowitz (1922) 255, but perhaps originates with Dissen (1821) II:2, 354. It has most recently been defended by Radt (1966) 163f.

(including Pindar himself) are equally good men who will transcend their own private (*oikeion*) interests to defend their host against any hypothetical reproach.[112] Accordingly, the syntactical emphasis in v.24f. must be put upon the "good men" (who are the object of Chromius' hospitality in the preceding sentence, and are the primary concern of the following sentence), not upon the "detractors" (who are merely a hypothetical foil).[113]

The following sentences have caused a great deal of controversy as well; critics have hotly debated the reference of each gnome. The phrase "different are the arts of different men" is a case in point; some refer the phrase to the detractors alone,[114] others to Pindar and other good men,[115]

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[112] There is absolutely no reason, syntactical or otherwise, for believing that the ἀλλοδαπῶν of v.22 are any different from the ἐσλοὺς of v.24 or the φίλοις of v.32; commentators who wish to see the "foreigners" opposed to "domestic friends" unnecessarily complicate the picture by supposing that the μεμφομένοις of v.24 are real people; "defending against blame" is little more than a Pindaric litotes for praising.

[113] We translate with Boeckh (1821) II:2, 73: *nactus enim hoc est, ut boni obtrectantibus aquam fumo portent contrariam.* This interpretation is supported by the parallel of *N.*7.61-63, where Pindar as guest defends his host from reproach by bringing in streams of water. Radt (1966) 157 presents three objections to this translation, none of which will stand up under examination:

(a). The subject Chromius is too far away (v.20) for λέλογχε to be personal. But unexpressed subjects inferred from a few lines back are not uncommon, least of all in Pindar. Chromius is present at least by implication in the immediately preceding sentence, as the owner of the δόμοι ("*his* house"). The victor is named only at very climactic junctures in the ode, and another periphrasis for him (after ἀνδρὸς φιλοξείνου just four lines before) would be awkward here. Pindar had no choice but to leave the subject unexpressed; there is no other intervening third-person singular which could possibly cause confusion.

(b). λαγχάνειν is used only of objects over which the subject has no control. But although Chromius may have control over the fact that these men are his friends, he does not have control over the fact that they are ἐσλοὺς, which is the point of the sentence; their nature is a matter of fate. Considering the Greek notion of double causality (on which, see Lesky *passim*), one cannot always draw a sharp distinction between what man can influence and what fate controls: Pindar often uses λαγχάνω with the winning of victory crowns (cf. *O.*10.61, *N.*10.27, *I.*8.64, fr.75.6), yet no one would contend that the winning of victory crowns was something over which the athlete had absolutely no control. Within the present ode, one can refer to Heracles in v.70 (ἡσυχίαν καμάτων μεγάλων ποινὰν λαχόντ'): surely the "exchange for great toils" was not something which Heracles won without personal exertion. Indeed, the fact that Heracles is the subject of λαχόντ' in v.70 is itself a justification for taking Chromius as the personal subject of λέλογχε and not making it impersonal; on the parallel between Heracles at the end and Chromius, cf. Dissen (1821) II:2, 358; Fraccaroli 530; and Radt himself (1966) 167.

(c). *Esloi* in Pindar always-refers to "the noble" as a general category, not as specific individuals. But it is a general category here too; we must refer ἐσλούς to specific individuals only under Radt's own historical presuppositions. Other versions of this sentence, which take the λέλογχε as impersonal, have the disadvantage of placing undue stress upon the μεμφομένοις, who in my view are merely a foil.

[114] This view goes back to Didymus (Σ*N.*1.36 Drachmann). Cf. Bury (1890) 6, who thinks this an allusion to Simonides and Bacchylides. But what we have learned about the complexity of the *physis/technē*-polarity should cause us to reject as simplistic any interpretation which associates *technē* only with bad men, *physis* only with good men.

[115] See Farnell II, 247.

others to both good and bad men,[116] others to neither, but to the ἔργῳ μέν/βουλαῖσι δὲ antithesis in v.26f. below.[117] The interpretation referring the phrase to both good and bad men is to be preferred. The emphasis is upon the advantages of multiplicity and the *allotrion* (which, as we have observed before, is to be identified with *technē*): if one has many friends (as a generous host like Chromius does) and if they are good men, their many various arts (among which is Pindar's poetry) will defend one against any potential threat, be it from anyone or any art. The "use of both this and that" in v.30 implies the same; its application should not be restricted to vv.26-28. But these benefits of different men and their different arts are all predicated upon the nature of the host himself—"but it is necessary for a man to advance in straight paths and to fight by nature."[118] The *technai* are many and various, but *physis* is simple and straightforward; the *technai* are *allotrion*, but have no meaning except in the context of an underlying *physis* which is *oikeion*.[119] As we observed in our analysis of *N.*3, the *allotrion*, even as an expansion or projection, is still meaningful only in the context of redounding to the *oikeion*. This *physis*/*technē*-gnome thus provides a sort of dialectical check to the recommendation of the *allotrion* in vv.22ff.

The ἔργῳ μὲν σθένος/βουλαῖσι δὲ φρήν antithesis which follows expands on the forms of φυᾷ, although both elements can also provide the basis of *technē*—in the first case athletics, in the second case prophecy (= poetry).[120] In fact, the *physis*/*techne*-gnome of v.25 initiates a movement of subject/object-integration which is to be developed throughout the remaining gnomes up to the opening of the Heracles-myth.[121] The "use of both this and that" may either be within Chromius' character, or within Pindar's celebration of it; the ἀμφὶ can be interpreted either way. Most significant is the ambiguity of the first person in v.31f. If the first person is the poet himself, the πλοῦτον to be made public to the benefit of friends

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[116] Mezger 105; Radt (1966) 162 n.2.

[117] See Dissen (1821) II:2, 354f. Against this view it can be said that σθένος and φρήν in v.26. are not τέχναι in themselves; they merely give rise to *technai*.

[118] The *physis*/*technē*-antithesis here is highlighted by the position of τέχνα as the first word of the sentence, and of φυᾷ as the last (cf. οἰκεῖον and ἀλλότριον in v.53f.).

[119] This *physis*/*technē*-antithesis has been foregrounded by the antithetical progression of the ode's first triad. The song's αἶνον μέγαν augments the physical achievement of the ἀελλοπόδων ἵππων (v.6), as the ἐγκώμιον μέλος does the ἔργμασιν νικαφόροις (v.7), and as the Μοῖσα does the μεγάλων ἀέθλων (v.11f.). Praise of the athletic victory gives way to broader praise of Sicily, whose natural abundance (v.14f. εὐκάρπου χθονός...πίειραν) is also supplemented by cultural wealth (v.15 κορυφαῖς πολίων ἀφνεαῖς).

[120] For the identification of poetry and prophecy, cf. *Paean* 6.6, *Parth.* 1.5f., fr.75.13, fr.150; Duchemin (1955) 32ff.; 80f. The equation is evident in the present poem, where Chromius is paralleled to Heracles, and thus Pindar to Teiresias.

[121] On the *physis*/*technē*-gnome, see Rose 171. On the integration in general, see Bundy (1962) I, 15, and Crotty (1975) 215-217.

is not so much literal wealth as the "wealth" of talent implied in vv.25-28.[122] But if the first person is general,[123] the reference of the statement is actually to Chromius, who is praised for being so liberal with his wealth and is exhorted to continue; as such, the gnome elaborates the note of generosity to friends which initiated the gnomic sequence at v.22. The ambiguity effectively equates the poet's generosity in praise with the victor's generosity in wealth: both subject and object mutually embody the *xenos*-code implied at the beginning of the second strophe, in that they both expand the narrow interests of the *oikeion* to encompass the broader concerns of the *allotrion*. The κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες imply that the hopes both "of" each (subjective genitive) and "in" each other (objective genitive) are identical, and that these hopes are also shared by their other friends, and men in general (including the hero of the myth which immediately follows).[124] It also implies that their hopes relate most broadly to the interest of the *koinon*,[125] and not just the *idion*.

The "relevance" of the Heracles-myth has occasioned a great deal of critical controversy. Wilamowitz denies that the infant Heracles has anything to do with the praise of the victor, but claims that it was just an old story that Pindar wanted to tell.[126] Drachmann follows some of the scholia in thinking that it must have been a story which Chromius specifically asked for.[127] Other commentators have been less harsh, and have sought out parallels between Chromius' career and Heracles'; some say that Chromius committed a brilliant feat in battle when young,[128] while others point to the fact that Chromius' relationship as son-in-law to Hieron is analogous to Heracles' relationship to Zeus,[129] while others merely regard the myth as a vague prediction of future prosperity after toil.[130] None of these explanation does any more than account for part of the myth, or a *tertium comparationis*; somewhat more intrinsic to the objective program of the poem is the interpretation of Didymus, which ex-

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[122] See Schmidt 459. On the subjective significance of *ploutos*, see p.161f. *infra*.

[123] On the first person general, see pp.145-148 *infra*.

[124] The victor, poet (cf. *N.*3.12), Heracles, and even the ἐσλούς of v.24 (who are responsible for the τέχναι ἑτέρων ἕτεραι of v.25) can all be synthesized under the rubric πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν, emphatically enjambed into the epode beginning the myth, after the strophe and antistrophe of gnomes. I simply do not see the negative, fatalistic overtones which most critics (especially Bundy (1962) II, 87-89) want to read into the phrase κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες; the following myth (with which the poem concludes) is not remotely fatalistic, but quite the contrary.

[125] On the *koinos logos* in Pindar, see Gundert 32.

[126] Wilamowitz (1922) 256.

[127] Drachmann (1891) 207, following Σ*N.*1.49c Drachmann.

[128] Schmidt 460.

[129] Radt (1966) 167.

[130] Dissen (1821) II:2, 358.

plains the infant Heracles-myth as an allusion to the fact that this is Chromius' first victory and that Pindar (like Teiresias) is prophesying more to come.[131] But there is no reason why it could not be mentioned explicitly, if it were important to the poem that Chromius were a son-in-law to Hieron, or had committed a brilliant feat when young, or had won his first athletic victory here.[132] As it is, all these interpretations are predicated on secret allusions extrinsic to the text, and thus contribute nothing to the "unity" of the text.

The myth should rather be viewed in terms of the *oikeion/allotrion* dialectic, the operation of which we have already observed, connecting the gnomic interlude of v.53f. with the extended sequence of vv.19-33. As at the opening of *N.*3, we are dealing with the confrontation of a narrow genetic code with a more advanced *xenos*-code. Amphitryon's *oikos* received a visitor from abroad (= Zeus), who fathered an *allotrion* son (= Heracles) who saves Amphitryon's *oikeion* son (= Iphicles). The situation is exactly parallel to that of Chromius' *oikos*, which receives visitors from abroad (the *allodapoi*), who are *esloi* ready to defend Chromius' *oikeion* interests against any hypothetical threat. Further, Teiresias' prophecy tells us that this *allotrion* son will later fight on behalf of the *koinon* interests of humanity, even at his *idion* danger (vv.61-66).[133] In the end, he will himself be accepted as a *xenos* into the *oikos* of Zeus (after defending the gods against the Giants in v.67f.), and will make it his own *oikos* by marriage to Zeus' daughter Hebe (vv.70-72). Thus Heracles is not exclusively an objective paradigm, as all past interpretations have assumed, but can equally well be viewed as a subjective paradigm. His role is analogous to that of Pindar himself, who, like the other *esloi*, is accepted as a *xenos* into Chromius' *oikos* and then defends Chromius' *oikeion* interests against the forces of evil which may threaten it.[134] The subjective parallelism is heightened by the fact that at the end of the poem, Heracles, who was previously a *laudandus*, now becomes a *laudator* by "praising his portion" in the *oikos* of Zeus (v.72 αἰνήσειν νόμον),[135] just as Pindar in vv.19ff. praised his portion in the *oikos* of Chromius.

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[131] Σ*N.* 1.49c Drachmann. This interpretation has found its most recent and persuasive advocate in Rosenmeyer 238-240. Privitera 32, objects that this view does not adequately account for the emphasis on the "moral" dimension of Heracles' victories over evil and injustice.

[132] First victories would not be felt as embarrassments: Pindar explicitly identifies the victory of *N.*2 as a first victory (*N.*2.4).

[133] For Heracles in this ode as a type of εὐεργεσία and thus a paradigm for the generosity of the victor (and poet), see Bundy (1962) II, 85.

[134] On the general significance of subject/object ambiguity in the reference of Pindaric myths, see pp.133-140 *infra*.

[135] This turn is especially significant in view of the fact that before, Heracles' λῆμα was ἐκνόμιον (v.56), beyond all measure or *nomos*. The fact that he has now limited himself to a

The figures of Heracles and the poet are so perfectly fused by the end of the myth that it is unnecessary to return to any further programmatic praise of the victor, since Heracles' self-limitation and acceptance of *nomos* equally stand for the poet's. In fact, the *oikeion/allotrion* interaction has functioned throughout the poem on this subjective level as well. Immediately before the gnomic sequence of vv.19ff., the poet cuts off his praise of Sicily and her inhabitants with the break-off formula, πολλῶν ἐπέβαν καιρὸν οὐ ψεύδει βαλών (v.18).[136] Instead of proceeding on this course of confronting ever new *allotria*, he will observe true *kairos* and stop (v.19 "I stand at the courtyard-doors") at the *oikos* of Chromius, the praise of which is his *oikeion* theme. But even the poet's praise of Chromius is made in general, *koinon* terms, and can ultimately be completed only by a return to the *allotrion* (the Heracles-myth with which the poem ends) and the κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες which it entails. But with Heracles' residence in the *oikos* of Zeus and his acceptance of *nomos* at the end of the poem, the *oikeion* and *allotrion* move into a final balance, and the poem is thus able to end.

The fate of Heracles shows that expansion beyond the *oikeion* into the *allotrion* can lead to a superior redefinition of the *oikeion*. We observe the same phenomenon in *O.*12. Political *stasis* forced the victor Ergoteles to leave the *oikeion* comfort of his "familial hearth" (v.14) for the unknown and *allotrion*. This change of fortune at first appeared negative, since on the most superficial level, men prefer the *oikeion* to the *allotrion*; but Pindar claims that it was actually a good turn of fortune, since if Ergoteles had led a life of domestic tranquility back in Cnossos, his innate virtue would have never been discovered and would have withered "without fame" (v.15). Now Ergoteles enjoys both the advantages of everlasting glory (brought by his forced entry into the arena of the *allotrion*) and a new domain in Himera which he can consider *oikeion* (v.19 παρ' οἰκείαις ἀρούραις). Ergoteles' exposure to and success in the *agōn* of the games figures symbolically his succesful performance in the *agōn* of life.

Many of the same polarities which we have observed in our analyses up to this point also converge in *N.*11.

Παῖ Ῥέας, ἅ τε πρυτανεῖα λέλογχας, Ἑστία,
Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου κασιγνήτα καὶ ὁμοθρόνου Ἥρας,
εὖ μὲν Ἀρισταγόραν δέξαι τεὸν ἐς θάλαμον,
εὖ δ' ἑταίρους ἀγλαῷ σκάπτῳ πέλας
οἵ σε γεραίροντες ὀρθὰν φυλάσσοισιν Τένεδον,

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nomos indicates satisfaction with present circumstances and thus provides an effective break-off formula to close the poem. The acceptance of *nomos* also mirrors Heracles' limitation of his expansive quest for the *allotrion* and reintegration with the *oikeion*.

[136] On the nature of this phrase as a break-off formula, cf. Radt (1966) 152f.

πολλὰ μὲν λοιβαῖσιν ἀγαζόμενοι πρώταν θεῶν,
πολλὰ δὲ κνίσᾳ· λύρα δέ σφι βρέμεται καὶ ἀοιδά·
καὶ ξενίου Διὸς ἀσκεῖται θέμις αἰενάοις
ἐν τραπέζαις·

(*N.* 11.1-9)

The ode opens with an invocation to Hestia, the goddess of the hearth, and thus the symbolic embodiment of the *oikos*. But Hestia is also at the center of the *prytaneion* (v.1); she represents broadly political interests (the *koinon*) as well as narrow domestic interests (the *idion*).[137] Not only does she receive into her chamber the newly elected *prytanis* Aristagoras (μέν), but she also favors all the other elders (δέ) responsible for the state of Tenedos. The hearth-goddess in effect expands the notion of *oikos* to encompass the entire community. With the imagery of sacrifice, song, and festivity (vv.6-9), the antistrophe presents the hearth as a center of hospitality (cf. ξενίου Διὸς θέμις): as we have observed before, the *xenos*-relationship in Pindar represents the extension of the *oikeion* to accommodate the *allotrion*. We must remember that the victory celebrated in this unique epinician is a political victory—a victory due not only to the *laudandus*' personal prowess, but preeminently due to his ability for relating to the interests of his fellow-citizens.

ἄνδρα δ' ἐγὼ μακαρίζω μὲν πατέρ' Ἀγεσίλαν,
καὶ τὸ θαητὸν δέμας ἀτρεμίαν τε σύγγονον.
εἰ δέ τις ὄλβον ἔχων μορφᾷ παραμεύσεται ἄλλον,
ἔν τ' ἀέθλοισιν ἀριστεύων ἐπέδειξεν βίαν,
θνατὰ μεμνάσθω περιστέλλων μέλη,
καὶ τελευτὰν ἁπάντων γᾶν ἐπιεσσόμενος.
ἐν λόγοις δ' ἀστῶν ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπαινεῖσθαι χρεών,
καὶ μελιγδούποισι δαιδαλθέντα μελίζεν ἀοιδαῖς.

(*N.* 11.11-18)

In the epode, the poet returns to the *oikeion* by focussing upon the victor and his genetic inheritance, both in body (θαητὸν δέμας) and character (ἀτρεμίαν σύγγονον). But these inherited virtues (marked by the μέν of v.11) can be developed and manifested only through the external display of wealth and athletic victory (marked by the δέ of v.13). Public recognition broadens the impact of the individual just as political participation does at the poem's opening. We are reminded that inherited *physis* is mortal ("let him remember that he wears mortal limbs"), and can be assured immortality only through the *technē* of other men—only by being praised ἐν λόγοις δ' ἀστῶν ἀγαθοῖσιν and by being ornamented with

[137] On the ambivalence of Hestia as a center of both private interest and public interest, see Vernant (1969) 97-143, and Gernet 21-43.

μελιγδούποισι ἀοιδαῖς.[138] As we saw in *N.*3, the survival of the *oikeion* (= *physis*) is ultimately dependent upon the application of the *allotrion* (= *technē*).

We again return to the domestic and *oikeion* with Aristagoras' parents in v.22f. Their ἐλπίδες ὀκνηρότεροι prevented him from entering the Olympic and Pythian contests as a boy; here, we see domestic safe-mindedness as a limitation and restraint upon Aristagoras' desire to display his talents to the world and win the resulting glory. The performance of past generations does not always provide an infallible guide to the potential of the next. This relation is illustrated by the extreme form of the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity figured in the gnome of vv.29-32:

> ἀλλὰ βροτῶν τὸν μὲν κενεόφρονες αὖχαι
> ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἔβαλον· τὸν δ' αὖ καταμεμφθέντ' ἄγαν
> ἰσχὺν οἰκείων παρέσφαλεν καλῶν
> χειρὸς ἕλκων ὀπίσσω θυμὸς ἄτολμος ἐών.

Some men reach too far for *allotria* which are beyond their capacity; on the other hand, some men are so confined by timidity and hesitation that they undervalue themselves and give up even what is *oikeion*. The proper scope of activity seeks to integrate both the *oikeion* (one's nature) and the *allotrion* (one's positive ambitions); the proper balance of the two will guarantee due measure, adapting to the different abilities of different generations (v.37ff.).

And since each generation's potential is not predictable (v.43f.), it is best to proceed with caution:

> τὸ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἀνθρώποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἕπεται
> τέκμαρ· ἀλλ' ἔμπαν μεγαλανορίαις ἐμβαίνομεν,
> ἔργα τε πολλὰ μενοινῶντες· δέδεται γὰρ ἀναιδεῖ
> ἐλπίδι γυῖα· προμαθείας δ' ἀπόκεινται ῥοαί.
> κερδέων δὲ χρὴ μέτρον θηρευέμεν·
> ἀπροσίκτων δ' ἐρώτων ὀξύτεραι μανίαι.
>
> (*N.*11.43-48)

Desire (= expansion into the *allotrion*) is inevitable (v.44f.), but there must be a limit or curb to this desire for the distant (v.47f.). In this light, the hesitation of Aristagoras' parents appears understandable and even prudent: the ἀναιδεῖ ἐλπίδι and ὀξύτεραι μανίαι are negative foils to their ἐλπίδες ὀκνηρότεροι (v.22).[139] The domestic safe-mindedness which was disparaged formerly is the poem's present object of praise. Human act-

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[138] This relationship is reinforced by the ambiguity of the word μέλη, which not only means "limbs," but also "songs." The word is played upon in v.18 (which introduces the songs) by μελιγδούποισι and μελίζεν.

[139] See Mezger 484, Bury (1890) 226.

tion necessarily consists of a delicate tension between both attitudes—ambition and restraint, expansion and limitation, self-assertion and humility. Maintaining the proper balance is especially important for Aristagoras now that he is not merely an athlete, but a statesman.

That the final emphasis here is on restraint is an apt sign that it is time for Pindar to restrain himself and conclude the poem. The necessity of poetic closure in a sense demands the final reintegration of the *oikeion* with the *allotrion*; unilateral privileging of the *oikeion* would never allow the poem to begin, while unilateral valorization of the *allotrion* would never allow the poem to end.

Fig. 3. The antithetical structure of *Nemean* 11.

Hestia

str. 1	*oikos* (*idion*)	1 πρυτανεῖα (*koinon*)
	3 εὖ μὲν Ἀριστάγοραν...	4 εὖ δ' ἑταίρους...
ant. 1	*oikos*	feasting and hospitality
ep. 1	11 μὲν...τὸ θαητὸν δέμας ἀτρεμίαν τε σύγγονον	13 εἰ δέ...ἐν ἀέθλοισιν ἀριστεύων
ep.1/str.2	15 θνατὰ μέλη (*physis*)	17 λόγοις ἀγαθοῖσιν...ἀοιδαῖς (*technē*)
ant. 2	22 ἐλπίδες ὀκνηρότεραι γονέων	23 πειρᾶσθαι ἀέθλων
ep. 2	30 τὸν δ' αὖ καταμεμφθέντ' ἄγαν	29 τὸν μὲν κενεόφρονες αὖχαι
str.3/ant.3	inconspicuous generations (= fallow fields)	famous generations (= productive fields)
ep. 3	47 κερδέων μέτρον	48 ἀπροσίκτων δ' ἐρώτων ὀξύτεραι μανίαι
	poetic closure	continuation of poem

4. Early/Late

The quantitative polarities with which we have dealt up to this point have all been fundamentally spatial measurements. The near and far are unequivocally spatial terms. The short (*brachus*) and long (*makros*), although possessing temporal applications, are nevertheless in their origin spatial quantifications (but of extension rather than of location). Self (*oikeion*) and other (*allotrion*) translate this set of polarities into a psychological space: one's own and another's are fundamentally territorial distinctions. But the true correlate of the near/far polarity in the temporal sphere must be that of "early" and "late," or to be more precise, "timely" and "late."[140]

[140] On the theme of poetic timeliness, cf. *O.*6.28 and *I.*1.1-3.

This polarity is, like the others, familiar to the student of Pindar's poetics. We have already confronted ὀψέ περ in *N.*3.80, concluding that, contrary to common belief, it does not refer to the composition of the ode itself, but to the praise of the victor; it is thus an apologetic break-off formula and as such a metaphorical translation of the subjective near/far-polarity. But *O.*10 unquestionably does refer to some kind of "lateness" characteristic of the ode as a whole.[141] Analysis of *O.*10 should therefore more broadly illuminate Pindar's thought in its temporal dimension.

Criticism of *O.*10 has long been preoccupied with the historicity and extent of its "lateness." Our present purposes do not justify a full review of the scholarship on this question. Here it will suffice to say that Bundy, through his study of the "encomiastic future,"[142] has effectively put to rest the theory that the future "I shall celebrate" of *O.*11.14 constitutes a promise of which this ode is the later fulfillment. Schadewaldt had already shown the conventionality of the χρέος-motif, and had accordingly argued that *O.*10.3 and 8f. refer to the ideal obligation of the poet to the victor, rather than to any specific "debt" or tardiness in composition.[143] But even if we stop short of this extreme, and if we grant (as I believe we must) that the proemium of *O.*10 does indeed apologize for lateness, it is still entirely possible that the apology for lateness is itself conventional,[144] and that *O.*10 was actually not much later than any ode for performance at the victor's home overseas. Of course, such an ode would be "late" in comparison with an ode performed at the scene of victory (and it is not unreasonable to assume that the short *O.*11 was performed at Olympia), but there is absolutely no cause to believe that by "late" Pindar must have meant four, eight, or even more years.[145] Nor, given the rhetorical nature of Pindar's proemia, need we assume that the

[141] Familiarity with *O.*10 is no doubt what motivated scholars ever since the scholiasts to misinterpret *N.*3.80 by assuming that it refers to the same kind of situation.

[142] Bundy (1962) I, 1, 21f.; also, cf. Slater (1969b) 86-94.

[143] Schadewaldt 278 n.1. Cf. Bundy (1962) I, 10f., Gianotti (1975a) 19. But Schadewaldt fails to account for v.85ff, and the prominence of "time" throughout the ode.

[144] See Thummer (1968) I, 87, who believes that the idea of lateness is used like that of φθόνος or misfortune—namely as a foil to elevate the value of the praise. Cf. Bundy (1962) I, 33, who compares Themistius 84b f.

[145] For a similar conclusion, see Gaspar 108; Hermann VIII, 120, favors dating the poem to the next Olympiad; Schmidt 100-102, believes that κεῖνον κατὰ χρόνον in v.102 indicates a distant past, and that Pindar wrote this poem in his old age. If the scholiast who dates this victory to 476 (Σ*O.*10. Inscr. a Drachmann; but Σ*O.*10. Inscr. c dates it to 484) is correct, it is possible that Pindar's other obligations in Sicily may have had to take precedence, creating some slight delay. But this would at most have been only a matter of months, and we should expect several months to elapse between a victory and overseas celebration anyway.

ἐπιλέλαθ' of v.3 is anything more than a playful excuse;[146] it should be taken no more seriously as a personal embarassment than Pindar's self-rebukes for digression. In the final analysis, the historicity of the "lateness" is of minimal importance; what is much more interesting is what, in this ode, Pindar makes of the concept "lateness" and what it reveals about the temporal dimension of his logic.

The ode begins:

Τὸν Ὀλυμπιονίκαν ἀνάγνωτέ μοι
Ἀρχεστράτου παῖδα, πόθι φρενὸς
ἐμᾶς γέγραπται· γλυκὺ γὰρ αὐτῷ μέλος ὀφείλων ἐπιλέλαθ'· ὦ Μοῖσ', ἀλλὰ σὺ
 καὶ θυγάτηρ
Ἀλάθεια Διός, ὀρθᾷ χερὶ
ἐρύκετον ψευδέων
ἐνιπὰν ἀλιτόξενον.

ἕκαθεν γὰρ ἐπελθὼν ὁ μέλλων χρόνος
ἐμὸν καταίσχυνε βαθὺ χρέος.
ὅμως δὲ λῦσαι δυνατὸς ὀξεῖαν ἐπιμομφὰν τόκος· ὁρᾶτ' ὦν νῦν ψᾶφον
 ἑλισσομέναν
ὁπᾷ κῦμα κατακλύσσει ῥέον,
ὁπᾷ τε κοινὸν λόγον
φίλον τείσομεν ἐς χάριν.

(*O.*10.1-12)

Clearly, lateness is associated with distance ("future time advancing from far away"), and as such receives a negative valuation from the traditional metaphysics of presence (corresponding to the ὀξεῖαν ἐπιμομφάν). But as we have observed in our study of the near/far and related polarities, the Pindaric text transforms traditional valorizations with its dynamically ambivalent logic; the distant terms have their value as well, in that they afford perspective and therefore a greater degree of objectivity or universality. This ambivalent relation is expressed in the present context by the metaphor of debt and interest; although debts by themselves are considered bad, they nevertheless bear interest, the accrual of which is undeniably beneficial, and all the more so with more time. The ode may be "late" (at least in comparison with *O.*11), but by virtue of its deferment it is both longer and better than it would have been if composed on the spot.[147] The argument is carried further by the image of the wave and the pebble. Finley is surely correct in interpreting the wave as a symbol for Pindar's poetry, the pebble for indebtedness (since

[146] On the poetic exaggeration implicit in ἐπιλέλαθ', cf. Nassen 224: "The more embarrassment he displays over the tardiness of paying his obligation, the more justification he has for the profuseness of his song, for the elaborateness of his praise."

[147] We may compare *O.*9.1-10, which states that the song of Archilochus was sufficient for the celebration at Olympia, but that a grander song is needed now.

pebbles were commonly used in calculation and thus in accounting),[148] but the image has a further ramification: a wave is something that grows and swells with time, until it finally becomes so large and powerful as to dwarf all else. The later the wave crests, the more magnificent it is, and the more it overshadows petty considerations like pebbles on the strand.

The same positive valuation of deferred fulfillment is expressed by another striking simile near the end of the poem:

χλιδῶσα δὲ μολπὰ πρὸς κάλαμον ἀντιάξει μελέων,
τὰ παρ' εὐκλέϊ Δίρκᾳ χρόνῳ μὲν φάνεν·
ἀλλ' ὥτε παῖς ἐξ ἀλόχου πατρὶ
ποθεινὸς ἵκοντι νεότατος τὸ πάλιν ἤδη, μάλα δέ οἱ θερμαίνει φιλότατι νόον·
ἐπεὶ πλοῦτος ὁ λαχὼν ποιμένα
ἐπακτὸν ἀλλότριον
θνᾴσκοντι στυγερώτατος·
καὶ ὅταν καλὰ ἔρξαις ἀοιδᾶς ἄτερ,...

(*O.* 10.84-91)

The surrounding context makes it clear that the late-born heir is a symbol for the ode itself. Both are recipients of *ploutos*, and thus function as the rich man's investment in immortality—in the child's case, the immortality of genetic inheritance, in the case of the ode, that of poetic fame and celebration of the wealth which commissioned it. The further the wealthy man advances in age, the more critical his need and desire for this kind of heir. Indeed, the ultimate fulfilment of a man's life is predicated on what comes "later"—what will remain after his life.

The early/late polarity can also be translated into that of nature and art. *Physis*, or substance, must be temporally prior (or "early"); but *technē*, even though coming later and in a sense being added onto preexisting *physis*, is nevertheless a necessary and essential augmentation. The relationship of *physis* and *technē* is explored by the first epode of the poem:

νέμει γὰρ Ἀτρέκεια πόλιν Λοκρῶν Ζεφυρίων,
μέλει τέ σφισι Καλλιόπα
καὶ χάλκεος Ἄρης. τράπε δὲ Κύκνεια μάχα καὶ ὑπέρβιον
Ἡρακλέα· πύκτας δ' ἐν Ὀλυμπιάδι νικῶν
Ἴλᾳ φερέτω χάριν
Ἁγησίδαμος, ὡς
Ἀχιλεῖ Πάτροκλος.

[148] Finley 120. Commentators since the scholiasts have agreed that the wave represents poetry (in keeping with Pindar's typical water-poetry association). The pebble is more difficult, with the scholia (cf. Σ*O.* 10.13a, e, g, 1 Drachmann) relating it to the ἐπιμομφάν of the previous line (since pebbles were used in voting); but indebtedness is the cause of the ἐπιμομφάν and has more direct relevance to the image of a pebble than blame (cf. *O.* 13.46, where the sea-pebble definitely refers to calculation). Péron 241, may be right in arguing that the ψᾶφον evokes both the voting pebble and the abacus-pebble, and therefore both blame and indebtedness.

θάξαις δέ κε φύντ' ἀρετᾷ ποτὶ
πελώριον ὁρμάσαι κλέος ἀνὴρ θεοῦ σὺν παλάμᾳ.

(*O.*10.13-21)

The Locrians' government is characterized by exactitude (νέμει γὰρ Ἀτρέκεια); government is of course a *technē*, which is implemented through *nomos*—the objectification of custom into a written text.[149] Their care for Ares (which, like athletics, is an activity based upon *physis*) is balanced by care for Calliope (music being the preeminent *technē* which celebrates both war and athletics).[150] Warlike valor alone is not always totally sufficient, as Heracles' initial difficulty with Cycnus shows. *Physis* must be modified by *technē*: the athlete's physical strength must be properly channeled and disciplined by the trainer's expertise. The *technē* of the trainer Ilas is in a sense paradigmatic for the *technē* of the poet as well: both Ilas and Pindar use their *technē* to mold and sharpen (θάξαις) the inborn *physis* of Hagesidamus (φύντ' ἀρετᾷ) and thus channel it toward "towering fame."[151]

The reference to Heracles' battle with Cycnus has caused much confusion to the commentators, who usually seek to explain it as an historical allusion, either to the difficulty of Hagesidamus' athletic victory[152] or to contemporary military difficulties of the Locrians.[153] But this line of conjecture is open to the obvious Bundyist objection that mention of defeats (or near-defeats) does not conduce to the glory of the victor, unless presented clearly as a foil. What is significant about Heracles' battle with Cycnus is that he at first had difficulty, but later vanquished him.[154] We are in fact dealing with another instance of the early/late polarity. Late things provide the fruition and lasting fulfillment for early things, which are by themselves incomplete or inadequate: later χάρμα provides the fulfillment of early *ponos* (v.22), just as later *technē* provides ultimate shape to preexisting *physis*.

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[149] A scholiast (Σ*O.*10.17i Drachmann) may be right in regarding this verse as an allusion to Zaleucus, the 7th-century statesman who gave the Locrians their first written code of laws.

[150] For the doublet of martial valor (Ares) and appreciation of music (Calliope), cf. *O.*13.22f., *N.*7.9. The coupling is traditional; cf. Homer, *Il.*9.186-189; Archilochus fr.1.

[151] The athletic victory would not be possible without the trainer, and the fame of the victory would not be possible without the poet. Belton 28, rightly observes that the victor's debt to the trainer (and by implication, to the poet) complements the poet's *chreos* to the victor, of which so much is made at the poem's opening.

[152] Cf. Σ*O.*10.19a, b, c, 20, 21a Drachmann; Gildersleeve (1885) 215f.; Erbse (1970) 28.

[153] See de Jongh 497f.

[154] Cf. Σ*O.*10.19b Drachmann. This is Stesichorus' version (= fr.207 PMG), on which Pindar is surely dependent.

The Cycnus-reference also serves as a bridge into the ensuing Heracles-myth, which is equally infused by the tension of early debts and late fulfillments. Heracles later kills the nephews of Augeas in an ambush, because they had earlier ambushed his army (vv. 30-34).[155] Augeas' relation to Heracles is also one of indebtedness (after having refused him the pay promised for cleaning the stables—v.29f.);[156] but this debt too is destined to be paid to Heracles, even though much later (v.35 ὄπιθεν; v.41 ὕστατος). Vengeance (which exacts fulfillment of earlier debts) may be slow and late, but it is sure; the later the vengeance, the more devastating its impact (as we see in the case of Augeas and his city).[157]

But Heracles' activity is not purely negative: his late destruction of Augeas and the old order provides the basis (through the distribution of τὰν πολέμοιο δόσιν ἀκρόθινα—v.56f.) for the construction of a new order[158]—that of the Olympic festival. The death of the old creates a patrimony nurturing the birth of the young (compare the aging man of wealth and his late-born son in vv.86ff.).

Athletic competition itself is characterized by a diachronic tension between expectation (v.63 δόξᾳ) and fulfillment (v.63 ἔργῳ), present ambition and future success, early preparation and late rewards. And the first six Olympic victors catalogued in vv.64-73 are merely the earliest stage in a tradition which extends up to Hagesidamus, and will be extended still further by even later victors. The early victors have meaning only insofar as there is a "later", only insofar as the tradition is perpetually renewed and the past is continuously reinscribed upon the present. The present poetic celebration of Hagesidamus is a ritual renewal (v.78 ἀρχαῖς δὲ προτέραις ἑπόμενοι) of their earlier celebrations, in which "the entire precinct rings with the festive joys of song in the encomiastic manner" (v.76f.). But this renewal and reinscription is possible only insofar as their memory is preserved.

However, lateness is negatively valued when associated with the potential for forgetting. We have already seen this threat posed by the rhetorical ὀφείλων ἐπιλέλαθ' of v.3. It can be argued that the evolution of writing during this period was primarily as a mnemonic remedy for such potential lapses of oral memory. Writing thus occupies a very critical and

[155] The lateness of Heracles' response is expressed stylistically by the climactic position of Ἡρακλέης (v.30) as no less than the fortieth word in its sentence, which has dragged on for seven lines without the subject being identified.

[156] Cf. Σ*O.*10.32 Drachmann, and Norwood (1945) 112.

[157] For the general topos of late, but devastating vengeance, cf. Solon 3.15f., and the accumulation of material in Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta*.

[158] For Heracles as civilizer, see our discussions above of *O.*3, *N.*3.22-26, and *N.*1.

problematic status for a poet of Pindar's era: Pindar and his literary peers undoubtedly depended on the stylus and wax tablet for the composition of their poetry, but their texts were still performed in the first place as oral, musical, and choreographic spectacles. An ambivalent attitude toward writing is displayed even as late as Plato's *Phaedrus*—a text familar for its denigration of writing to a derivative φάρμακον (i.e., a "cure" for memory lapses, but at the same time a "poison" which will in the end weaken and destroy oral memory).[159] This metaphysical valorization of the oral/present/originary/early above the written/absent/derivative/late has also found many adherents among classical scholars of the present century, particularly after the romanticization of early Greek poetic tradition initiated by Milman Parry and the "oralist" school of criticism.[160]

But Pindar was unconcerned with the historical and/or metaphysical implications of writing *vis-à-vis* oral speech. One suspects that literate poets writing in performative generic contexts and in a primarily oral social context still regarded their literate activity as something of a novelty, and in fact found that the tension between writing and orality opened up numerous creative possibilities.[161] Writing provides the vehicle for long-term remembrance, and thus for the individuation of poetry: poets come to have names only once their works can be preserved intact, rather than merely being absorbed into subsequent generations of oral poetry (as were the countless oral bards who preceded Homer and Hesiod). It follows that historical persons and deeds celebrated in poetry can be fully and exactly remembered in perpetuity only if that memory is fixed in written form.[162] The list of original Olympic victors whose memory

[159] Plato's devaluation of writing here is surely related to his belief, expressed in the *Seventh Letter* (341c ff.), that the fundamental principles of his metaphysical theory can never be put into the form of a written treatise, but must be discovered only by an individual going through the process of philosophical dialectic, which is necessarily oral. For a provocative interpretation of writing in the *Phaedrus*, see "La Pharmacie de Platon," in Derrida (1972a) 69-197.

[160] Among the most vigorous voices in this tradition is that of Havelock, who concerns himself with expounding the "pre-literacy" of the Greeks up until the end of the fifth century. But term "pre-literacy" reflects modern viewpoints and prejudices; from the standpoint of the Greeks themselves, it is much more useful to talk about "proto-literacy." To a Greek of Pindar's time, the interesting thing was not that literary texts were written in an *oral* culture, but that they were *written* in an oral culture.

[161] Even Havelock 232-234, acknowledges the role of the Pre-Socratic philosophers as pioneers on the brink between pre-literacy and literacy, who were interested in articulating a new form of language and thought about the world which would distinguish them from their predecessors in oral tradition (Homer and Hesiod). Inasmuch as Pindar and other lyric poets also had access to writing in their composition, it seems reasonable to suppose that they were trying to do the same.

[162] Havelock 188f., contends that poetic tradition in the sixth and fifth centuries is carried on by the oral memorization of texts in the schools; but even he acknowledges the

Pindar celebrates in vv.64-73 was almost certainly derived from official written records.[163]

Accordingly, it is interesting to see how Pindar addresses the question of writing. He undoubtedly does so in the very first line of *O.* 10 with the verb ἀνάγνωτε. At least one recent critic has seen in this opening statement a stigmatization of writing and the necessity of resorting to it.[164] But the implication of vv.1-3 is clearly that writing is the necessary medium for the poet's remembrance of Hagesidamus and his song. We would do well to consider to whom the imperative ἀνάγνωτε is addressed; I would argue that the second person plural verb can only be addressed to this ode's audience.[165] When they read "the Olympic victor, son of Archestratus" inscribed upon the poet's mind, they are in fact reading the present ode externalized and objectified into a written text. We must therefore conclude that writing not only advances the poet's own remembrance of words and events, but also the preservation of those words and events among posterity.[166]

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necessity of some written texts as guides to memorization. On the existence of such a school-book edition of selected odes of Pindar in fifth-century Athens, see Irigoin 11-19. Pindar seems not to have doubted that his odes would receive wide circulation beyond their original audience (cf. *N.*5.1-5) and even immortal fame among posterity (cf. *O.*10.86-96, *O.*11.4-6, *P.*1.92-100, *P.*3.110-115, *P.*4.299, *P.*5.46-49, *N.*6.29f., *N.*11.13-18, *I.*1.67f., *I.*5.24-28, *I.*8.62-69, fr. 121). This topos of verbal immortalization is far more common and elaborate in Pindar than in previous poets, and must be attributed to a special self-assurance that only the certainly of written preservation and dissemination can bring. See n.166 *infra*.

[163] See Wilamowitz (1922) 223f. The care for detail and exactitude creates at least a pretense of historicity.

[164] See Kromer (1976) 423: "the poet cannot find the place in his heart where the words are 'written' but asks someone else to do so." She adduces as a parallel for her interpretation Aeschylus, *Supp.* 946-949. But the point of this passage is not that oral speech is "more vital, more dynamically expressive" than writing; indeed, the point is precisely that written documents can be altered and amended (rather than being fixed and static, as she contends), whereas a spoken promise cannot. Cf. Sansone 58.

[165] The scholiast (Σ*O.* 10.1a Drachmann) thinks that the verb is addressed either to the Muses or the chorus. But the first alternative would create great confusion, since v.3 is addressed to the Muse and Alatheia (with a dual verb), and is clearly directed to a different addressee than the preceding verses (as made evident by the ἀλλά). For the second alternative there is quite simply no parallel; indeed, it would be positively awkward for a performing chorus to sing a statement addressed to itself. Without any more specific identification, it is quite easy to take the statement as addressed to the audience (to whom, in fact, all the odes are at least indirectly addressed). Compare the opening imperative 'Ακούσατ' in *P.*6.1.

[166] A corollary to this conclusion is that Pindar viewed the written preservation of his odes as equal (or even greater) in importance to their original performance. For a discussion of the earliest transmission of written texts of the odes, see Irigoin 8f. Written texts would have been distributed to members of the chorus, and certainly to members of the victor's family. Copies of these texts would often be placed in state or temple archives; the scholiast tells us that *O.*7 was inscribed in gold in the temple of Athena at Lindos. Collections of selected odes were assembled later for use as musical paradigms in the schools,

For Pindar, writing is intimately bound up with the very process of thought. The ode is written upon his mind (v.2f. φρενὸς/ἐμᾶς γέγραπται), i.e. it is congealed as an inscribed "trace" (a mark of absence) within the organ of consciousness (and thus of presence).[167] Although being the trace of a past and potentially forgotten moment of presence, the written memory renews that presence into the present. As such, writing collapses the polarity between absence and presence, past and present, early and late. Pindar did not conceive writing itself as a marked term in competition with oral presence; for this view, we must wait until the development of Platonic metaphysics (not to mention Hegel and Saussure). In the archaic period, writing was being discovered both as a medium and a mediation.

The association of writing and remembrance is carried further by the invocation to the Muse and Alatheia in v.3f. The Muses are, of course, the daughters of Mnemosyne: their primary function is the linguistic preservation of poetic raw material - information.[168] It is therefore significant that the Muse should be coupled with 'Αλάθεια ("she who does not allow forgetfulness").[169] The Muse and Alatheia restrain slander and falsehood (ψευδέων ἐνιπὰν ἀλιτόξενον) only through precise memory of events as they actually were. In fact, Alatheia is parallelled on the objective level by the 'Ατρέκεια ("Exactitude") who governs the Locrians in v.13, and who is herself associated with a muse (Calliope in v.14).

This emphasis upon writing and remembrance is understandable in view of the ode's preoccupation with time. Writing (and its concomitant capacity for preserving fame), rather than being late itself, is precisely what mediates early and late, and thus controls time. Time at the begin-

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and with the growth of the book trade in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, more complete collections came to be assembled. For a collection of the available evidence concerning publication and the book trade in this period, see Pfeiffer 25-32, and Davison 86-128,

[167] Compare the "tablets of the mind" (δέλτοις φρενῶν) in Aeschylus, *PV* 789 (cf. *PV* 534f., *Eum.* 275, *Supp.* 179, 991f., and fr. 530.21 Mette), and Sophocles' *Triptolemus*, fr.540 Nauck (cited by Σ*O*.10.1e Drachmann). See Sansone 59-62.

[168] See Bundy (1972) 79 n.95, and Minton 188-212. For a provocative discussion of the Homeric Muses and their assertion of language as absolute *alētheia*—Being in its full, unrevised presence, see Pucci (1980a) 168f.

[169] Pindar is obviously playing on the etymology of 'Αλάθεια, as is evident from the ἐπιλέλαθ' juxtaposed in the preceding line (cf. Gildersleeve (1885) 214; Lozza 166). Krischer 161-164, has shown that ἀληθής should be translated not with the Heideggerian *Unverborgenheit* (as "unhidden"), but rather in the sense of "not allowing itself to be unnoticed." Accordingly, we may identify 'Αλάθεια here in Pindar as the abstract capacity which does not allow things to be unnoticed, i.e. which does not allow forgetfulness (λάθα). For the general association of Alatheia and remembrance, cf. *O.*8.2, *P.*3.103, *O.*7.69, and within our present poem, *O.*10.54 (for acute discussion of the last two examples, see Belton 38f., and in general, Detienne (1967) 9-27, Gianotti (1975a) 63). The association becomes fully developed with the Platonic doctrine of *anamnēsis*; see Heitsch 36-52.

ning of *O.* 10 is perceived as an advancing threat (ἐπελθὼν ὁ μέλλων χρόνος) which sunders the (early) event from present (late) awareness. But this valuation is reversed in vv.53-55, where Time is daemonized into the arbiter of truth—ὅ τ' ἐξελέγχων μόνος ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον Χρόνος.[170] Alatheia (= she who does not allow forgetfulness) depends on time for her authentication. This characterization of time as a positive force of continuity and revelation is continued in v.85, proclaiming the present song, παρ' εὐκλέϊ Δίρκᾳ χρόνῳ μὲν φάνεν. Deferment enriches the event, and thereby makes "lateness" all the more a cause for endearment and value, as in the case of the late-born son (v.86ff.). The "early" glory of athletic victory is only ephemeral (v.93 βραχύ τι τερπνόν) and will have no meaning once the unsung victor has crossed into Hades (v.92); it is only the "late" effect on posterity—the broad fame (v.95 εὐρὺ κλέος) nurtured by the Muses, as in the case of Hagesidamus—which can guarentee survival.

By the end of the poem, time is reduced to a point (v.102 κεῖνον κατὰ χρόνον). Its flux is solidified, through memory, into a written product which is permanent and therefore essential. The moment of Hagesidamus' victory, as witnessed by Pindar (v.100ff.), is graphematically superimposed upon all time; it is at once a finite point and an infinite duration. The brief flower of his youth (v.104 ὥρᾳ τε κεκραμένον) becomes an image which will never wither—the idealized object of an immortal *erōs* (cf. v.99 παῖδ' ἐρατὸν δ' Ἀρχεστράτου), like the boy Ganymede who is made eternally young σὺν Κυπρογενεῖ (v.105). This *erōs* is not just the favor of the immortal gods, but is also the immortal pleasure of the text which will be enjoyed by countless generations of men.

We have observed, therefore, that immortalization consists in the inscription of the early onto the late. Writing is the very medium of this inscription. The "ancient tomb (σάματι) of Pelops" (v.24) beside which Heracles established the Olympic festival may in a sense be emblematic for the ambivalent status of writing, and all σάματα. The *sēma* as tombstone is obviously related to death and absence (of the signified); nevertheless, the *sēma* is also alive and present (as a signifier)—the tombstone stands as a symbol for Pelops which will be read and interpreted by living men Olympiad after Olympiad.

In summation, we can say that this ode is an orchestrated reflection upon the nature of time, and that it manifests its perception in terms of the antithetical categories "early" and "late." Pindar turns inside out

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[170] The relation is reinforced by the presence of the Μοῖραι in v.52. Fate is merely truth deferred. On the topos of truth and time in archaic thought and poetry, see Komornicka (1976) 9f.

the traditional negative valuation of deferment: "late" things are shown to be the necessary fulfillment, extension, or recompense for the incomplete "early" things which imply them. This is surely the relevance of the Heracles-myth, with its "late" vengeance on Augeas and "early" establishment of the Olympic festival, which in turn finds its "late" fulfillment in the present celebration of Hagesidamus. *O.* 10 suggests that every poem is "late," insofar as it comes after the victory and inscribes that victory, through writing, on posterity. Every victory is therefore "early" (especially in the case of a boy-victor like Hagesidamus), inasmuch as it provides a seed which will be perpetually reinscribed on tradition.

CHAPTER TWO
RELATIONS OF MANNER

1. *Malthakos/Trachus*

The relations which we have studied up to this point have all been quantitative: they deal with the duration or position, in space and time, of both the victor's and poet's achievements. "Relations of manner," on the other hand, can be said to be those which describe the quality or character of their activities. Perhaps the fundamental qualitative polarity is the ethical—that of *agathos* and *kakos*. Ethical overtones will almost inevitably be mapped into any dichotomy of qualities, as can readily be observed from the Pythagorean table of oppositions discussed in the previous chapter.

But even this ethical context does not justify unilateral emphasis on one side of a polarity over another. The "good" exists only in contrast with the "bad"; without its contrary, neither term has any meaning. All ethical polarities must therefore remain in perpetual tension. Although defying description as "good" and "bad," the activities of victor and poet must reflect "good" and "bad," i.e., react to the "good" and "bad" elements which necessarily compose the human condition—good fortune and bad fortune, glory and mortality, victory and toil, pleasure and pain. The polarity of μαλθακός and τραχύς is one of Pindar's most common translations of this ethical dichotomy into an epinician context.

Like so much else in ancient literature, the origins of the opposition are to be found in Homer. The most common reference of the term "gentle" (μαλθακός, μαλακός, μειλίχιος, μείλιχος) in Homer is to language, which is of course the subjective application which we shall find in Pindar. Homer's μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσι and their various formulary allomorphs[1] are almost as frequent as his famous "winged words." But there are also "harsh words," and these are often counterpoised to the "gentle

[1] This formula allows numerous different metrical positions and lexical substitutions, usually with the adjective μειλίχιος (μείλιχος) sometimes with μαλακός, usually with ἔπος, but sometimes with λόγος or with the adjective used substantively after a verb of speaking. It would probably be better to regard this phrase as a formulary group (what Nagler would call a "Gestalt") rather than as a formula *per se.* For various "gentle words," cf. *Il.* 1.582, 4.256, 6.214, 6.337, 6.343, 9.113, 10.288, 10.542, 11.137, 12.267, 17.431, 21.339, *Od.*1.56, 6.143, 6.146. 6.148, 9.363, 9.493, 10.70, 10.173, 10.422, 10.442, 10.547, 11.552, 12.207, 15.374, 16.279, 18.283, 19.5, 19.415, 20.165, 21.192, 24.393, *H.Cer.* 336. For the motif of "gentle speech" in later traditions, cf. Hesiod *Th.*84, 90; Semonides 7.18; Solon 27.15; Aeschylus, *Ag.*95; and of course, the obviously Homeric μειλιχίοισι λόγοις of Pindar, *P.*4.128 and 240.

words." In *Il.*12.267, Ajax and Teucer rebuke warriors slack in battle, ἄλλον μειλιχίοις, ἄλλον στερεοῖς ἐπέεσσι. In 17.431, the charioteer Automedon coaxes the horses of Achilles after Patroclus' death, πολλὰ δὲ μειλιχίοισι προσηύδα, πολλὰ δ' ἀρειῇ. In 21.338f., Hera exhorts Hephaestus not to let the river Xanthus turn him away either with kindly or threatening words: μήδε σε πάμπαν μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσιν ἀποτρεπέτω καὶ ἀρείῃ. In 11.137, the sons of Antimachus supplicate Agammemnon for their life μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσιν, but receive an "ungentled" reply: ἀμείλικτον δ' ἄκουσαν.[2] Homer also uses the antithesis to structure entire passages: in 6.325, Hector rebukes Paris αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσι, while twelve lines later, Helen encourages him μαλακοῖς ἐπέεσσι. Exhortation can be either negative (shame before one's fellows, like Hector) or positive (like Helen's encouragement to an ideal of behaviour). But the antithesis can also reflect the object addressed as well as the subject speaking: in 4.241, Agamemnon addresses the slack in battle χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν, but fifteen lines later he addresses the chieftain Idomeneus, who is excelling, μειλιχίοισιν. This last antithesis is nothing less than the polarity of praise and blame which we have confronted throughout Pindar.

It is interesting to note that although "gentle words" occur frequently in the *Odyssey* (even more so than in the *Iliad*), "harsh words" do not occur there, and accordingly the antithesis of gentle and harsh language is absent. Although the *Odyssey* is a work very much preoccupied with problems of language and communication, "harsh words" seem less at home in its domestic environment than in the more martial *Iliad*.

Nevertheless, the antithesis of the gentle discourse and the harsh discourse was transmitted through Pindar and other fifth-century poets to later rhetorical tradition. There is an appropriate style for saying "gentle" things and an appropriate style for saying "harsh" things. Whoever confuses the two categories is guilty of sophistry - attempting to cast a deceptive shade upon one's true intentions. Hence, the exile Oedipus accuses Creon of "speaking harsh things softly" (Soph., *OC* 774 σκληρὰ μαλθακῶς λέγων). Dionysius of Halicarnassus criticizes Demosthenes for the same:

> I disapprove of the smooth (λεῖον) and soft (μαλακὸν) quality of the language. For it ought to be harsh (τραχεῖαν) and bitter (πικρὰν) and make something close to a blow; but it is moist and even, just like olive-oil flowing through the ears without a rattle, indeed seeking to charm (θέλγειν) and delight our ears.
>
> (*De Demosthene* 20)

Aristotle also uses this stylistic antithesis (*Rhet.* III, 1408b9f.).

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[2] For nearly the same line, compare Hector's supplication and Achilles' "ungentled" reply in 21.98.

The gnomic tradition which developed in the archaic period after Homer preserved the opposition of gentle and harsh, in a generalized and objective form (in contrast with the subjective, linguistic opposition which we have been discussing up to this point). From Pindar's Syracusan contemporary Epicharmus we have the statement, ὦ πονηρέ, μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μῶσο, μὴ τὰ σκληρὰ ἔχῃς (fr.288 Kaibel). Desire for the gentle (= luxury) could merely result in its opposite—accentuation of the harsh. Theognis 1194 seems to have the same thought in mind when proclaiming that for the dead man, σκληρὸν γίνεται ἢ μαλακόν. This statement is splendidly ambiguous, claiming both that in death "even the gentle becomes harsh" and that in death "the harsh indeed becomes gentle." The same idea is equally well behind Simonides fr.590 PMG: ἐν ἀνάγκαις γλυκὺ γίνεται καὶ τὸ σκληρόν[3]. All of these gnomes reflect an identification of gentle and harsh: under certain circumstances the gentle becomes harsh and *vice versa*. As we have often had occasion to observe before, such polarities are not, at least in the archaic period, ossified into unilateral valorizations of one term above another; the words themselves are still semantically and connotatively fluid, and hence the polarities are fundamentally unstable.

Certainly the word μαλθακός (along with its cognates and synonyms) is an example of such semantic fluidity. Most of the word's associations are distinctly positive. In addition to being associated with language in general, *malthakos* comes to be connected specifically with the physical organs of language—sound and voice (cf. Sappho 129LP μελλιχόφωνος; Alcman 4 fr.1.5 γαρύματα μαλσακά; Tyrtaeus 12.8 μειλιχόγηρυς). And out of this physical aspect derives Pindar's association of *malthakos* with song (cf. *I.*2.8 μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί),[4] which is a preeminent positive force in his imagistic universe. But being too "gentle" can be a negative quality. Over-softness has long had the overtones of cowardice, weakness, and effeminacy.[5]

This last set of connotations is especially prominent in the *Prometheia*-trilogy which has traditionally been ascribed to Aeschylus. This is the one document roughly contemporaneous with Pindar in which we observe the *malthakos/trachus* antithesis as such:

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[3] The polarity γλυκύς/πικρός is closely related to that of *malthakos/trachus*. Cf. Theognis 301, 1353; Solon 13.5 (= γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν); Pindar, *N.*7.52f., *I.*7.47f.

[4] Also, cf. *P.*1.98, *P.*3.51, *P.*4.137, *P.*5.99f., *P.*8.31, *N.*9.49.

[5] Cf. Homer, *Il.*17.588, 22.373; Alcaeus, fr.6.9LP; Theognis 365; Aeschylus, *Eum.*74; Herodotus 7.153.4, 9.122.3; Plato, *Phaedrus* 239C. See μαλαχθείς in *N.*3.16 and our discussion thereof on p. 43 *supra*.

σὺ μαλθακίζου, τὴν δ' ἐμὴν αὐθαδίαν
ὀργῆς τε τραχύτητα μὴ 'πίπλησσέ μοι.

(*PV* 79f.)

Or again:

οἶδ' ὅτι τραχὺς καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ
τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων Ζεύς· ἀλλ' ἔμπας
μαλακογνώμων
ἔσται ποθ', ὅταν ταύτῃ ῥαισθῇ·

(*PV* 186-189)

Furthermore, we can observe the word μαλθακός and its derivatives five times in the *Desmotes* (v.79, 188, 379, 952, 1008), twice in our fragments of the *Luomenos* (fr.192, 199 Nauck), rarely elsewhere in Aeschylus. The word τραχύς and derivatives occur seven times in this play (v.35, 80, 186, 311, 324, 726, 1048), twice elsewhere in Aeschylus, rarely in Sophocles and Euripides. The frequency of these terms in the *Prometheia*, contrasted with their relative rarity in the rest of tragedy, and certainly in the rest of Aeschylus, indicates that their use here may be of thematic significance. Both terms are most frequently associated with the language or attitude of Prometheus or Zeus, which is described as *trachus* and not *malthakos* (at least now); but the trilogy's resolution may look forward to a point at which discourse and attitude will become *malthakos*. This thematic opposition almost certainly owes its provenience to Pindar, since the terms are common in Pindar while relatively uncommon in tragedy[6]. In fact, two of the Pindaric odes which prominently feature the opposition (*P.* 1 and *N.* 4) have been viewed as sources for the *Prometheia* on quite independent grounds.[7]

Before turning to Pindar, we should recall one final passage which exhibits the dialectical fusion of these concepts in their developed form. In Books II and III of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the education of the state's guardians, defining its two basic components as *gymnastikē* and *mousikē*:

> "Don't you see," I said, "how they dispose their thought, whoever attend to gymnastics throughout their life, but do not touch music? Or as many are disposed in the opposite way?"
> "Concerning what," he said, "do you speak?"

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[6] Especially significant is the fact that the *Prometheia*, like Pindar, prefers the terms μαλθακός and τραχύς rather than the equally common μειλίχιος and σκληρός.

[7] For the relation of *P.* 1 to the description of Aetna's eruption in *PV* 351-372, and possibly to other elements in the trilogy as well, cf. Lloyd-Jones (1971) 100f. On the Peleus-Thetis myth of *N.* 4.60-68 and its possible relation to the *Prometheus Pyrphoros*, cf. Stoessl 151.

"Concerning savageness (ἀγριότητος) and harshness (σκληρότητος) and in turn concerning softness (μαλακίας) and gentleness (ἡμερότητος)," I said.
"I see," he said, "that those conversant with nothing but gymnastics come out more savage than fitting, and that those conversant only with music in turn become softer than is best for them."
"And indeed," I said, "the spirited part of their nature produces this savageness—that part which if rightly nurtured would be manly, but when stretched beyond what is fitting would become hard (σκληρόν) and difficult (χαλεπόν), in all probability."
"So it seems to me," he said.
"Well? Wouldn't the philosophical nature have gentleness? And if it is more relaxed, would it not be softer (μαλακώτερον) than fitting, while if it is well nurtured, is it not gentle (ἥμερον) and orderly (κόσμιον)?"
"These things are true."
"And we say that it is necessary for the guardians to possess both of these natures."
"It is necessary."
"Therefore it is necessary that they be harmonized to each other."
"How not?"

(Plato, *Republic* III, 410 C-E)

Athletics by itself would lead to a character which was excessively hard, while music by itself would lead to a character which was excessively soft. The two disciplines must be fused so as to create a balanced character combining firmness with sensitivity: the ideal guardians must be equipped to be both "gentle toward fellow-citizens and harsh toward external enemies" (375C πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾴους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς).

The hard aspect of *gymnastikē* and gentle aspect of *mousikē* are also evident in Pindar. But the symmetry is not quite so neat. Pindar sees the harsh and gentle combined even within the objective realm of athletic achievement, and within the subjective domain of poetry. The duality of response (to friends and enemies, in good circumstances and bad) is relevant to both athletes and poets:

οἷον αἰνέων κε Μελησίαν ἔριδα στρέφοι,
ῥήματα πλέκων, ἀπάλαιστος ἐν λόγῳ ἕλκειν,
μαλακὰ μὲν φρονέων ἐσλοῖς,
τραχὺς δὲ παλιγκότοις ἔφεδρος.

(*N.* 4.93-96)

The poet's *malthakos* stance toward friends and *trachus* stance toward enemies seems to express the twin epideictic modalities of praise and blame (cf. *N.* 8.39 αἰνέων αἰνητά, μομφὰν δ' ἐπισπείρων ἀλίτροις).[8] The gentleness of celebrating the victor must be combined in the poet with a

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[8] On praise and blame as fundamental categories of Greek and Indo-European poetry, see Dumézil *passim*, Detienne (1967) 18-27, and Nagy 222-242.

certain toughness and ability to withstand all the forces of envy which threaten poet and victor alike. Praise for friends and blame for enemies also reminds us of the old ethical principle of doing good to one's friends, ill to one's enemies (cf. *P.*2.83f. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν· ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἅτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐών).[9]

We also find the *malthakos/trachus* polarity at least implicit in the very beginning of *N.*4. But here the context is objective:

Ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων
ἰατρός· αἱ δὲ σοφαὶ
Μοισᾶν θύγατρες ἀοιδαὶ θέλξαν νιν ἁπτόμεναι.
οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τέγγει
γυῖα, τόσσον εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάορος.
ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει,
ὅ τι κε σὺν Χαρίτων τύχᾳ
γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλοι βαθείας.

(*N.*4.1-8)

The poetic encomium ("a eulogy accompanied by the lyre"), like warm water,[10] renders the victor's limbs μαλθακά.[11] The implication is that the physical exertion and toil which have preceded the present celebration are somehow *trachus*. This is why the remedial powers (ἰατρός) of song and festivity[12] are needed; the association of the poetic *technē* with the "gentle" *technē* of medicine[13] is familiar to us from *P.*3. As in *P.*3, the word is what can truly confer immortality. But the pharmacological effect of the medicinal song may result in forgetfulness as well as memory; ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον not only implies that verbal commemoration of the deeds will last longer than the deeds themselves (which is obvious), but moreover that the *malthakos* verbal celebration will soften the memory of the painful and *trachus* aspects of the physical *ponos* and the general vicissitude which it symbolizes.[14] This implication is surely what forms the nexus between vv.1-5 and 6-8.

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[9] The idea was commonplace. Cf. Archilochus, fr.126; Solon 13.5; Theognis 871f.; Aeschylus, *Choe.* 120-123; Euripides, *Heracles* 585f., *Ion* 1046f., *Medea* 809; Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.3.14, 2.6.35, *Anab.* 1.9.11, *Hiero* 2.2, 6.12; Plato, *Rep.* I, 331e, *Meno* 71e; Isocrates, *Demonicus* 26.

[10] On the water-poetry association, see p.14 and p.37 n.76 *supra*.

[11] The adjective is usually construed as proleptic. But the neuter plural μαλθακά may also be an adverbial accusative, in which case it describes the action of the water, and is thus subjective (as at v.95). The ambiguity is significant. It should be noted, however, that the manuscripts read the verb here as τεύχει, in which case only the first interpretation is possible; τέγγει is Heyne's emendation based on Plutarch, *De Tranquilitate* 6.

[12] On poetry as "remedial discourse," see Laín Entralgo *passim*, Pucci (1980b) 25-32, and Bergren (1981) 205-210.

[13] Cf. *O.*13.85, *P.*3.6, 51, *P.*4.271, *N.*3.55.

[14] For the general topos of celebration as a λάθα πόνων, cf. *O.* 1.97-99, *O.*2.18-22, 51f., *O.*7.77, *O.*8.7, *P.*1.46, *P.*5.10f., 106, *N.*1.69f., *N.*3.16f., *N.*5.48, *N.*7.74, *N.*10.24,

The polarity is continued, although in a submerged form, in the next strophe:

τό μοι θέμεν Κρονίδᾳ τε Δὶ καὶ Νεμέᾳ
Τιμασάρχου τε πάλᾳ
ὕμνου προκώμιον εἴη· δέξαιτο δ' Αἰακιδᾶν
ἠΰπυργον ἕδος, δίκᾳ ξεναρκέϊ κοινὸν
φέγγος. εἰ δ' ἔτι ζαμενεῖ Τιμόκριτος ἁλίῳ
σὸς πατὴρ ἐθάλπετο, ποικίλον κιθαρίζων
θαμά κε, τῷδε μέλει κλιθείς,
υἱὸν κελάδησε καλλίνικον

(*N*.4.9-16)

The general "eulogy accompanied by the lyre" discussed in the first strophe is here manifested as the present ὕμνου προκώμιον. Pindar gives (θέμεν) the song, for Zeus, Nemea, and the wrestling achievement of Timasarchus; Aegina is to "receive" it (δέξαιτο). The interaction is crystallized by the host/guest-relation which so commonly refers to the mutual affection of subject and object in Pindar;[15] Aegina is a δίκᾳ ξεναρκέϊ κοινὸν φέγγος.[16] This reciprocal *xenos*-relationship is one of *philia*, which as we have observed, is the subjective mode of the *malthakos*; but the "guest-protecting justice" also implies a *trachus* defense against mutual enemies.

The following lines on the victor's deceased father Timocritus also balance the *malthakos* with the necessary vitality of the *trachus*. As a periphrasis for "being alive," Pindar says ζαμενεῖ ἁλίῳ ἐθάλπετο. ἐθάλπετο reminds us of the warm baths in the strophe above (which render the limbs *malthaka*), yet is here accomplished not by something which is itself *malthakos*, but rather by the fire of the "vigorous," "violent," "raging" (= ζαμενεῖ) sun. The sun symbolizes the robust world of physical vigor and flourishing life,[17] and this healthy environment of physical exertion is, like athletics, in a sense *trachus*; total submersion in "gentleness" can

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I.8.1f., 6-8, fr.124ab.5f., Bundy (1954) 46ff., and Detienne (1967) 69. Especially apt is the analogue of *O*.12.19, where the θερμὰ Νυμφᾶν λουτρά are not merely a local landmark, but also refer to Ergoteles' general relief from the *ponos* of exile and wandering.

[15] On the *xenos*-relationship, see our discussion on pp.156-158 *infra*.

[16] The dative is surely instrumental to the adjective: Aegina's light is *koinon* (rather than *idion*) only because of the island's hospitality to strangers. A scholiast (Σ*N*.4.20a Drachmann) raises the interesting possibility that this phrase may be ambiguous, referring either to Aegina (as most modern commentators assume) or to the hymn, which is the implied object of δέξαιτο. It is just as possible for the poem to be a far-shining beacon for all men as it is for the virtues of Aegina to be. This would be a subject/object ambiguity of the sort which is common in Pindar, effective especially insofar as it plays upon the reciprocity inherent in ξεναρκέϊ (either "protecting guests" or "protecting hosts"); on *dika* as a term of encomiastic propriety, cf. Gundert 68; Bundy (1962) II, 58 n.54, 61 n.69.

[17] For the association, cf. *O*.3.24, *P*.4.144, *N*.7.73, *Threnos* 7.1.

only mean death. But Timocritus, if still alive, would balance the necessary harshness of man's physical existence with the gentle *philia* of song. However, Timocritus is dead, and his role as father-poet must be supplanted by Pindar himself, whose poetic *philia* by analogy becomes a fatherly *philia* for the boy Timasarchus.

The relationship is expressed through Timasarchus' climactic journey and victory in Thebes (vv.19-24), which is of course Pindar's city. He comes "as a friend to friends" (v.22 φίλοισι φίλος), and looks upon Thebes as a "hosting (ξένιον) city" (v.23), which reciprocates Pindar's enjoyment of *xenia* in Aegina (v.12). The mutual exploits of the Aeginetan Telamon and Theban Heracles in vv.25-30 are surely meant as a figure for the mutual *philia* of the Aeginetan Timasarchus and Theban Pindar:[18]

σὺν ᾧ ποτε Τροΐαν κραταιὸς Τελαμὼν
πόρθησε καὶ Μέροπας
καὶ τὸν μέγαν πολεμιστὰν ἔκπαγλον Ἀλκυονῆ,
οὐ τετραορίας γε πρὶν δυώδεκα πέτρῳ
ἥροάς τ' ἐπεμβεβαῶτας ἱπποδάμους ἕλεν
δὶς τόσους. ἀπειρομάχας ἐών κε φανείη
λόγον ὁ μὴ συνιείς· ἐπεὶ
ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν.

(*N.*4.25-32)

The mutuality of their relationship is not limited to gentle *philia*, but also has a *trachus* side, which consists in fighting mutual enemies (cf. v.12 ξεναρκέϊ). He who has not experienced and understood the *trachus*—the violence and danger inherent in human life—is ἀπειρομάχας, and has thus lived incompletely; inversely, anyone who has accomplished anything has necessarily undergone much hardship (ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν). Human creativity is dependent on overcoming opposition; it therefore involves not only *philia* and the *malthakos*, but also *neikos* and the *trachus*.

This principle is well exemplified by the subjective gnomic interlude which follows:

τὰ μακρὰ δ' ἐξενέπειν ἐρύκει με τεθμὸς
ὧραί τ' ἐπειγόμεναι·
ἴϋγγι δ' ἕλκομαι ἦτορ νεομηνίᾳ θιγέμεν.
ἔμπα, καίπερ ἔχει βαθεῖα ποντιὰς ἅλμα
μέσσον, ἀντίτειν' ἐπιβουλίᾳ· σφόδρα δόξομεν
δαίων ὑπέρτεροι ἐν φάει καταβαίνειν·
φθονερὰ δ' ἄλλος ἀνὴρ βλέπων
γνώμαν κενεὰν σκότῳ κυλίνδει

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[18] Cf. Köhnken 198, Crotty (1982) 59.

χαμαὶ πετοῖσαν. ἐμοὶ δ'ὁποίαν ἀρετὰν
ἔδωκε Πότμος ἄναξ,
εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι χρόνος ἕρπων πεπρωμέναν τελέσει.

(*N.*4.33-43)

The break-off formula of v.32f. is clearly limitative and retentive, but vv.35ff. on the other hand are stimulative, exhorting the poet on to his task; such dialectic we have observed often enough before.[19] As in other contexts, the stimulation is a matter of *erōs*, here caused by the love-charm (ἴϋγγι);[20] the love which is charmed is surely the same *philia* of poet for victor (his subject-matter) with which we have been dealing throughout.[21] And the νεομηνίᾳ is surely the new theme (cf. *N.*3.2 ἱερομηνίᾳ Νεμεάδι) of victor-praise.

But Pindar is again sidetracked from his victor-praise by the foil of opposition in v.36ff. As elsewhere, the *philia* between friends is balanced by *neikos* between enemies. Critics have attempted to read all the usual historical explanations into the present passage: we are told that v.36f. reflects that Pindar was engaged either at Thebes or overseas and had to fight from afar a conspiracy against him at Aegina,[22] or that the ἄλλος ἀνήρ was some rival poet who criticized Pindar's use of mythological "digression" and instead advocated the liberal employment of gnomes,[23] or, on the other hand, a rival poet, possibly Simonides, who himself

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[19] We also see the opposition inherent in the notion of time developed here. The ὧραι τ' ἐπειγόμεναι of v.34 clearly shows us the destructive and limitative side of time—time as mortal finitude, which will stop the poet Pindar just as it has already stopped the singers Timocritus (v.13ff.) and Euphanes (v.89ff.). But as we observed in our analysis of *O.*10, time can also be revealed as a positive force of continuation and accomplishment; such is the case with the χρόνος ἕρπων πεπρωμέναν τελέσει (v.43) which closes this gnomic section in ring-form.

[20] The magic of this love-charm is definitely situated within the realm of the *malthakos* (cf. θέλξαν in v.3, referring to the songs which assuage *ponos* by casting a spell of *euphrosyna*). The *iunx* is also associated with the power of language in Pindar's other reference to it (*P.*4.213-219); on the "charm" as a form of benign verbal power, see Laín Entralgo 42-50. The stimulative image of the *iunx* may be compared with the whetstone of Pindar's tongue in *O.*6.82ff., which prepares the poet for the praise of the victor.

[21] On Pindar's use of "erotic" motifs to describe the poet-victor relationship, see Crotty (1982) 76ff., and our discussion of *I.*2 on pp.161f. *infra.*

[22] Cf. Σ*N.*4.58c Drachmann; Farnell II, 266f.; Norwood (1945) 270 n.57. Against this interpretation of μέσσον as "the space intervening," it can be argued that the absolute καταβαίνειν (in the following line) usually refers to arrival at a destination (especially after a sea-voyage—cf. *O.*7.13, *P.*3.73); hence it would be more reasonable for v.36f. to express the poet's being out at sea (with μέσσον either as the middle of his body, as is usually assumed, or the middle of the ship's hull), than for it to express the opposite. For a thorough discussion of these lines, see Péron 92-100.

[23] Cf. Mezger 394, Bury (1890) 72. But for just criticism of these views, cf. Norwood (1945) 270f. n.58, who notes that γνώμη does not have the meaning of "gnome" until much later.

employed too many digressions.[24] But Köhnken may be right in questioning not only the historical reality of the opponent(s), but even his (their) identity as poet(s).[25] The "envious man" is just as much an opponent of Timasarchus as of Pindar;[26] the mutual *philia* of Timasarchus and Pindar necessitates their mutual strife with any enemy, real or hypothetical. As we have observed before, the mention of envy (and thus the hypothetical possibility of opposition to poet and victor) is to be expected in break-off formulae; it is due to his fear of merely stirring up such jealousy that the poet refrains from overdoing praise.[27]

Pindar associates himself with light (v.38 ἐν φάει), fulfillment (χρόνος ἕρπων πεπρωμέναν τελέσει), and affirmation, the forces of envy with darkness (v.40 σκότῳ), emptiness (γνώμαν κενεάν), and negation. Pindar braves the sea even up to his midriff, but the envious man is never able to leave the ground (v.41 χαμαὶ πετοῖσαν); the contrast may remind us of the soaring eagle and low-flying daws at the end of *N.*3.[28] In sum, envy is a reflection of vacuity and utter lack of accomplishment: the ἄλλος ἀνήρ is therefore a total cipher, with no identity or substantive reality. But it is only when actively pitted against the otherness of such an ἄλλος ἀνήρ that the enterprises of both subject and object realize their full heroic potential.[29] Praise is validated only in confrontation with the potential threat of blame: ὁ γὰρ ἐξ οἴκου ποτὶ μῶμον ἔπαινος κίρναται (fr.181).

We perceive this relation in the Peleus-myth which follows the gnomic interlude (even as we did in the preceding Heracles/Telamon-myth). Peleus triumphs over Iolcus only once he has encountered the deadly treachery of Hippolyta and Acastus, which is warded off through the *philia* of his ally Cheiron. The situation is analogous to that in v.36ff. Norwood[30] aptly compares the δολίαις τέχναισι (v.57f.) of Hippolyta with the ἐπιβουλίᾳ which Pindar strives against in v.37; Köhnken[31] may also be right in comparing Cheiron's rescue of Peleus from this plot (so as to accomplish τὸ μόρσιμον Διόθεν πεπρωμένον in v.61) to Pindar's rescue of Timasarchus from any potential enemies (so as to accomplish ὁποίαν

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[24] Cf. Σ*N.*4.60b Drachmann.

[25] Köhnken 206-208.

[26] Cf. Bernardini (1977) 122f.

[27] Cf. p.15 n.17, and p.28 n.51 *supra*.

[28] This analogy need not necessarily imply that the ἄλλος ἀνήρ of *N.*4.39 is a literary opponent; as we shall observe in our discussion of the ambiguity of the eagle-metaphor on p. 150f. *infra*, the daws of *N.*3 refer equally to hypothetical literary opponents of Pindar and personal opponents of the victor.

[29] On the repeated structure of triumph after conflict and hardship, cf. Maloney 178; Kromer (1973) 110; Crotty (1982) 60.

[30] Norwood (1945) 180.

[31] Köhnken 208. He further contends, 209f., that the ὁποίαν ἀρετάν... (v.41ff.) is a first-person indefinite statement which refers to Timasarchus as well as Pindar himself.

ἀρετὰν ἔδωκε Πότμος ἄναξ...πεπρωμέναν in vv.41-43). The *trachus* is overcome only through the *malthakos* loyalty of *philia*; and inversely, the *philia* of friends achieves its ultimate test and manifestation only in the encounter with mutual enemies—the *trachus*.

The confrontation with the *trachus*, and all the primal terror of nature which it entails, is further illustrated by Peleus' contact with Thetis (vv.62-64). Thetis changes into numerous terrible entities, all of which Peleus must restrain and subdue. Thetis' multiplicity of forms represents the elusiveness and terror of the divine; it can be won only if one dares to grapple with it directly and face it in all its harsh epiphany. Wrestling symbolizes precisely this attempt to grapple directly with what is *trachus* in nature and human life, without shrinking away; such is the significance not only of Pindar's wrestling with the waves of envy (v.36f.), and of his wrestling with language (vv.93-96), but preeminently of Timasarchus' wrestling at the athletic competition. It is only after embracing the *trachus*, as Peleus has done, that the *malthakos* celebration of marriage, synthesis, and mediation can occur (vv.65-68).[32]

We have observed before[33] the general association of the *trachus* with unmodified *physis*, and of *malthakos* with the refinements of *technē*. This homology is surely crystallized in the image of vv.79-85:

εἰ δέ τοι
μάτρῳ μ' ἔτι Καλλικλεῖ κελεύεις
στάλαν θέμεν Παρίου λίθου λευκοτέραν·
ὁ χρυσὸς ἑψόμενος
αὐγὰς ἔδειξεν ἁπάσας, ὕμνος δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
ἐργμάτων βασιλεῦσιν ἰσοδαίμονα τεύχει
φῶτα·

(*N.*4.79-85)

Gold achieves its full radiance only when refined (ἑψόμενος): i.e., the raw material of nature (which also happens to be a symbol for the money which has commissioned this ode) achieves its ultimate fulfillment only when purified by art, whether the *technē* of metallurgy or of poetry. The raw/cooked (ἑψόμενος) opposition surely implies that of *trachus* and *malthakos*. Raw gold stands to refined gold as the ἀγαθῶν ἐργμάτων to fame; the ὕμνος is the mediating process of refinement. This antithesis repeats the *logos/ergon* antithesis of the poem's opening (v.6 ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον), where the gentleness of verbal celebration is both more long-lived and more potent than the harshness of the physical deeds

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[32] On the symbolic significance of the Peleus-Thetis marriage and Cheiron's role therein, see our remarks on p.42 *supra*.

[33] See p.43 *supra*.

which the *logos* commemorates. The "tombstone whiter than Parian marble" is a metaphor for poetic immortality: marble tombstones are like refined gold in that the material achieves its full radiance only when sculpted and polished, and this metaphorical tombstone is like the ὕμνος in that it bears a *logos* which commemorates an otherwise mortal and time-bound entity. All these images imply that raw *physis* can be fulfilled and extended only through refining *technē*; and *technē* necessarily consists in taming, softening, or rendering smooth the rough edges inherent in *physis*.

As we observed in our discussion of *O.*10.24,[34] the tombstone not only entails death, but also life—as a living signifier (cf. v.6 ῥῆμα...βιοτεύει) which remembers the dead signified. The dead are truly brought back to life in this poem, not only as the recipients of encomiastic aid, but indeed as encomiastic agents themselves: the victor's late father Timocritus praises Timasarchus at the beginning (v.13ff.), just as his grandfather Euphanes praises Callicles at the end (v.89f.). Thus Timocritus and Euphanes serve a mediating function: they are like the *laudator* in that they are singers and moreover encomiasts, but connected with the *laudandus* in that they are his relatives. This technique of merging consolation and epinician celebration—both forms of remedial discourse—is very subtle and highly effective. Pindar's own poetry represents, in surrogate, the encomia which Timasarchus' late father and grandfather would have composed; their song is in a sense renewed and revived by Pindar's.

The wrestling metaphor at the end of the poem (vv.93-96), which we quoted at the opening of our discussion, provides the final union of subject and object (as of *malthakos* and *trachus*).[35] The wrestling victory of Timasarchus is very much like the poet's struggle, not only with the hypothetical opposition of vv.36-41 (here represented by the ἔριδα of v.93), but even with the very tissues of language (v.94 "weaving together the sentences, a wrestler not to be thrown in discourse"). The very word-order of this passage suggests that it was composed only with great effort; surely the contorted pile-up of participles and attributives exemplifies the "word-twisting" which Pindar refers to. By themselves inert and insignificant (like unrefined gold or marble), the words are in a sense raw

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[34] See p.69 *supra*. The same is also true of the tomb of Amphitryon in v.20, which is remembered through perennial reinscription on the present as a *locus* for athletic competition.

[35] On the general significance of athletic metaphors for poetry as a means of integrating subject and object, see our discussion on p.152f. *infra*. The fact that the trainer Melesias is praised here, rather than the victor himself, introduces a further mediation; the trainer is linked to the victor as another athlete, but to the poet as a mature representative of *technē* (see our discussion of trainers on p.116 *infra*).

Fig. 4. The antithetical structure of *Nemean* 4.

Second Column Valorized	1 πόνων	1-3 εὐφροσύνα, ἀοιδαί
	5 γυῖα	4-5 θερμὸν ὕδωρ μαλθακὰ τέγγει
	6 ἐργμάτων	6 ῥῆμα
	10 Τιμασάρχου πάλᾳ	11 ὕμνου προκώμιον
First Column Valorized	13 ζαμενεῖ ἁλίῳ	14 ἐθάλπετο
	25-30 conflict with Troy, etc.	25 friendship of Heracles and Telamon
	32 ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν	30 ἀπειρομάχας
Second Column Valorized	33 ἐρύκει με τεθμός	35 ἴϋγγι δ' ἕλκομαι
	37 ἀντίτειν' ἐπιβουλίᾳ	38 ἐν φάει καταβαίνειν
	57 Ἱππολύτας δολίαις τέχναις	60 ἄλαλκε δὲ Χίρων
	62-64 πῦρ...λεόντων ὄνυχας σχάσαις	65 ἔγαμεν μίαν Νερεΐδων
	80 Καλλικλεῖ	81 στάλαν
	82 ὁ χρύσος ---- ἑψόμενος ---->	82 αὐγὰς ἔδειξεν
	83-85 ἀγαθῶν ἐργμάτων ---- ὕμνος ----> φῶτα	84 βασιλεῦσιν ἰσοδαίμονα
Neutral Valorization	93 ἔριδα στρέφοι	93 αἰνέων Μελησίαν
	96 τραχὺς δὲ παλιγκότοις	95 μαλακὰ μὲν ἐσλοῖς

material out of which the *malthakos* texture of the encomium is woven.[36] We thus see that the *malthakos/trachus* antithesis of the poem's last two lines reflects the polarization of a wide range of phenomena—celebration and toil, praise and blame, love and strife, art and nature, form and substance, text and words: *malthakos/trachus* in the broadest sense depicts the human condition, and the reality of struggle with perpetual opposition, contention, negation, and antithesis as a necessary prelude to all harmony, synthesis, attainment, and fulfillment.

We also find the polarity crystallized in *P.*8.6-12, part of the splendid proem to Hesychia:

τὺ γὰρ τὸ μαλθακὸν ἔρξαι τε καὶ παθεῖν ὁμῶς
ἐπίστασαι καιρῷ σὺν ἀτρεκεῖ·
τὺ δ' ὁπόταν τις ἀμείλιχον

[36] Pindar's frequent architectural metaphors for poetry usually emphasize "words" (λόγοι, ἔπεα, or ῥήματα) as the material building-blocks out of which the poetic structure is joined together. Cf. *O.*6.1-4,27, *P.*3.113f., *P.*4.138, *P.*6.9, *P.*7.3, *N.*3.4f., fr.194.1-3; also, cf. *N.*2.2 ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων.

χαρδίᾳ χότον ἐνελάσῃ,
τραχεῖα δυσμενέων
ὑπαντιάξαισα χράτει τιθεῖς
ὕβριν ἐν ἄντλῳ·

The poet has just asked "kindly" (φιλόφρον) Hesychia to receive the Πυθιόνιχαν τιμάν for Aristomenes: hence, her connection with τὸ μαλθαχόν (which as we learned from *N.* 4.4 and 95 is associated with the celebration of athletic victory by *philoi*). She understands both "how to do and how to experience" what is *malthakos*: friendship sets up a relation of reciprocal interchange. But Hesychia equally well has a τραχεῖα and ἀμείλιχον aspect toward "enemies" (δυσμενέων) of peace and order, exemplified by the giants Porphyrion and Typhos. This dual nature—*malthakos* toward friends, *trachus* toward enemies—is exactly that which we observed in the *laudator* at the end of *N.* 4.

While *malthakos* describes the quiet domesticity which we normally associate with Hesychia, *trachus* describes her awe-inspiring vigilance and power. Both are forms of restraint—the *malthakos* internal restraint, the *trachus* external constraint. Indeed, the *trachus* is necessary to defend, protect, and maintain precisely what we value most dearly as *malthakos*. Herein is the central paradox of the *malthakos/trachus* polarity: one must oneself be *trachus* in order to defend the *malthakos* qualities of one's *philia* and domestic tranquility from the inevitable threats of violence and negation which are even more *trachus*. Hesychia is thus significant as a mediation of *malthakos* and *trachus*, because she manages to entail both without contradiction. She holds the keys both of "councils" (v.3 βουλᾶν), the *malthakos* form of discourse, and of "wars" (v.3 πολέμων), which are the necessarily *trachus* response where counsel fails. In her role of mediation,[37] it is only natural that she should be linked closely with χαιρῷ ἀτρεχεῖ. *Kairos*, as we have observed, is Pindar's most general term for "mediation"—that narrow space in which something is neither too much nor too little, but according to the moment is σμιχρὸς ἐν σμιχροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις (*P.* 3.107) and thus partakes equally of both poles. Qualitatively, *kairos* means being gentle among the gentle, harsh among the harsh. As qualitative *kairos*, Hesychia is opposed to *hybris*, which is precisely the failure to determine what is appropriate in each circumstance, and thus to mediate polar tensions.

τὰν οὐδὲ Πορφυρίων μάθεν
παρ' αἶσαν ἐξερεθίζων. χέρδος δὲ φίλτατον,
ἑχόντος εἴ τις ἐχ δόμων φέροι.

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[37] On the general significance of Hesychia as a balance of opposites for Pindar, see Bundy (1954) 19ff.

βία δὲ καὶ μεγάλαυχον ἔσφαλεν ἐν χρόνῳ.
Τυφὼς Κίλιξ ἑκατόγκρανος οὔ νιν ἄλυξεν,
οὐδὲ μὰν βασιλεὺς Γιγάντων· δμᾶθεν δὲ κεραυνῷ
τόξοισί τ' Ἀπόλλωνος· ὃς εὐμενεῖ νόῳ
Ξενάρχειον ἔδεκτο Κίρραθεν ἐστεφανωμένον
υἱὸν ποίᾳ Παρνασσίδι Δωριεῖ τε κώμῳ.

(*P.*8.12-20)

Hybris, embodied by Porphyrion, knows no αἶσαν. The contrastive gnome which follows in v.13f. implies that *hybris* violates the *oikeion*—the quiet virtues of domestic peace and tranquility, and accordingly implies that it is the role of Hesychia to defend the *oikeion*. Hesychia's defensive power is actualized in Zeus' slaying of Typhos and Apollo's of Porphyrion. Indeed, Apollo's role is exactly equivalent to Hesychia's: his, too, is fundamentally a dual character, harsh toward enemies (v.17f. δμᾶθεν...τόξοισί τ' Ἀπόλλωνος), but gentle toward friends (v.18ff. ὃς εὐμενεῖ νόῳ ἔδεκτο...).[38] Apollo is the archer-god, but he is also a god of poetry and athletics. Yet we must never forget that the Pythian festival which is the background for the present victory and its *malthakos* celebration was established only through Apollo's slaying of the Python—his *trachus* defense against a force of *hybris* and monstrosity.[39]

Aegina also embodies Hesychia; indeed, this identification infuses the whole proem. It can be noted that δικαιόπολις in v.22 (of Aegina) is tautometric with μεγιστόπολι in v.2 (of Hesychia). It is also easy to note, as some commentators have,[40] that Aegina's "justice" corresponds to the invocation of Hesychia as "daughter of Justice" (v.1.f. Δίκας θύγατερ). Like Hesychia, Aegina combines the Muse (v.25 ἀείδεται) and Ares (v.26f. θρέψαισα...ὑπερτάτους ἥρωας ἐν μάχαις).

Indeed, it is precisely Aegina's prowess in Ares that furnishes a subject for the Muses: athletics—the subject of the present song—is merely a peaceable extension of martial virtue (hence, its coupling with war in v.26f.).[41] Aegina's *technical* excellence in music (the realm of τὸ μαλθακόν) is made possible only by her *physical* excellence in war and athletics (the realm of τὸ τραχύ).

But Pindar breaks off the praise of Aegina and focusses upon the specific case of Aristomenes:

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[38] Apollo has received (ἔδεκτο) the very victory-celebration which Hesychia is exhorted to receive (v.5 δέκευ) at the beginning of the ode.

[39] On the common derivation and close association of the Python- and Typhos-myths, see Fontenrose 77-93.

[40] Cf. Mezger 403; Gildersleeve (1885) 329; Schroeder (1922) 70.

[41] For Pindar's general association of athletic and martial virtues. cf. *O.*2.43f., *N.*1.16-18, *I.*1.50, *I.*7.24-26, and Bowra (1964) 184-186.

εἰμὶ δ' ἄσχολος ἀναθέμεν
πᾶσαν μακραγορίαν
λύρᾳ τε καὶ φθέγματι μαλθακῷ,
μὴ κόρος ἐλθὼν κνίξῃ. τὸ δ' ἐν ποσί μοι τράχον
ἴτω τεὸν χρέος, ὦ παῖ, νεώτατον καλῶν,
ἐμᾷ ποτανὸν ἀμφὶ μαχανᾷ.

(*P.*8.29-34)

This passage relates the *malthakos/trachus* polarity to subjective concerns. The lyre and poetic voice are by nature μαλθακῷ, but the κόρος (= encomiastic excess)[42] caused by μακραγορίαν could "grate" or "scratch" (κνίξῃ) the gentleness of poetry. Clearly, the verb κνίξῃ associates poetic excess with the *trachus*; κνίζω is often used of provoking anger (cf. *P.*11.23, *N.*5.32), and could thus parallel this passage with Porphyrion's provocation of Hesychia to anger in v.12f. (and in general, v.8f.). As we have observed above, the gentle entails knowledge of appropriate limitations, while the harsh is associated with monsters and giants who exceed all limitation. The poet's rejection of μακραγορίαν in favor of "what runs before my feet," so as to preserve his φθέγματι μαλθακῷ from grating κόρος, merely applies this principle subjectively.

The Alcmaeon-myth of the third triad further transmutes the *malthakos/trachus* polarity introduced with Hesychia. Like Hesychia, and like Aegina, Alcmaeon combines *trachus* prowess in war with *malthakos* appreciation for poetry.

χαίρων δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
Ἀλκμᾶνα στεφάνοισι βάλλω, ῥαίνω δὲ καὶ ὕμνῳ,
γείτων ὅτι μοι καὶ κτεάνων φύλαξ ἐμῶν
ὑπάντασεν ἰόντι γᾶς ὀμφαλὸν παρ' ἀοίδιμον,
μαντευμάτων τ' ἐφάψατο συγγόνοισι τέχναις.

(*P.*8.56-60)

Indeed, Alcmaeon's role as a "guardian" of the *malthakos* is exactly equivalent to that of Hesychia. The ὑπάντασεν of v.59 surely recalls Hesychia's ὑπαντιάξαισα (v.11); only here the "encounter" is friendly (*malthakos*), whereas before it was hostile (*trachus*). Alcmaeon's συγγόνοισι τέχναις (v.60) of prophecy are not far removed from the poet's own "inborn arts"; indeed, the present ode is in a sense prophetic,[43] and even

[42] On the encomiastic implications of *koros*, see Gundert 67f.; Bundy (1962) I, 29 n.71; Bundy (1972) 87f.; Bernardini (1967) 86f.

[43] On the general association of poetry and prophecy in Pindar, see p.54 n.120 *supra*. We cannot altogether ignore the historical circumstances of the ode. Aegina in 446 was under Athenian domination, and it may well be that the emphasis on Hesychia in *P.*8 is a wish for the return to a peaceful state of strength and independence (cf. ἐλευθέρῳ στόλῳ in v.98); this wish borders on being a prophecy of Athens' downfall and Aegina's reascendence, as may be implied in the cycle of good fortune and bad fortune depicted in vv.76-97.

contains a prophecy (Amphiaraus') concerning the prophet Alcmaeon himself.

This same dialectic of domestic tranquility and external war, *malthakos* and *trachus*, friendship for friends and enmity toward enemies, is also found in *Paean* 2—Pindar's paean for the Abderites—which may in fact be the source for much of what we observe in *P.* 8.[44] Of special interest in this respect is *Paean* 2.31-34:

> εἰ δέ τις ἀρκέων φίλοις
> ἐχθροῖσι τραχὺς ὑπαντιάζει,
> μόχθος ἡσυχίαν φέρει καιρῷ καταβαίνων.

We see here the familiar dialectic of being gentle to friends,[45] harsh to enemies. What is more, we also find *hēsychia* introduced precisely as the mediation of *malthakos* and *trachus* (i.e., the consequence of the protasis which proposes being gentle to friends and harsh to enemies). Although we might normally associate the domestic tranquility of *hēsychia* with what is *malthakos*, *hēsychia* is equally predicated upon the *trachus* (represented here by μόχθος, which alone is responsible for "bringing" *hēsychia*). Moreover, as in *P.* 8.7, *hēsychia* is implicitly identified with *kairos*; only if μόχθος accomplishes things "opportunely" (i.e., only if "harsh among the harsh," as implied by the protasis) does it bring *hēsychia.*

This relation of *hēsychia* coming only through *mochthos* is borne out by the poem's second triad. Although the second strophe is at best fragmentary, many of the words which do survive (v.37 ἄλκαι, v.39 μάρναμαι, v.42 ἀντομένων, v.45 ποτιχύρσῃ) indicate that the theme was *polemos*, as does the scholiast's paraphrase.[46] It moreover appears that vv.48-50 deal with civil strife.[47] The poem continues:

> τὸ δ' εὐβουλίᾳ τε καὶ α[ἰδ]οῖ
> ἐγκείμενο[ν] αἰεὶ θάλλει μαλακαῖς ε[ὐ]δίαι[ς·]
> καὶ τὸ μὲν διδότω θεός· [ὁ δ]' ἐχθρὰ νοήσαις
> ἤδη φθόνος οἴχεται τῶν πάλαι προθανόντων·
> χρὴ δ' ἄνδρα τοκεῦσι⟨ν⟩ φέρειν βαθύδοξον αἶσαν.
>
> (*Paean* 2.50-58)

But as war is the appropriate defense against external threats, so are εὐβουλίᾳ τε καὶ αἰδοῖ the appropriate defense against internal threats; we recall here Hesychia "holding the keys both of counsel and of war" (*P.* 8.3f.). Hence, it is fitting that the state which has the advantages of good counsel should flourish μαλακαῖς εὐδίαις. *Malthakos* counsel, rather

[44] For the general parallel, see Farnell II, 193.
[45] For ἀρκέων φίλοις, cf. *N.* 1.32.
[46] Σ*Paean* 2.43 Radt.
[47] Σ*Paean* 2.48 Radt, and Radt (1958) 49-52.

than *trachus* war, is the proper way of resolving differences among fellow-citizens, who should be "friends" (and therefore participants in the *malthakos* rather than the *trachus*). Enmity among fellow citizens takes the form of ἐχθρὰ νοήσαις φθόνος, which is now banished thanks to εὐβουλίᾳ and αἰδοῖ (specifically for the dead). The implication of this entire sequence of ideas may be that war against an external enemy is the best way of overcoming internal *stasis*; the *trachus* may on this rationale guarantee the survival of those relationships among fellow citizens which are properly *malthakos*.

The epode identifies more precisely τῶν πάλαι προθανόντων (v.56), through whom envy (and thus the potential for civil strife) is banished. The forefathers obtained this land only σὺν πολέμῳ (v.59), and defended it ἄντα δυσμενέων Μελαμφύλλου προπάροιθεν (v.69f.); only in virtue thereof have they attained ὄλβον (v.60) and their present domestic fortune.[48] Their prosperity can be confirmed only when tried by misfortune (vv.63-65). In this sense, *malthakos/trachus* can be associated not only with peace and war, but even with the more general alternation of good fortune and bad fortune.

We can see this same extension of *malthakos/trachus* in the course of *P*.8. Surely this is the implication of Amphiaraus' prophecy: good fortune is inevitably mixed with bad, the gentle with the harsh. Adrastus fares well in the expedition of the Epigonoi, but at the same time, τὸ δὲ οἴκοθεν ἀντία πράξει (v.51f.), in that he loses his son.[49] Yet his present success is itself a rectification (v.49f. ἀρείονος ὄρνιχος) of προτέρᾳ πάθᾳ (v.48), just as Alcmaeon's success is a rectification of Amphiaraus' own defeat.

Success does not come without toil, which is to say that man is inevitably caught up in a cycle of good fortune and bad fortune, and cannot know the one without knowing its opposite:

> εἰ γάρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπαται μὴ σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ,
> πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφρόνων
> βίον κορυσσέμεν ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς·
> τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κεῖται· δαίμων δὲ παρίσχει,
> ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὕπερθε βάλλων, ἄλλον ὑπὸ χειρῶν.
>
> (*P*.8.73-77)

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[48] This relation is also reflected by the poem's conclusion. Poetic celebration (vv.96-103)—representative of domestic prosperity and the *malthakos* in general—is possible only by virtue of Abdera's success in war (the *trachus*), which furnishes a subject for poetry (vv.103-106), in addition to furnishing the general prosperity which makes poetry possible. Hence it is that war is an εὐκλέα χάριν for ἐπέων ἐσλῶν (v.102f.).

[49] Fraccaroli 459 (cf. Bornemann (1891) 234f.), notes that Aristomenes' fate is mixed in just the opposite way: he fares well in respect of the *idion* (his own athletic victory), but ill in respect of the *koinon* (in view of Aegina's defeat and subjugation).

The pretense of suffering good fortune without antecedent *ponos* is merely specious sophistry (πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ); the *malthakos* by itself would be an invention of pure technicism (ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς), but could not partake in the reality of *physis* (τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κεῖται). The gnome of v.76f. not only states that good fortune lifts up some men while bad fortune casts down others, but like all vicissitude-gnomes, also implies that good and bad fortune can at different times (ἄλλοτ') affect the same man. Hence, the juxtaposition of Aristomenes' catalogue of victories (vv.78-80) with the vivid image of his defeated opponents slinking back home in shame (vv.81-87) serves not only to contrast his good fortune with their bad fortune, but equally implies that their bad fortune might potentially be his. He is thus advised at the beginning of the catalogue to proceed with all due measure (v.78 μέτρῳ κατάβαιν'), i.e., with full consciousness of the vicissitude inherent in the human condition.[50]

The association of this cycle of good fortune (the way up) and bad fortune (the way down) with the *malthakos/trachus* polarity which we have observed throughout *P.*8 becomes especially clear at the end of the poem:

ὁ δὲ καλόν τι νέον λαχὼν
ἁβρότατος ἔπι μεγάλας
ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέτεται
ὑποπτέροις ἀνορέαις, ἔχων
κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν. ἐν δ' ὀλίγῳ βροτῶν
τὸ τερπνὸν αὔξεται· οὕτω δὲ καὶ πίτνει χαμαί,
ἀποτρόπῳ γνώμᾳ σεσεισμένον.
ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ
ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ' ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ,
λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μείλιχος αἰών.

(*P.*8.88-97)

ἁβρότατος in v.89 and μείλιχος in v.97 are almost synonyms for *malthakos*, in its superlative and even excessive aspect; god-given fortune provides men with a life of luxury, "softness," and insulation from the cruder aspects of reality. Falling to the ground from this state cannot help but be *trachus*. Man cannot help but be exposed to both sides of any such polarity—good fortune and bad fortune, up and down, gentle and harsh, light (λαμπρὸν φέγγος) and darkness (σκιᾶς ὄναρ), and most broadly, "is"

[50] Most critics who accept this reading assume that κατάβαιν' has the technical sense of "entering the contest," and thus infer that Pindar is advising Aristomenes not to enter further athletic competitions (cf. Gildersleeve (1885) 332, Farnell II, 199); but such an absolute use of καταβαίνειν is not attested in Pindar, or his contemporaries (cf. Radt (1958) 40f.), and the exhortation of μέτρῳ κατάβαιν' is thus probably less specific—since Aristomenes is at the height of fortune, he must watch his step in general. An apt analogue for the present line is καιρῷ καταβαίνων which we have already encountered in *Paean* 2.34, and which certainly does not possess the agonistic sense.

(τί δέ τις;) and "is not" (τί δ' οὔ τις;).[51] But ultimately all these antitheses must be united in a structure of creative tension—what Heraclitus would call ἁρμονία,[52] and what Pindar himself undoubtedly alludes to when he says ὦναξ, ἑκόντι δ' εὔχομαι νόῳ/κατά τιν' ἁρμονίαν βλέπειν/ἀμφ' ἕκαστον ὅσα νέομαι (vv.67-69).[53] Commentators have long pointed to this ode, and in particular the section which we have just quoted, as an example of the pessimism of Pindar's old age.[54] But we could just as well say that the ode is optimistic.[55] It is the nature of ἁρμονία to combine and thus mediate both qualities into a unified vision of human existence.

We also find this Heraclitean ἁρμονία in *P.* 1. In fr. 51 DK, Heraclitus characterizes the παλίντροπος ἁρμονία of coincident opposition ("how each thing, although differing, agrees with itself") by the twin examples of the bow and lyre: both are instruments "bent back onto themselves," caught in a tension between being pulled together and being pulled apart. It is interesting that Pindar would also equate the two instruments, as he clearly does when, in his invocation to the Χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, he speaks of the κῆλα (v.12) which can subdue even the war-god Ares himself.[56] But Pindar's interest in the oppositional implications of this equation lies not so much in the internal mechanics of the instruments themselves as in their symbolic implications. The lyre is the preeminent symbol of music, the bow of war. And as we have observed in our discussion of *P.* 8, the music/war doublet certainly implies the *malthakos/trachus* polarity. That lyre and bow are equated tells us that, opposed as they are, they are in a more profound sense merely two aspects of the same thing.

The mighty proem of *P.* 1 can be seen as an exploration of this dialectic:

> Χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἰοπλοκάμων
> σύνδικον Μοισᾶν κτέανον· τᾶς ἀκούει μὲν βάσις ἀγλαΐας ἀρχά,

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[51] For the Heraclitean nature of v.95, see Schroeder (1922) 76.

[52] Cf. fr.8, 51 and 54 DK. Also, cf. Empedocles, fr.23.4, 27.3, 96.4, 122.2 DK; Philolaus, fr.6 and 10 DK; Aeschylus, *PV* 551.

[53] This passage has been much disputed by past commentators, but has not been correctly understood. The basic sense of ἁρμονία has to do with the melodic progression of high and low notes (cf. Plato, *Leges* II, 665A; Ps.-Aristotle, *Problemata* XIX.27), and thus the sequential connection of antithetical states. In the present passage, Pindar is using ἁρμονίαν as a transitional metaphor for his movement from praise of the victor's good fortune (vv.64-66) to gnomic qualification and admonition (vv.73-78). ἁρμονία is a sense of balance, like the Δίκα (= encomiastic propriety) which stands beside the victory-revel in v.70f. See Hubbard (1983).

[54] Cf. Schmidt 407-409; Finley 36-38; Bowra (1964) 398-400.

[55] See Bornemann (1891) 237-240, who remarks that the poet is careful to end every antithesis on a positive note, especially in the last three verses of each triad.

[56] For the equation of bow and lyre, and for the general parallel between Pindar and Heraclitus here, see Simpson 455.

πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ σάμασιν
ἁγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς ἐλελιζομένα.
καὶ τὸν αἰχματὰν κεραυνὸν σβεννύεις
αἰενάου πυρός. εὕδει δ' ἀνὰ σκάπτῳ Διὸς αἰετός, ὠκεῖαν πτέρυγ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν
χαλάξαις,

ἀρχὸς οἰωνῶν, κελαινῶπιν δ' ἐπί οἱ νεφέλαν
ἀγκύλῳ κρατί, γλεφάρων ἁδὺ κλάϊθρον, κατέχευας· ὁ δὲ κνώσσων
ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ, τεαῖς
ῥιπαῖσι κατασχόμενος. καὶ γὰρ βιατὰς Ἄρης, τραχεῖαν ἄνευθε λιπὼν
ἐγχέων ἀκμάν, ἰαίνει καρδίαν
κώματι, κῆλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνων θέλγει φρένας, ἀμφί τε Λατοΐδα σοφίᾳ
βαθυκόλπων τε Μοισᾶν.

ὅσσα δὲ μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεύς, ἀτύζονται βοὰν
Πιερίδων ἀΐοντα, γᾶν τε καὶ πόντον κατ' ἀμαιμάκετον,

(*P.* 1.1-14)

Music leads off the dance, and gently assuages the forces of divine reason and order in the universe (the thunderbolt, the eagle of Zeus, Ares); this assuaging, propitiating function is surely what Pindar means when he calls his poetry *malthakos*, as he so often does.[57] But the βοάν of the Pierides also has the power of terrifying all the monstrous forces of disorder and *hybris* in the universe, "as many things as Zeus has not loved." The extended ecphrasis of Typhos (vv. 15-28) serves here as an illustration. We can infer that this complementary power of music—the power of blame—is what Pindar would classify as *trachus*. Poetic discourse possesses a pharmacological duality—being both a remedial *pharmakon* which comforts the good, and a poisonous *pharmakon* which causes pain to the bad.[58] The βοάν can either be "song" or a "war-shout."

The dialectic of the proem extends further, however. Not only do we see a general antithesis between the forces of light, to whom music is *malthakos*, and the forces of darkness, to whom it is *trachus*, but moreover, we observe a certain progression even within the first category. The βάσις ἀγλαΐας ἀρχά and ἁγησιχόρων προοιμίων ἀμβολάς constitute auto-referential proclamations of the present proem,[59] and are thus purely within the realm of the *malthakos*. But the three entities which song tames—the thunderbolt, the eagle of Zeus, and the war-god Ares—are all entities which have a certain *trachus* aspect. Ares, in fact, is said to leave

[57] See our semantic discussion of μαλθακός on p.73 *supra*.

[58] On the ambiguity of the verbal φάρμακον as cure or poison, cf. Homer *Od.* 4.230ff. (cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.* I.1.4, 614; Macrobius *Sat.* VII,1.18; Bergen (1981) 205-210); Gorgias, *Encomium Helenae* 14; Plato, *Phaedrus* 274E; Laín Entralgo 95; and the seminal essay of Derrida (1972a), "La Pharmacie de Platon," especially p.111.

[59] Compare the ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι of *O.* 2.1 or the πρόσωπον τηλαυγές of *O.* 6.1-4.

behind the τραχεῖαν ἐγχέων ἀκμάν in order to "assuage" (ἰαίνει) his heart in repose. Invincible on the battlefield, he is tamed only by the κῆλα of the Muses.[60] Music, in its *malthakos* aspect, softens *trachus* toil and exertion, whether of the athlete, warrior, or war-god.[61] But at the same time, music is itself *trachus*: it subdues (in a very different way) precisely those forces of disorder and negation that we would normally expect Zeus and Ares to fight. Herein we again see the fundamental unity of *malthakos* and *trachus*: being *malthakos* to a friend entails being *trachus* to his enemies.

The same principle can be applied to Pindar's relation with Hieron in this poem. Music is magnified into a form of cosmic harmony, and the disorder which it quells is equally universal. Hence we can see the defeated Carthaginians assuming the same role as Typhos, Hieron as Zeus and Ares, Pindar as the Muses. Hieron's triumph over the harsh Τυρσανῶν ἀλαλατός and ὕβριν πρὸ Κύμας (v.72) is placed in the wider perspective of the Athenians' and Spartans' triumph over the barbarian Medes (vv.75-78). The Phoenician is rendered *malthakos*, and will now keep to the gentle realm of the *oikeion* (v.71f. ἅμερον κατ' οἶκον). Hieron's military victories are coupled with his role as founder of Aetna (framing, in vv.61-68 and 79f., the description of the Carthaginian defeat) to characterize him as a consummate champion of peace, order, and civilization; in short, his victory assumes cosmogonic proportions.[62] Pindar will preserve this triumph of civilization by celebrating it in his verse and by interceding with the gods (cf. v.67ff.) on behalf of its continuance and prosperity.

The exact function of Pindar's poetry in respect of Hieron's achievement becomes clear at the end of the poem. Just as the ode begins with a symbolic reference to itself as "golden lyre," so does it end with an even more explicit reference to its own powers:

μὴ δολωθῇς, ὦ φίλε, κέρδεσιν εὐτράπλοις· ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας

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[60] The word κῆλα itself expresses the pharmacological ambivalence which we have been discussing: arrows normally cause death, but these are magic arrows which merely "charm" (there is no doubt a word-play on κηλέω, evoked here by its synonym θέλγει—cf. Maehler 82). On κηλέω and θέλγω as terms of remedial discourse, cf. Laín Entralgo 29 n.46, 50-53, 60-64, 87f.

[61] As in the proem of *N.*4, music acts as a remedial *latha ponōn*. Cf. v.46 καμάτων ἐπίλασιν, which is coupled with ὄλβον as the reward for Hieron's endurance of travail in war (v.47f.), even as Philoctetes endured much pain, which was later remedied by his honor for bringing an end to the Trojan war (vv.50-55). That this honor and καμάτων ἐπίλασιν consists in poetic celebration is confirmed by vv.42-45 and 58f., which open and close these reflections. Poetry is also remedial in its capacity to propitiate the gods and thus win the divine favor necessary for continued prosperity (cf. v.39f., 48-50, 56f.).

[62] See the excellent essay of Trumpf 129-157.

οἷον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει
καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς. οὐ φθίνει Κροίσου φιλόφρων ἀρετά.
τὸν δὲ ταύρῳ χαλκέῳ καυτῆρα νηλέα νόον
ἐχθρὰ Φάλαριν κατέχει παντᾷ φάτις.
οὐδέ νιν φόρμιγγες ὑπωρόφιαι κοινανίαν
μαλθακὰν παίδων ὀάροισι δέκονται.

(*P.* 1.92-98)

Providing fame among posterity is the business of bards as well as historians. This fame after death can be either good fame (the *malthakos* aspect of poetry), as illustrated by Croesus, or bad fame (poetry in its *trachus* aspect), as illustrated by the "hateful speech" concerning the cruel tyrant Phalaris. Phalaris is not celebrated by φόρμιγγες like the one at the beginning of the ode, nor is he received into the κοινανίαν μαλθακάν; he is completely alienated from the realm of the *malthakos*. This concluding doublet thus resumes the fundamental contrast which we have observed in the ode—that between music as gentle praise for the good and as harsh censure for enemies of the good. The two are properly inseparable: praise of the good receives its most powerful assist from contrast with the foil of what is not good.

But the *malthakos* and *trachus* qualities of music are not only a reflection of the subject-matter; they embody something internal to Pindar's verse as well. The joyous victory-celebration is highlighted through contrast with the inherent finitude, limitation, and *Tragik* of the human condition. The κῶμος is all the more intense if sung against the antiphonal background of a θρῆνος. This dialectic is reflected in odes like *N.* 4 and *I.* 7, which allude to late relatives of the victor, and is perhaps most strikingly crystallized in the myth of *P.* 12 on the origin of flute-music. This *technē* originated from the dirge which the monstrous Gorgons sang at the death of their sister Medusa:

τάν ποτε
Παλλὰς ἐφεῦρε θρασειᾶν Γοργόνων
οὔλιον θρῆνον διαπλέξαισ' Ἀθάνα·
τὸν παρθενίος ὑπό τ' ἀπλάτοις ὀφίων κεφαλαῖς
ἄϊε λειβόμενον δυσπενθέϊ σὺν καμάτῳ,

(*P.* 12.6-10)

Just as the song combines Athena's joy with the Gorgons' sorrow and musical loveliness with the harshness of death,[63] even so the Gorgons themselves combine beauty with their monstrosity. Beneath their hideous

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[63] Dolin 86, parallels the derivation of Athena's joy from the Gorgons' sorrow with the derivation of Perseus' fame and greatness from the fragility and despair of Danae (vv.14-18).

tangle of snake-writhing hair are the faces of maidens unrivalled in fairness (cf. v.16 εὐπαράου Μεδοίσας).[64] In this ode, the terrible Gorgons become charming and even pathetic. Transformed by the imitative powers of art (v.21 μιμήσαιτ' ἐριχλάγκταν γόον), even the harsh *physis* of the Gorgons and their dirge can realize the beauty and gentleness which is potential within them. This beauty is actualized in the flute-playing of the victor Midas (which is certainly not limited to dirges), and by extension in the poetry of Pindar himself.

Before leaving the subject of the *malthakos* and the *trachus*, we should examine a text in which we can see the potential of gentle language within a harsh and challenging environment enacted as a dramatic reality—namely, the *Fourth Pythian*. Written on an epic scale, *P.*4 is concerned much more than any of the other odes with characterization, and as in Homer this characterization is effected primarily through the speeches. Hence, the form of discourse and the nature of language are appropriate concerns in this poem.

It is interesting that, from the whole Argonautic saga, Pindar should choose Jason's confrontation with Pelias as the scene which he highlights in the greatest detail. Our first view of Jason is thus of Jason as orator, making his debut before the ἐν ἀγορᾷ πλήθοντος ὄχλου (v.85). Jason's "kindly words" (v.101 ἀγανοῖσι λόγοις) contrast markedly with the rude and coarsely phrased demand for identification which Pelias has just addressed to him (vv 98-100 καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων σε χαμαιγενέων πολιᾶς/ἐξάνηκεν γαστρός; ἐχθίστοισι μὴ ψεύδεσιν/καταμιάναις εἰπὲ γένναν). Jason's straightforward narration of his background and present purpose belies Pelias' accusation of deceitfulness: Jason's uprightness in life is manifested by his honesty and moderation in speech (v.104f. ἐκτελέσαις...οὔτε ἔργον οὔτ' ἔπος ἐκτράπελον).

Pelias' non-observance of the appropriate hospitality-relation with his ξεῖν' (v.97) contrasts with the warm reception accorded by Jason to his relatives, including the exchange of fitting ξείνι' (v.129). The hospitality and festivity which characterize their relation are reflected by Jason's "gentle discourses" (v.128 μειλιχίοισι λόγοις). But the five days and nights of festivity and gentle words merely build up to the "serious discourse" (v.132 λόγον σπουδαῖον) of the sixth day. Gentleness does not contradict seriousness of speech, but can in fact prove an effective way of making it more persuasive.

We see this persuasive power of the gentle discourse in Jason's second confrontation with Pelias as well:

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[64] For the figures of the Gorgons, see Gildersleeve (1885) 366. Dolin 73, parallels this ambivalence of the Gorgons with the ambivalence of Persephone (v.2), who is a goddess of both death and resurrection, the underworld and fertility.

πραῦν δ' Ἰάσων
μαλθαχᾷ φωνᾷ ποτιστάζων ὄαρον
βάλλετο χρηπῖδα σοφῶν ἐπέων· "Παῖ Ποσειδᾶνος Πετραίου,
ἐντὶ μὲν θνατῶν φρένες ὠκύτεραι
κέρδος αἰνῆσαι πρὸ δίκας δόλιον τραχεῖαν ἑρπόντων πρὸς ἐπίβδαν ὅμως·
ἀλλ' ἐμὲ χρὴ καὶ σὲ θεμισσαμένους ὀργὰς ὑφαίνειν λοιπὸν ὄλβον.

(*P*.4.136-141)

Jason's gentle voice and wise words are intended to quell the emotions, to apply θέμις to "passions,"[65] and thus to avoid the τραχεῖαν ἐπίβδαν which is attendant upon overindulgence and immoderation.[66] The assuaging, healing effect of Jason's words is projected onto the broadly political plane by his desire to do justice as king. He does not care about Pelias' wealth, unjustly won though it may be; Jason's sole concern is with the throne and scepter, by means of which his father once "set straight disputes for the people" (v.153 εὔθυνε λαοῖς δίκας) and by means of which Jason hopes to do the same. Jason's role as the ideal orator in this poem implies his ultimate fitness for the role of ideal statesman. Pindar's characterization of Jason and his gentle words surely draws from Hesiod's picture of the orator-king in the proem to the *Theogony*:

> Whomever of heaven-nourished kings the daughters of great Zeus will honor and look upon at his birth, they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and gentle (μείλιχα) words flow from his mouth. And all the host look to him, deciding law-suits with straight judgments (ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν); he would prudently put an end even to a great dispute, by speaking surely. On this account are kings wise, because they easily make things right again, soothing with gentle words (μαλακοῖσι ἐπέεσσιν) the misguided host. When he comes through a crowd, with gentle (μειλιχίῃ) reverence they ask his blessing like a god's, and he is conspicuous among those gathered. Such is the sacred gift of the Muses to men.
>
> (*Theogony* 81-93)

Just as Jason stood out among the host in the *agora* and was admired by them as if a god (*P*.4.87f.), so is Hesiod's king, and just as the purpose of Jason's gentle words is to promote a peaceful resolution of his dispute with Pelias, such is the purpose of the Hesiodic figure. Jason's aspiration is indeed to be such an orator-king.

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[65] The "gentle words" are thus revealed as a civilizing force, intimately connected with *sophia* and *themis*—intelligence and order—as opposed to the raw passions of uncivilized human nature. On the relation of these themes, cf. Giannini 55f. This constellation reinforces our general identification of the *malthakos* with culture and *technē*.

[66] As the scholia (Σ*P*.4.247 Drachmann) note, ἐπίβδαν is a metaphor referring literally to the "day after the feast." In addition to being an ideal orator and ideal statesman, Jason has also been characterizaed as an ideal host—one who knows when to impose the appropriate limit, when to turn from εὐφροσύναν (v.29) to the λόγον σπουδαῖον (v.132), and thus avoid the hangover and satiety of the ἐπίβδαν.

Jason's powers of persuasion appear to have their effect even on the blustering Pelias: even he now responds gently (v.156 ἀκᾷ δ' ἀνταγόρευσεν καὶ Πελίας). But of course Pelias' gentleness is deceptive rather than real. Pelias conceives the mission to recapture the Golden Fleece so as to provide exactly the sort of κέρδος δόλιον which Jason had warned against; the ultimate result, as Jason had predicted, is that Pelias comes to his τραχεῖαν ἐπίβδαν. Pelias remains in every sense a genuinely *trachus* ruler, quite appropriately addressed as Παῖ Ποσειδᾶνος Πετραίου.

Aeetes is a ruler very similar to Pelias, thinking that he has deceived Jason with a harsh task, but in the end being deceived himself. Here again, Jason's powers of persuasion are crucial: aided by Aphrodite's *iunx* (vv.213-217) and taught the proper verbal incantations (v.217 λιτάς τ' ἐπαοιδάς), he seduces Medea with the μάστιγι Πειθοῦς (v.219) and thus wins her *pharmaka* against physical destruction (v.211f. φαρμακώσαισ' ἀντίτομα στερεᾶν ὀδυνᾶν), even as before, aided by Hera's instillation of *pothos* (vv.184-187),[67] he persuaded the Argonauts to join him in the expedition, and thus to find a *pharmakon* (v.187 φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς) which paradoxically combines death (v.186 ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ) with the indestructibility of fame.

Jason's subsequent yoking of the fire-breathing oxen (and later his slaying of the dragon) is preeminently an athletic feat—an achievement of physical endurance (assisted by the pharmacological *technē* of Medea—cf. v.249). It is thus not unfitting that his companions should crown him like an athletic victor and celebrate his victory with μειλιχίοις λόγοις (v.240). Just as Jason himself once received his relatives with μειλιχίοις λόγοις (v.128), now he is so received. As we observed in the proem to *N.*4, celebration is by its very nature a "gentle" response to the "harshness" inherent in all toil, whether athletic or otherwise. The athletic games which the Argonauts later celebrate on Lemnos (v.253) merely institutionalize into a broader agonistic context the physical toil and victory of Jason in pursuit of the Golden Fleece, and moreover apply the myth to the present athletic victory of Arcesilas.[68]

Jason as the ideal statesman and athlete is thus a positive paradigm for the victorious statesman and athlete Arcesilas.[69] Arcesilas is exhorted to

[67] The theme of erotic persuasion is also manifested in the Lemnian episode (vv.251-256), where the woman who formerly hated men are collectively seduced by the Argonauts.

[68] Even on the most superficial level, the Lemnians provide the transition back to the race of Euphamus, and thus Cyrene (cf. vv.254-256).

[69] But of course Jason's banishment also parallels him to Damophilus. Critics have long perceived a connection between the settlement reached by Jason and Pelias and the reconciliation of Damophilus with Arcesilas. Cf. Boeckh (1821) II:2, 263f.; Dissen (1847) II, 216f.; Gildersleeve (1885) 278. Yet no strict one-to-one correspondence of myth to occa-

be a healer (v.270 ἐσσὶ δ' ἰατὴρ ἐπικαιρότατος), and thus to be like Ἰάσων, whose very name implies his role as a healer.[70] As a healer, he will apply to the wound (= the exile of Damophilus) a "gentle hand" (v.271 μαλακὰν χέρα). Jason's gentle discourse thus prefigures Pindar's remedial discourse and the resulting reconciliation between Arcesilas and Damophilus.

As previously in the poem, this gentle discourse of reconciliation is bound up with the themes of festivity and hospitality. It is on this account that Damophilus' role at the feast (vv.294-296) is emphasized just as much as his role in the council (v.282 ἐν δὲ βουλαῖς πρέσβυς). His ability to silence the forces of harsh discourse (v.283f. ὀρφανίζει μὲν κακὰν γλῶσσαν φαεννᾶς ὀπός,/ἔμαθε δ' ὑβρίζοντα μισεῖν) is balanced by his ability to delight his fellow citizens with the gentle discourse of music (v.295f. ἔν τε σοφοῖς δαιδαλέαν φόρμιγγα βαστάζων πολίταις ἡσυχίᾳ θιγέμεν). The music which he provides must, at least in part, refer to the music of the present poem, which is itself a gentle discourse of persuasion on Damophilus' behalf. The παγὰν ἀμβροσίων ἐπέων (v.229) of Pindar's poetry is the culminating assertion in a long series of statements on the power of gentle language.

This gentle language derives from the *xenos*-relation of Pindar and Damophilus (v.299 πρόσφατον Θήβᾳ ξενωθείς); this poem is thus a sort of *xenion*, or guest-friend gift, from Pindar to Damophilus, which Damophilus in turn gives to Arcesilas.[71] So were the first gentle words of the poem—those of Poseidon/Eurypylus to the Argonauts (v.29 φιλίων ἐπέων)—reflective of hospitality and festivity (v.30f. ξείνοις ἅ τ' ἐλθόντεσσιν εὐεργέται δεῖπν' ἐπαγγέλοντι πρῶτον). All these allusions to guest-friendship and celebration are of course paradigmatic for the present festivity surrounding Arcesilas' chariot-victory, made possible through the generosity of Damophilus. It is only fitting that Damophilus should be included as a guest in the atmosphere of festivity and celebration which he helped create. By offering the *xenion* of the present poem and its gentle words, Damophilus hopes to reestablish, first in the domestic

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sion is really possible. Cogent is the view of Robbins 209, to the effect that the correspondence of myth to occasion is, like so much else in Pindar, ambiguous: Arcesilas is presented with a choice between the positive paradigm of Jason (the man of gentle words and reconciliation) and the negative paradigm of Pelias (the man of harsh words and obstinacy). Arcesilas' claim to the throne (which the Battid myth serves to support—cf. Mezger 217; Illig 76; Thummer (1957) 78; Giannini 39-48) can best be demonstrated by his statesmanlike behaviour: so it is that Jason proves his fitness for rule.

[70] Cf. Finley 85. We have noted above Jason's effective manipulation of *pharmaka*.

[71] ΣP.4.467 Drachmann, contends that this ode was commissioned by Damophilus as a token of his allegiance to the king. This seems to be a reasonable inference; it would otherwise be difficult to justify Damophilus' introduction into the poem (unless we subscribe to the view that Pindar engaged in historical allusions and quarrels completely irrelevant to the encomiastic context).

microcosm, the political order which was founded by the *xenion* of the clod which Poseidon/Eurypylus gave Arcesilas' ancestor Euphamus along with gentle words.

However, Euphamus (whose very name means "good in speech") lost the clod (vv.38-43). It is only his descendent (the stutterer Battus—cf. v.63) who will fulfill his destiny. So the new political order in Cyrene is established only by reconciliation with one who has erred, one who has been flawed in speech. Even as the remedial discourse of the Delphic oracle[72] compensated for Battus' speech-impairment, so the remedial discourse of the *Fourth Pythian* compensates for Damophilus' error in speech. But this error may only make Damophilus all the more experienced and wise a counsellor in the future; his failure in the past may make his gentle words now all the more meaningful a gesture. In the final analysis, "gentle words" in *P.*4 are a metaphor for reconciliation and domestic tranquility: they are the gentle words not only of Jason and the poet, but preeminently of Arcesilas and Damophilus. As we have noted so often before, gentle words reveal their full value only in confrontation with harshness, whether of external enemies or whether representative of the toil and vicissitude which necessarily characterize the human condition in general.

2. *Euthus/Skolios*

Closely related to the *malthakos/trachus* polarity is that of the straight (εὐθύς) and the crooked (σκολιός),[73] which merits a brief mention here on account of its employment in *P.*2.83ff., a passage which has caused much trouble for the commentators, but responds readily to our methodology. The polarity of straight and crooked is fundamental in Hesiod, where the straight is of course associated with the ways of truth, the crooked with the ways of falsehood.[74] The same association is present in Heraclitus, fr.59 DK,[75] and certainly forms the traditional background to Pindar's employment of the polarity. The expected positive valuation of the straight is quite evident in *N.*1 (also, cf. *O.*7.90f., *N.*8.36). Friends of the victor are those who traverse the straight path (*N.*1.25 χρὴ δ' ἐν εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς στείχοντα μάρνασθαι φυᾷ). On the other hand, enemies of peace and

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[72] On the Delphic oracle as a form of remedial discourse, cf. Laín Entralgo 56-58.

[73] For the explicit association of straight/crooked with *malthakos/trachus*, cf. Solon 4.36f. εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα πραΰνει.

[74] See Pucci (1977) 16-21.

[75] For the text and interpretation of this fragment, cf. Kirk 97-104. Compare also *Il.*16.387; Theognis 535f., 1147; Pindar, *N.*10.12, and fr.213. The straight/crooked opposition is one of the ten Pythagorean oppositions (cf. p.34 n.65 *supra*), with the expected positive valorization of the first term.

world-order are represented as those who take the crooked path of excess (*N.* 1.64f. τινα σὺν πλαγίῳ ἀνδρῶν κόρῳ στείχοντα τὸν ἐχθρότατον) and are in the end slain by the civilizer Heracles. But Sicily (v.15), Heracles (v.43), and Teiresias (v.61) are all described as in some sense "upright" (ὀρθός).

However, in *P.* 2.83-88, Pindar appears to be praising the crooked path:

> φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν·
> ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἅτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι,
> ἄλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς.
> ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει,
> παρὰ τυραννίδι, χὠπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός,
> χὤταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωνται.

This statement seems especially strange since Pindar has just finished attacking "crooked" slanderers and "foxes" (v.75 ψιθύρων παλάμαις, v.76f. διαβολιᾶν ὑποφάτιες, ὀργαῖς ἀτενὲς ἀλωπέκων ἴκελοι), and since he proceeds in the very next line to praise the man who is "straight in tongue" (v.86 εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνήρ) and speaks his mind under all forms of government. It accordingly seems incredible to many critics that Pindar himself could under any condition advocate treading the very path of crookedness which he has elsewhere so strongly condemned. Farnell goes so far as to say that this passage is Pindar's "worst piece of composition, in which he seems to lose his head and to show a weakness of brain that he never shows elsewhere."[76]

But it is on principle wrong to attribute our own failure in understanding Pindar's "logic" to a lack of logic on his part; we must recognize that Pindar's logic is somewhat different from ours. The present passage may be illuminated by our study of the *malthakos/trachus* dialectic and its proportion of gentleness to friends, harshness to enemies. Among friends one should use the straight path, but it is sometimes necessary to fight enemies with their own wiles (cf. *I.* 4.52 χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν); it is sometimes necessary to be *trachus* (or *skolios*) in order to protect the positively valorized *malthakos* (or *euthus*) relations from the threat of enemies who are themselves even more *trachus* (or *skolios*).[77] Like *malthakos/trachus*, the *euthus/skolios* opposition is thus mediated by

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[76] Farnell II, 131. He accordingly accepts the solution of Gildersleeve (1885) 255f., which is to make this whole section a dialogue between Pindar and his envious adversary. But in addition to the total lack of precedent for such a dialogue in early Greek lyric (Bacchylides 18 is altogether different, with the division between coryphaeus and chorus clearly marked by strophes), the internal mechanics of Gildersleeve's division are highly dubious (cf. Schroeder (1922) 22).

[77] Pindar not only attacks λύκοιο δίκαν ("in the manner of a wolf") but also practices λύκοιο δίκαν in the sense of exacting "a wolf's justice," which demands tit-for-tat and responds to enemies with equal countervailing force.

kairos—the ability to distinguish between circumstances in which one should be straight (among friends) and those in which one should be crooked (among enemies).[78]

Bundy is surely right in identifying the foxes of v.77 as representative of pure technicism.[79] Accordingly, Pindar's fighting them like a wolf need not necessarily mean that the fights them with lies of his own, but could imply that he fights them with *technai* of his own—i.e., his poetry.[80] Much of the difficulty of this passage arises from a shift of the straight/crooked polarity from its traditional association with truth/falsehood to a derivative association with *physis*/*technē* (*physis* is straightforward and simple, *technē* more complicated and therefore "crooked").[81] In fact, Pindar fights the crookedness of the sycophants (cunning as deceit) with a very different and much more honorable kind of crookedness—that of cunning as art.[82] This kind of crookedness does not contradict truthfulness—being εὐθύγλωσσος (v.86)—but actually serves it. The foxes (sycophants) fight by means of deception, whereas the wolf (Pindar) admits his enmity and presumes to fight openly.[83] In this way, the straight (as truthfulness) may contain its opposite (the crooked as artfulness) without self-negation. But of course, this crookedness is most artful in its very self-denial, i.e., in its insistence on its own straightforwardness.[84]

3. *Alatheia*/*Pseudos*

Our examination of the straight/crooked polarity and its problematics calls for a broader consideration of truth and falsehood in Pindar. Just as we noted a certain ambivalence in the notion of "crookedness" (= falseness, or artfulness), we can note that the same ambivalence is also internal to the notion of falsehood (= deceit, or mimesis). The question of

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[78] This sense of proportion contrasts with the sycophant described in the immediately preceding lines, who indiscriminately fawns upon all (v.82 ὁμῶς μὰν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντας), and potentially slanders all. For the general association of the straight as behaviour appropriate among friends, the crooked among enemies, compare the familiar scolion εὐθὺν χρὴ τὸν ἑταίρον ἔμμεν καὶ μὴ σκολιὰ φρονεῖν (fr.892 PMG).

[79] Bundy (1962) I, 30.

[80] Cf. *N.*1.25 τέχναι δ' ἑτέρων ἕτεραι, immediately before the "straight path" = *physis* equation just cited. See our discussion on p.53f. above.

[81] Crookedness is associated especially with *mētis* (cf. ἀγκυλομήτεω Κρόνου) which, in its positive aspect implies *technē*, in its negative aspect *pseudos*.

[82] On the "crookedness" of Pindar's art, see our discussion of *poikilia* on p.101 below.

[83] On these general characteristics of the fox and the wolf, see Detienne-Vernant 50f. n.66.

[84] It is the character of *mētis* to conceal itself as its opposite—unthreatening simplicity. See Detienne-Vernant 21-23.

truth and falsehood is thus of profound importance for our evaluation of Pindar's poetics and the nature of his representational act.

This is not the place for a complete review of Pindar's terms for truth and falsehood,[85] or for a history of the philosophical dimensions of this polarity. But we can make certain observations which call into question any unilateral view of its operation. Marcel Detienne's seminal study of truth in archaic Greece[86] reminds us that truth was not always regarded in the objective, factual terms of modern science, but was for the archaic mind a social determination. Detienne has shown that the original polarity was not between *alētheia* and *pseudos*, but between *alētheia* and *lēthē*: truth is assertion or praise of a *laudandus* which will result in his remembrance, while *lēthē* is non-assertion and oblivion. And deception was not always a negative quality: *peithō* and *apatē* were cardinal elements in the development of rhetorical and sophistical discourse. Assertions of truth might very well contain elements of deception, and deception might very well employ truth-assertions. This potential interpenetration of truth and falsehood contrasts with the radical polarization of these notions by the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, and later philosophical traditions (which are closer to our modern view). Pindar stands at the brink in the history of ideas when poetic assertion could still be regarded as *alētheia*, and *apatē* could still be regarded as the necessary mode of confronting the world's process and ambiguity, but when these notions were also beginning to be infused with positive and negative ethical valuations by contemporary religious and philosophical thought.

We have seen that the straight (honest) path in Pindar is simple and straightforward, without any complications that might conceal ambivalence or qualification. But the crooked (dishonest) path is erratic and variegated, full of zig-zag contradictions and reversals. Applied to verbal discourse, this concept of *variatio* is expressed by the term ποικιλία, which Pindar commonly uses to describe his own poetry.[87] But Pindar also uses ποικιλία as a term designating falsehood and deceit.[88] There may therefore be a sense in which the "crookedness" and elaborate complexity (metrical, structural, logical) of Pindar's discourse nests the possibility of deceit.

We have already observed this possibility inherent in the remedial

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[85] For this, see the thorough study of Komornicka (1979).

[86] Detienne (1967).

[87] Cf. *O*.6.87, *P*.9.77, *N*.5.42, *N*.8.15, fr.179, fr.194, and Maehler 70, 90f. For the "crooked" and variegated path of Pindar's poetry, compare the flitting bee of *P*.10.53f. (also, cf. *P*.11.38f.)

[88] Cf. *O*.1.29, *N*.5.28f., *N*.8.25. On the traditional associations of this word with deceit, cf. Komornicka (1979) 141-144, Detienne-Vernant 18f.

power of the Pindaric *logos*, which "charms" the listener.[89] This "charming" is pleasant, but at the same time constitutes an impairment in the rational faculties, such as to grant the charming discourse a manipulative power over the listener. In *N.*4.1-8, we observed that the charming discourse effects a *latha ponōn*—a propitious "forgetting" or "softening" of unpleasant truth (= pain). And as we have noted, *latha* is necessarily antithetical to *alatheia*.[90] But like all *pharmaka*, the charming discourse can also be abused to effect less propitious forgettings of truth.[91]

Just as the discourse of the Hesiodic Muses features the ambivalent potential for both truth and lies (*Theogony* 26-28),[92] so does Pindar's discourse, in the form of selective remembrance and selective forgetting.[93] For all his protestations of truthfulness and sincerity, Pindar recognizes that truth is not an absolute good, and thus that falsehood is not an absolute evil. Thus he chooses not to mention Peleus' and Telamon's murder of their brother Phocus, since this truth is not a good truth:

> στάσομαι· οὔ τοι κερδίων
> φαίνοισα πρόσωπον ἀλάθει' ἀτρεκής·
> καὶ τὸ σιγᾶν πολλάκις ἐστὶ σοφώτατον ἀνθρώπῳ νοῆσαι.
>
> (*N.*5.16-18)

"Exact truth" is not always conducive to *kerdos*—the best interests of both subject and object. But a softened truth, revised and purged of unpleasant details, is often more appropriate, even though less ἀτρεκής. The same idea is expressed in even more emphatic terms by fr.42:

> χαλῶν μὲν ὧν μοῖράν τε τερπνῶν
> ἐς μέσον χρὴ παντὶ λαῷ
> δειχνύναι· εἰ δέ τις ἀνθρώποισι θεόσδοτος † ἀτληχηχότας
> προστύχῃ, ταύταν σχότει χρύπτειν ἔοιχεν.

Pindaric *mimēsis* is therefore not an act of simple reduplication, but a revisionary process which transforms the object through selective remembrance (presence) and forgetting (absence). Pindar's is properly an act of re-presentation. The Pindaric mirror does not reflect all reality, but is specifically a "mirror for fair deeds:"

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[89] See p.91f. above.

[90] See p.68 n.169 *supra*.

[91] θέλγω is associated with deceit and lies in the pre-Pindaric tradition. Cf. Homer, *Il.*12.245f., 21.276, 604; *Od.*1.59f., 16.194f.; Theognis 981; and Komornicka (1979) 173f.

[92] For the interpretation of this passage, see Pucci (1977) 8-16.

[93] This homology truth: falsehood:: remembrance: forgetting is also articulated by the Hesiodic text (*Th.*52-55); see Pucci (1977) 22-27, and generally, Detienne (1967) 9-27, 47f.

ἔργοις δὲ καλοῖς ἔσοπτρον ἴσαμεν ἑνὶ σὺν τρόπῳ,
εἰ Μναμοσύνας ἕκατι λιπαράμπυκος
εὕρηται ἄποινα μόχθων κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς.

(*N.* 7.14-16)

The re-presented reality of Pindar's epinicia does not include those aspects which are not *kalos* (such as the less seemly aspects of Ajax' or Neoptolemus' death).[94] Through the selecting power of Mnemosyne, these details are deflected and the image is thus "turned" (ἑνὶ σὺν τρόπῳ).[95] It is clear from the context that the "mirror" is formed by flowing water (= the streams of the Muses in *N.* 7.12),[96] with all its capacity for transformation, flux, and distortion of the image.

This distorting reflection (or rather, inflection) of historical or mythical reality is most clearly revealed in "hush-passages" like those of *N.* 5.16-18, *O.* 9.35-41, or *O.* 13.91. The unseemly continuation or conclusion of a myth is not denied or cancelled, but simply absent—indefinitely deferred. However, Pindar's revision of the Pelops-myth in *O.* 1 is not a mere *deferment*, but a positive *difference*:[97] the myth is declared "false" (*O.* 1.28-34, 46-51) and Pindar substitutes for it another version which seems more suitable. Nowhere does Pindar explicitly assert that his version is the "true" version. He merely claims that his version is more conducive to *kerdos*:

ἔστι δ' ἀνδρὶ φάμεν ἐοικὸς ἀμφὶ δαιμόνων καλά. μείων γὰρ αἰτία.

ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαργον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι·
ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους.

(*O.* 1.35, 52f.)

Critics have been inclined to see in Pindar's treatment of myth a deeply ingrained religious prudery which refuses to believe the gods capable of anything less than exemplary behaviour. Without going into the question of what Pindar believed to be the "true" version of the myth (if he believed any version to be "true"), it must be noted that ancient authors felt remarkably free about revising and manipulating myths to suit their

[94] The difference between the Neoptolemus-myths of *Paean* 6 and *N.* 7 consists in the latter's more favorable selection of details (as befits an Aeginetan ode), not in any alteration of the story itself. Cf. Köhnken 40, Gentili (1979) 13.

[95] This is complemented by Pindar's assertion at the end of the poem that his words about Neoptolemus have not been ἄτροπος (i.e., without revision). On the poetic implications of τρόπος in archaic texts as a term for revisionary re-presentation, or "turning," see Pucci (1982) 50-57. It is significant that the Pindaric text "turns" reality "in one way": the text enhances the good, but is unconcerned with revision in the other direction (debasing the bad).

[96] Cf. Dissen (1821) II:2, 419; Bury (1890) 116.

[97] On *différence* ("difference") and *différance* ("deferment") as the two basic operations of linguistic revision, see Derrida (1972b) 1-29.

own utilitarian exigencies. But this revisionary inflection is simultaneously repressed by the Pindaric text's recurrent proclamations of truth.[98] In light of what we have learned about Pindaric mimesis, these proclamations are better taken as assertions of sincerity than of historical accuracy.[99] Even while fictional and "false" on the realistic level of the signifieds, there may be a higher and more essential level on which the signifiers are "true," inasmuch as they are appropriate and self-consistent. Pindar's is a poetic truth, not an historical truth.

This complex array of representational dialectics may be better illustrated by turning to a more detailed analysis of one of the texts which we have mentioned—*N.*5. This text announces itself with the famous assertion:

> Οὐχ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ', ὥστ' ἐλινύσοντα ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ' ἐπ' αὐτᾶς
> βαθμίδος
> ἑσταότ'· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσας ὁλκάδος ἔν τ' ἀκάτῳ, γλυκεῖ' ἀοιδά,
> στεῖχ' ἀπ' Αἰγίνας, διαγγέλλοισ' ὅτι
> Λάμπωνος υἱὸς Πυθέας εὐρυσθενὴς
> νίκη Νεμείοις παγκρατίου στέφανον,
>
> (*N.*5.1-5)

Pindar's art is not like the sculptor's realistic technique which exposes its object from every side. Pindar's representation is dynamic rather than static:[100] the text is not a still-life artifact, but a process of verbal dissemination from mouth to mouth around the world. With this dissemination comes the possibility of difference—revisionary forgetting and remembering, reinterpretation, and re-presentation. Motion entails mutation. The nautical imagery implies the progressively increasing distance between signifier (the song) and signified (at Aegina): the Pindaric signifier is fluid, and thus resists objectification into a fixed and tangible perimeter (like that of the sculpture on its pedestal).

This fluidity and flexibility of the text is evidenced even in its own internal structural dynamics—its capacity to reveal and not reveal, to conceal and deconceal. It is appropriate to remember the sons of Aeacus and their birth on Aegina, but better to leave unmentioned their reason for emigrating. This touched-up picture is the rationale for the assertion that

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[98] Cf. *O.*2.92, *O.*4.21f., *O.*6.20.,90f., *O.*7.53, *O.*10.3-6, *O.*11.6, *O.*13.52,98f., *P.*2.86, *P.*4.278f., *N.*1.18, *N.*7.49f.,63, *Parth.*2.38, fr.11, fr.205.

[99] See Detienne (1967) 27, my translation: "On this level of thought, if the poet is truly inspired, if his language bases itself on a gift of vision, his utterance tends to identify itself with 'Truth.'" We should interpret the objective truth-exhortations of *P.*1.86 and *P.*3.103f. in the same light. On the general equation of truth and praise in Pindar, cf. Pucci (1980a) 164f.

[100] On the rest/motion-polarity and its reversals throughout the text of *N.*5, see the excellent essay of Segal (1974) 397-411.

"not every exact truth revealing its visage is more profitable " (v.16f.). We thus see the Pindaric text calling attention to its own mimetic freedom and capacity for *apatē*. But the very fact that the text calls attention to its *apatē* is a stroke of extraordinary candor and sincerity which is almost sufficient to atone for the self-conscious deception, without cancelling its effectiveness.

The same revisionary process operates, although less overtly, in the Muses' song at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. We are told much about Peleus' virtuous resistance of Hippolyta's advances, and about Thetis as the gods' reward for his virtue. But we do not hear about Peleus' reason for being in the house of Acastus,[101] nor do we hear about what happens after Hippolyta's accusation of Peleus,[102] nor do we hear about the difficulties which Peleus has with Thetis after the gods grant her to him.[103] None of these details, however important they may be to the narrative of the Peleus-saga, are conducive to the glorification of Peleus and Thetis or to the enhancement of their wedding.

The Muses' song as a whole constitutes a positive enhancement of reality—a benign manipulation of truth through selection. But the story contains within it a much more insidious and pernicious kind of falsehood, seen in Hippolyta's discourse of deception:

Πηλέα θ', ὥς τέ νιν ἁβρὰ Κρηθεῖς Ἱππολύτα δόλῳ πεδᾶσαι
ἤθελε ξυνᾶνα Μαγνήτων σκοπὸν
πείσαισ' ἀκοίταν ποικίλοις βουλεύμασιν,
ψεύσταν δὲ ποιητὸν συνέπαξε λόγον,
ὡς ἦρα νυμφείας ἐπείρα
κεῖνος ἐν λέκτροις Ἀκάστου
εὐνᾶς· τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἔσκεν·
πολλὰ γάρ νιν παντὶ θυμῷ
παρφαμένα λιτάνευεν.
τοῖο δ' ὀργὰν κνίζον αἰπεινοὶ λόγοι·
εὐθὺς δ' ἀπανάνατο νύμφαν,

(*N*.5.26-33)

The emphasis throughout this passage is not so much on the moral outrage of Hippolyta's cunning, as upon its verbal sophistication. She persuades her husband with plots which are ποικίλοις ("dappled" with

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[101] Peleus was purified by Acastus for the killing of Eurytion, who had just purified him for the murder of Phocus. Cf. Ps.-Apollodorus, *Bibl.*3.13.1f.

[102] Acastus took Peleus on a hunt, stole his magic sword while Peleus was asleep, and attempted to kill him with it. Cf.*N*.4.59f.

[103] On Thetis' metamorphoses in order to escape the humiliating marriage with a mortal, cf. *N*.4.62-65. Neither is any mention made here of Zeus' real reason for wanting Thetis married to Peleus (in order to remove from his own desire the goddess who, according to Prometheus' prophecy, would bear a son greater than his father).

white and black, illumination and obfuscation, true and false). Out of such scraps of reality and fiction, she carefully fits together a ψεύσταν ποιητὸν λόγον.[104] And before, she attempted to win over Peleus with her cunning discourse, παρφαμένα (literally, "speaking to the side (of truth)");[105] in contrast to her crooked deflection from the path of truth, Peleus responds εὐθύς (in addition to being the adverb "immediately," this word can also be a nominative adjective defining Peleus' "straight" moral/rhetorical posture). Hippolyta is ἀβρά, and thus a master of the alluring *malthakos* discourse,[106] but to Peleus her λόγοι become αἰπεινοί and thus harshly "grate" (κνίζον) on him.[107]

The contrastive significance of Hippolyta's discourse of deception is underlined by v.42, which qualifies epinician song with the same adjective *poikilos* which had before been applied to her discourse. Pindar's discourse and Hippolyta's both employ deception through the selective and revisionary re-presentation of reality. But the enhancing deception of poetry stands as a necessary antidote to the malicious, envious falsehoods by which Pindar's *laudandi* may have been victimized in other contexts. Harshness is needed to combat the harsh, crookedness to combat the crooked, lies to combat lies, and arts to combat arts. Pindar's opposition must always be defeated on its own terms. We have perceived throughout our study that there is no absolute good or bad ethical valuation of these terms.

The problem of truth and falsehood ultimately points toward that of nature and art. Falsehood in Pindar may be a revisionary enhancement of truth, even as art positively enhances nature. Indeed, representation is an "artistic" act. Deceit involves the intellectual powers of *dolos*, *mēchana*, *mētis*, and *technē*, all of which can, like deceit itself, be used to either good or bad ends. Learning divorced from natural talent and malicious slander devoid of truth are the typical marks of the envious opposition; these must be countered by the poet's enrichment of genius with art, and amplification of inner truth with utilitarian deceit.

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[104] The terms used here to describe Hippolyta's discourse are reminiscent of the terms which Pindar commonly uses to describe his own. ποικίλος we have noted already. "Fitting together" (συνέπαξε) is also a Pindaric metaphor for poetic composition: compare ἅρμοσαν in *P.*3.114 and our discussion of ἁρμονία in *P.*8.68 (see n.53 *supra*), and in general see Nagy 297-300. ποιητόν here has the sense of "made-up" or "fictional," but this is not far from the use of ποιέω to designate poetic representation, already current in Herodotus (1.23, 2.53, 3.38, 4.14, 4.16) and later common in Plato and the orators.

[105] On the implications of this word, see Detienne (1967) 67f.; Pucci (1977) 17f.; Komornicka (1979) 171f.

[106] On the connection of softness with falsehood, see our discussion of *N.*4.1-8 (p.102 above), and compare Hesiod, *Th.* 90 (where *malthakos* is coupled with *parphami*), discussed by Pucci (1977) 17-20.

[107] On the "grating" effect of the *malthakos* indulged to excess, cf. *P.*8.29-32 (compare *N.*7.52f.).

CHAPTER THREE
RELATIONS OF TRANSFORMATION

1. *Physis/Technē*

Certainly one of the most common polarities in Pindar is that of nature and art, φύσις and τέχνη. These terms describe neither the magnitude nor quality of poet's and athlete's achievements, but their genesis and enhancement. Hence, *physis* and *technē* are understandably important for any consideration either of Pindar's poetics or his general *Weltanschauung*.

We have confronted the nature/art-opposition several times already, both as a rhetorical antithesis (cf. *N.*1.25, *N.*3.40-42) and as a deep structure. We have noted the affinity of art to the *malthakos*, of unmodified nature to the *trachus*; song and medicine are both gentle arts which assuage the raw *ponos* characteristic of the human condition (and represented paradigmatically by the athlete's toil). If we turn to the myth of *O.*13, Athena's invention of the bridle shows us technology as a limiting and refining capacity (*peras*), while nature without art tends toward the *apeirōn*, like the unbridled fury of the soaring Pegasus. But at the same time, we have also seen fit to associate *physis* with the inherent and *oikeion* (which is in a sense limited), *technē* with the imported and *allotrion* (which is not limited). *Physis* is original and primary, while *technē* can be seen as an external addition to it. This polyvalent associativity of the *physis/technē*-opposition points toward its fundamental ambivalence, especially when we consider the ambivalence of each of the oppositions with which we have associated it.

This is not the place to discuss the many senses of the word φύσις in early Greek.[1] Here, it should suffice to note that for Pindar, φύσις is used only twice (*N.*6.5, *I.*4.49) and both times refers to bodily form; its synonym φυά is extended to include internal qualities of character as well (cf. *O.*2.86, *P.*8.44, *N.*1.25, *N.*7.54).[2] But both in their strict (bodily) and extended (ethical) use, the words retain their etymological sense (from φύω) and thus emphasize genetic inheritance. *Physis* does not mean "Nature" in the Romantic or Platonic sense, just as *technē* in Pindar does not refer to "Art," but to "an art."[3] Even though *physis* and *technē* do not possess the degree of abstractness for Pindar that they do for the later sophists,

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[1] For this discussion, see Beardslee *passim*, Thimme *passim*, and Heinimann 89-109.

[2] Cf. Thimme 18-21, Heinimann 99.

[3] *Phya*, especially inasmuch as it refers to inborn character, does possess a certain degree of abstraction; *technē* is less abstract, although Pindar does use its plural (*technai*) to refer to "the various arts," which approaches an abstract sense.

the antithesis between inborn and cultivated qualities, or nature and nurture, is nevertheless very real for him.

There has been an unconscious tendency among Pindaric critics to construe the *physis/technē*-opposition along the lines of *physis/nomos* or *ergon/logos*, valorizing the first term as "truth," while denigrating the second term to the derivative status of "appearance" or "limitation." They have typically regarded passages such as *O.*2.86, *O.*8.51f., *O.*9.100, *N.*1.25, and *N.*3.40-42 as reflections of Pindar's aristocratic temperament for which "genius, which is implanted at one's birth (φυᾷ) and is a gift of God, is everything."[4] But we have already observed the danger of taking such gnomes out of context and privileging them as the poet's doctrine.[5] All gnomes in Pindar are at best provisional. One suspects that the arrogant, aristocratic defender of *phya* whom some Pindaric critics have drawn for us may be the same fiction as the serene apostle of *sōphrosynē* and quietism whom they have depicted in other contexts. As we observed at the beginning of our inquiry, this portrait of Pindar is tainted by a "metaphysics of presence" which does not do justice to the dialectical complexity of his thought. *Physis/technē* may be just as ambivalent for Pindar as *physis/nomos* and *ergon/logos* come to be for later rhetoric.

Certainly inborn excellence is the basis for all achievement, whether in the poetic or athletic realm. But *phya* is a mere potential for *sophia*, a potentiality which can be enhanced only through nurture, training, exercise, effort—in short, what Pindar calls "toil and expense"—πόνος δαπάνα τε (*O.*5.16, *I.*1.42, *I.*5.57, *I.*6.10f.). All of these factors—both those which reflect the learner's own exertions (*ponos*) and those which derive from external guidance (bought by *dapana*)—compose the kind of discipline which may be called a *technē.* The succession of *technē* from teacher to student is not unlike the genetic inheritance of *phya* from generation to generation. The inculcation of *technē* requires divine assistance every bit as much as the transmission of *phya*, since all *technai* ultimately originate from the gods.[6] This similarity of *phya* and *technē* makes it wrong to sunder them absolutely; they are, in fact, caught up in a complementary dialectic. In conclusion, we can say that *phya* uncontaminated by the training of *technē* (whether the poet's or the athlete's) is just as ineffectual as learning (*technē*) without inborn aptitude (*phya*). The fact that Pindar may polemicize against the latter imbalance more than

[4] Farnell II, 74. For a similar valorization of *physis*, cf. Gildersleeve (1885) xxxiii; Gundert 15-19; Becker 63-68; Bowra (1964) 6f.

[5] See p.7 *supra.*

[6] The figure of Athena is especially significant as the goddess who transmits *technē* to mortals (cf. *O.*7.50f., *P.*12.6, and the myth of *O.*13). *Technē* is also associated with Zeus (*O.*9.52), Apollo (*P.*3.11), Hephaestus (*O.*7.35), and of course, the Muses (*Paean* 7B.18-20, 9.39).

against the former only reflects the nature of his intellectual opponents; some sophists may have claimed the universal possibility of education (regardless of birth or class), but no one—not even the most self-conscious aristocrat—would claim that birth was alone sufficient for achievement, regardless of training.

We can look at the dialectic another way. *Physis* is substance and thus ontologically anterior; *technē* is form, and although later, is in the end just as important in determining the shape and outcome of any activity. The author of the treatise *On the Sublime*, who is a much more acute classicist than is often recognized, seems to have understood well the proper relation of these terms:

> Nature (ἡ φύσις), although generally autonomous in matters of passion and sublimity, nevertheless is not wont to be something random and altogether without method (ἀμέθοδον). For in all things nature stands as a first and archetypal element of creation, but method (ἡ μέθοδος) is sufficient to provide and contribute quantities and opportunity (καιρόν) for everything, as well as the most unerring practice and application. And grand things are rather dangerous by themselves without knowledge, if left unstable and unsupported, and if left over to nothing but their own motion and unlearned (ἀμαθεῖ) daring (τόλμῃ). For they often need the goad, and often the bridle.
>
> (Ps.-Longinus 2.2)

Physis, although providing the material and even inspiration, is by itself raw and undisciplined; perfection can be attained only through the modulating power of *technē*, and its dialectical powers of stimulation and restraint, the goad and the bridle.[7] The author goes on to say that the greatest good is "faring well," but "second and not less is deliberating well." And of course, "nature (ἡ μὲν φύσις) controls the ordering of good fortune, art (ἡ τέχνη δὲ) that of good counsel." This is like the Pindaric dialectic expressed at the end of *P.*1:

> τὸ δὲ παθεῖν εὖ πρῶτον ἀέθλων·
> εὖ δ' ἀκούειν δευτέρα μοῖρ'· ἀμφοτέροισι δ' ἀνὴρ
> ὃς ἂν ἐγκύρσῃ καὶ ἕλῃ,
> στέφανον ὕψιστον δέδεκται.
>
> (*P.*1.99f.)

[7] Compare the twin inventions of Corinthian *technē* celebrated in *O.*13.16-20 - the ox-goading (βοηλάτᾳ) dithyramb and the equine bridle (μέτρα). For the same antithesis of the goad and the bridle, we may also compare Isocrates' statement concerning Theopompus and Ephorus (Cic., *Brutus* 204), or Plato's concerning Aristotle and Xenocrates (Diog. Laer. 4.6), or Aristotle's concerning Callisthenes and Theophrastus (Diog. Laer. 5.39). Cf. Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 25.6. The antithesis was no doubt proverbial even in Pindar's time.

The same dyad is found in *O*.5.25-27, *P*.10.22, *N*.1.32, *N*.9.46f., *I*.5.12f., and *I*.6.9-11.[8] *Physis* is good fortune, but good repute can be assured only through the *technē* of poetic celebration. Thus, although *physis* may be primary and anterior, it depends for its preservation upon *technē*, which although second, is in the end equally important.[9]

Pindar had ample authority in tradition for this positive valuation of *technē*. In their study of *mētis* in Greek mythology, Detienne and Vernant have emphasized the often neglected importance of cunning, intellect, and artifice, which are, for the Greeks, in a sense even more important than physical strength. The praise of μῆτις and μαχανά is every bit as common in Pindar as that of *phya*.[10] Both words are sometimes used of the poet's art (cf. *O*.1.9, *P*.8.34, *N*.3.9, *N*.7.22, *I*.4.2, *Paean* 7B.17). Even a term such as δόλος can be used positively by Pindar (cf. *O*.9.91, *P*.2.39); τέχνα quite often has this same sense of "cunning" or "device" (cf. *O*.9.52, *P*.2.32, *P*.3.11, *P*.4.249, *N*.4.58, *I*.4.37). Hence, τέχνα even in the more general sense of "art" or "craft" cannot be dissociated from this conceptual framework. Perhaps Pindar's favored term for developed technical, intellectual, and poetic skill is σοφία,[11] which stands as a mediating term between *physis* and *technē*. The capacity for "skill" is necessarily inborn (and thus *physis*), but at the same time can have no significance unless actualized in consistent practice (and thus formalized into a method or *technē*). Skill involves both talent and discipline.

The necessity of *technē* in addition to *physis* can readily be illustrated by an ode such as *I*.4. Pindar describes the victor Melissus with a twin animal metaphor:

> τόλμᾳ γὰρ εἰκὼς
> θυμὸν ἐριβρεμετᾶν θηρῶν λεόντων
> ἐν πόνῳ, μῆτιν δ' ἀλώπηξ, αἰετοῦ ἅ τ' ἀναπιτναμένα ῥόμβον ἴσχει.
> χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν.
> οὐ γὰρ φύσιν Ὠαριωνείαν ἔλαχεν·
> ἀλλ' ὀνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι,
> συμπεσεῖν δ' ἀκμᾷ βαρύς.
>
> (*I*.4.49-55)

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[8] See Bundy (1962) II, 72 n.93.

[9] Cf. *O*.6.46, *O*.7.50-53, *O*.10.20f., *N*.1.24-30, *N*.4.1-8, 82-85, *N*.7.11-16, *N*.9.6f., *I*.7.16-19, and the general *Sieg-Lied* motif catalogued by Schadewaldt 298-306. Also compare the role of the Muses in the *Hymn to Zeus* and the analysis of Pucci (1980a) 163-166.

[10] For μῆτις, cf. *O*.13.50, *P*.4.58, 262, *P*.9.38, *I*.4.47. For μαχανά, cf. *P*.1.41, *P*.3.62, 109, *P*.8.75.

[11] On σοφία in Pindar, cf. Gladigow 39-55, and Gianotti (1975a) 95-109, who emphasizes the "technical" implications of the word. In our earliest texts, *sophia* is little more than a synonym for *technē*, but Pindar makes *sophia* depend also on *physis* (cf. *O*.2.86, *O*.9.28f.) and thus renders the notion more complex.

In respect of "boldness," "heart," and "toil"—everything that can, in short, be subsumed under the notion of *physis*—the athlete is like the mighty lion. But in respect of μῆτιν (and thus *technē*), he is like the crafty fox.[12] The ideal athlete clearly combines excellence in both realms. The fox's clever tricks, such as rolling over on its back, can elude even the superior *physis* of the eagle.[13] V.52 generalizes the fox's behaviour into a recommendation of polymorphic artifice and fluidity (πᾶν ἔρδοντ') as a technique of coping with enemies of all sorts.[14] Norwood has gone so far as to deny the Pindaric authorship of this ode on account of its "cynical morality" and positive valorization of cunning.[15] But this opinion is merely an extreme application of the erroneous view that Pindar one-sidedly valued *phya* above *technē.*

Technē is particularly important in the case of a pancratist like Melissus. The scholiast is probably right in identifying the fox's clever twisting and turning in v.51 as an allusion to the wrestler's tricks.[16] Even though he may be ὀνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι, Melissus is nevertheless a skilled wrestler (συμπεσεῖν δ' ἀκμᾷ βαρύς). Here *physis* is superficial (and deceptive) appearance, whereas art becomes more of an internalized ability (and thus inner truth); this formulation contrasts with the more usual teaching that nature is truth, art at best an imitation. The same inner/outer tension[17] is also applied to Heracles, who is a clear paradigm for Melissus, being μορφὰν βραχύς (v.57), but ψυχὰν δ' ἄκαμπτος (v.58), using his superior *technē* in wrestling to defeat the much larger (and in purely *physical* terms, more powerful) Antaeus. The marks of physical inadequacy which characterize Melissus and Heracles (both of whom are nevertheless victorious) suggest that *physis* by itself may not be the determining factor either in athletics or human life as a whole.

The same implication has already been made in the preceding Ajax-myth:

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[12] For the same dyad, cf. *O.*11.19f., fr.237, and Bundy (1962) I, 29f. Even the scholiast (Σ*I.*4.77b Drachmann) recognizes the fox as τεχνικός.

[13] For the eagle as a figure of superior *physis*, cf. *P.*5.111f., *I.*6.50, and especially *O.*2.86-88. On the fox's ruses of "reversal," see Detienne-Vernant 35-37.

[14] On the polymorphic nature of *mētis*, see Detienne-Vernant 18-20.

[15] Norwood (1945) 172-175; he objects to the sentiment of v.52 in particular (as do Wilamowitz (1922) 341 and Farnell I, 259). But the idea here is really no different from *P.*2.83-85 (on which, see p.99f. *supra*).

[16] Σ*I.*4.77c Drachmann. The pancratium especially involves this kind of motion and flexibility, since it permits leg-holds and other tricks not allowed in normal wrestling. See Philostratus, *Im.* 2.6, 348.24-349.19 K, and Gardiner (1930) 212-221.

[17] Detienne-Vernant 21-23, mark as one of the characteristic features of *mētis* its ability to conceal itself, to appear to be something more innocent that it actually is, i.e., specifically to dissociate inner and outer.

ἔστιν δ' ἀφάνεια τύχας καὶ μαρναμένων,
πρὶν τέλος ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι.
τῶν τε γὰρ καὶ τῶν διδοῖ·
καὶ κρέσσον' ἀνδρῶν χειρόνων
ἔσφαλε τέχνα καταμάρψαισ'· ἴστε μὰν
Αἴαντος ἀλκάν, φοίνιον τὰν ὀψίᾳ
ἐν νυκτὶ ταμὼν περὶ ᾧ φασγάνῳ, μομφὰν ἔχει
παίδεσσιν Ἑλλάνων, ὅσοι Τροίανδ' ἔβαν.
ἀλλ' Ὅμηρός τοι τετίμακεν δι' ἀνθρώπων, ὃς αὐτοῦ
πᾶσαν ὀρθώσαις ἀρετὰν κατὰ ῥάβδον ἔφρασεν
θεσπεσίων ἐπέων λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀθάνατον φωνᾶεν ἕρπει,
εἴ τις εὖ εἴπῃ τι·

(*I*.4.33-45)

τέχνα can allow men who are inferior in terms of pure *physis* to defeat those who are stronger. The contest of Odysseus and Ajax over the arms of Achilles is a case in point.[18] In the two odes where Pindar treats this myth more extensively (*N*.7.20-30, *N*.8.21-34), Ajax is presented as a man of deeds, but not words (cf. *N*.8.24 ἄγλωσσον μέν, ἦτορ δ' ἄλκιμον); this imbalance results in insufficient credit for Ajax (*N*.8.24 λάθα κατέχει), and more than the appropriate share for the verbal technician Odysseus (*N*.7.20f. ἐγὼ δὲ πλέον' ἔλπομαι λόγον 'Οδυσσέος ἢ πάθαν).[19] Surely the μομφάν which Ajax has among the Greeks even after his suicide (illustrated so well in Sophocles' play) is not unlike the envy described in *N*.8.21f. (ὄψον δὲ λόγοι φθονεροῖσιν, ἅπτεται δ' ἐσλῶν ἀεί).[20]

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[18] The scholia (cf. Σ*I*.4.58c,d Drachmann) are in some doubt as to whether the allusion of v.36f. is to the judgment of arms or the wrestling-match of Ajax and Odysseus in *Il*.23.700-739. The judgement of arms is closer to the suicide of Ajax described in the following verses, but the wrestling-match is especially apposite to the pancratist Melissus and his foxlike *technē* (which we have already discussed in regard to vv.51ff.). It is entirely possible that the allusion encompasses both stories, since they both imply the superiority of Odysseus' *technē* over the Ajax' mere *physis*.

[19] Of course, it is not only Odysseus' own verbal power which is responsible, but also his connection with the verbal *technē* of Homer.

[20] The scholia (cf. Σ*I*.4.58e,f Drachmann) debate whether the μομφάν is Ajax' blame among the Greeks, or the reproach which he presents to the Greeks (for not recognizing his merit and thus causing his suicide). Modern commentators have lined up on each side; for a history of the problem, see Thummer (1968) II, 72f., who favors the latter view. The linguistic evidence is ambiguous: μομφὰν ἔχει and its allomorphs clearly mean "has reproach" at Eur., *Heracleidae* 974, and Isaeus 11.39. The two places where the expression occurs with a dative (Aesch., *PV* 445; Eur., *Orestes* 1069) are generally interpreted as "present reproach," but in their contexts can equally well mean "have reproach." For the dative of judgment (a variety of ethical dative), one may compare such expressions as *Il*.2.285 ἐλέγχιστον πᾶσιν βροτοῖς, and Soph., *Ajax* 440 ἄτιμος 'Αργείοισιν (cf. Friederichs 94). The interpretation of μομφάν as passive is surely more consistent with the present context, the point of which is not to reproach Odysseus (who is not even mentioned) and his *technē*, but to argue for the necessity of *technē* in addition to *physis*. Ajax' lack of verbal *technē*

This μομφάν can be reversed only by the verbal art of Homer, who restores Ajax to honor and indeed has given him immortality. Even though Ajax may have been somewhat deficient in *technē* himself, this lack can be compensated for by application of the poet's *technē*. Just as τέχνα destroyed Ajax (v.37), so can it rehabilitate him.[21]

The gnomic vv.44-46 generalize this kind of poetic immortality, and vv.47-49 apply it specifically to the victor Melissus. It is Pindar's poetic *technē* that can guarantee the permanence and stability of the victor's *physis*,[22] just as Homer's poetic *technē* can do so for Ajax. *Physis* by itself is unpredictable (ἀφάνεια τύχας), inconstant (τῶν τε γὰρ καὶ τῶν διδοῖ), and even self-destructive (as in the case of Ajax' suicide). It is precisely the application of *boulē* and τέχνα which allows man to overcome and control the vicissitudes of *physis*.

Critics have long considered vv.33-35 an allusion to previous losses by the Cleonymids in equestrian contests.[23] But there is no evidence for this assumption, and the mention of athletic losses is not only unnecessary in an epinician, but generally inappropriate.[24] καὶ μαρναμένων in any event must refer to those engaged in martial strife, not athletic contests; if the μαρναμένων were identical to the ἐριζόμενοι of v.31, why would we need the καί, which seems to introduce a new group of people? On my interpretation, v.32 (τῶν ἀπειράτων γὰρ ἄγνωτοι σιωπαί), rather than being a

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causes his reputation (*logos*) to suffer, as it did also in *N*.7.20-24 and *N*.8.24f. But Homer (ἀλλ' Ὅμηρος...) rectifies the blemishes (μομφάν) on Ajax' reputation, just as Pindar does for the Cleonymids. It is difficult to see what relation "blame for the Greeks" can have to the general context at all, except as a metonymy for Ajax' "blame among the Greeks."

[21] The fundamental duality and flexibility of τέχνα can be seen in the ambivalent role of Homer. In *N*.7.20-24, it was none other than Homer who was responsible for the relative over-valuation of Odysseus and under-valuation of Ajax. Here, he is the defender of Ajax. This perplexed the scholiasts (cf. Σ*I*.4.63a, b Drachmann) so much that they thought the object of τετίμακεν in v.41 might be Odysseus, even though he is nowhere mentioned in the ode. But here, as in the case of Heracles' "short" stature, Pindar felt quite free to revise and manipulate details of any myth to suit the context. Different sections of the *Iliad* might be cited as honoring either Ajax or Odysseus.

[22] This relation was illustrated even at the opening of the ode, where the Cleonymids' prosperity is threatened by the winds of vicissitude (v.5f. ἄλλοτε δ' ἀλλοῖος οὖρος...), but is rescued by the winds of poetic fame which spread abroad their reputation (vv.9-11 ἄηται μαρτύρια ἀπλέτου δόξας): even so is the τέλος of death (v.5) transformed into the tautometric τέλος of accomplishment (v.11).

[23] Cf. Σ*I*.4.52a Drachmann; Dissen (1821) II:2, 505f.; Schmidt 416; Bury (1892) 68f.; Fraccaroli 672; Gundert 13; Finley 67; Thummer (1968) II, 57. Köhnken 100-104, argues against this interpretation of vv.33-35, but nevertheless still subscribes to the view that vv.30-32 allude to Cleonymid losses. But in this case, the transition between v.32 and vv.33-35 is harsh.

[24] Vv.30-32 in no way force us to conclude that their entries in the Panhellenic games were losses. Pindar does not state whether they were losses or victories, but this does not mean that none were victories; οὐδὲ...ἀπεῖχον (v.30) may just be a climactic litotes which is a variation upon the direct proclamation of victory in vv.27-29.

half-hearted apology or consolation for athletic losses, is a transitional gnome which, through a contrastive foil to both, parallels the display of athletic excellence in the victory-catalogue to the martial valor which is implied in vv.33ff.[25]

Indeed, the point of the whole section preceding the victory-catalogue (vv.14-26) is precisely that the Cleonymids' athletic successes have helped make up for their martial losses, and have displayed the same kind of valor with a more felicitous outcome. The hard misfortune of the τραχεῖα νιφὰς πολέμοιο (v.17) which felled four clansmen in the same day is contrasted with the Cleonymids' present athletic fortune, which is like the gentle flowering of spring (v.19f.). Poseidon, by granting this Isthmian victory and thus the present θαυμαστὸν ὕμνον (v.23), has reawakend (v.24 ἐκ λεχέων ἀνάγει) the clan's old athletic fame, which had fallen asleep (v.25), not due to the putative losses of vv.30-32,[26] but because overshadowed by the grievous loss of four family-members in battle.

Hence, the dubiety and insecurity of vv.33-45 is more appropriate to a description of the Cleonymids' military loss than their athletic fortune. The loss of four clansmen in battle is also a fitting take-off point for the myth of Ajax' death,[27] particularly if, along with the vast majority of commentators,[28] we infer the battle to be Plataea: the Theban aristocracy's alliance with the Persians no doubt earned for them among the "sons of the Greeks" exactly the same sort of μομφάν which Ajax had. But as we observed in vv.23-26, Pindar's celebration of the Cleonymids and their *areta* as exhibited in the games rehabilitates their reputation just like Homer's celebration of Ajax' courage and prowess.

Like *O.*2, this poem contains two complementary mythical panels of approximately the same length and scope. The Heracles-myth is in many ways the inverse of the Ajax-myth; whereas Ajax failed because he was overcome by the superior *technē* of Odysseus, Heracles succeeds because

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[25] We do not absolutely exclude the possibility of reference to athletic vicissitude. But this could at best be only a secondary reference. For the parallelism of athletics and war, cf. v.14f. and p.85 n.41 *supra.* The ἀπειράτων are a foil to both; as such, the gnome of v.32 looks both backward and forward. Vv.33-35 pick up from v.32 by saying that even those who do battle are subject to the unpredictability of fortune, and may thus be ἄγνωτοι (like the ἀπειράτων), unless celebrated by poetic fame.

[26] This is the view of Dissen (1821) II:2, 505.

[27] If we assume that vv. 33-35 refer to the vicissitudes of athletic competition, this would trivialize the myth and emphasize the supposed athletic losses beyond all proportion; a victor does not commission an epinician ode in order to have his athletic losses so highlighted.

[28] Cf. Dissen (1821) II:2, 500, who cites Boeckh as concurring with this opinion; Mezger 275; Fraccaroli 679; Gaspar 82f.; Wilamowitz (1922) 337; Schadewaldt 307 n.4; Bowra (1964) 408.

he can overcome Antaeus with his superior *technē*.[29] Heracles' myth projects the *physis*/*technē*-opposition beyond the athletic realm into a general reflection on nature and culture. As in *N*.3.21-26 and *N*.1.61-68, the myths of *O*.3 and *O*.10, and most particularly in the famous *nomos*-fragment (fr.169),[30] Heracles is presented as a civilizer: he investigates the furthest reaches of both land and sea (v.61f.), and tames the elements. By clearing the seas of piracy, he "renders gentle" (v.63 ἁμερώσαις) a *physis* which was previously harsh, and thus opens up the sea lanes for civilizing ναυτιλίαισι (v.63).

Just as Homer τετίμακεν (v.41) Ajax and gave him immortality, so in the end Heracles "is honored" (v.65 τετίμαται) and is immortalized among the Olympians.[31] He is honored among men also, as in the feast and games dedicated to him (vv.67-74). The crowning of the altars (v.68) is clearly parallel to the crowning of the victor with the glory of song (v.48).[32] The cult of the eight sons of Heracles recalls the Cleonymid dead,[33] and may also recall the μομφάν of Ajax, since the circumstances in which these sons died were not altogether favorable to Heracles' reputation.[34] The light- and darkness-imagery describing their altars (v.71 ἐν δυθμαῖσιν αὐγᾶν φλὸξ ἀνατελλομένα συνεχὲς παννυχίζει), as previously in the ode (cf. vv.19f., 25f., 39, 46f., 52), highlights the alternation of human fortune; the chiaroscuro effect emphasizes the possibility of brilliant fame (cf. v.46 ἐργμάτων ἀκτὶς καλῶν ἄσβεστος αἰεί) even amid the general darkness and obscurity which attend the human condition (cf. v.19 μετὰ χειμέριον ζόφον). Such is the glory symbolized by the sacred flames on the altars of the Heraclids, shining bright even amid the dark misfortune

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[29] The myths are also contrasted in that Odysseus' *technē* was used for selfish and evil ends, Heracles' for public and beneficent ends. On the complementary relation of these two myths in general, see Segal (1981) 74-77.

[30] See our discussions on pp.16, 39, 56, 65 *supra*. On Heracles in general as a figure of civilization, see Galinsky 31ff., and Kromer (1973) 12-16.

[31] Cf. Mezger 285. For a general analysis of this ode's imagistic structures relating to the themes of mortality and immortality, and the various modes of transformation which bridge the two realms, see the sensitive essay of Segal (1981) 69-86.

[32] The responsion of στεφανώματα (v.68) with στεφάνωμ' (v.48) is surely significant since both lines are the second verse of the antistrophe. Cf. Bury (1892) 54.

[33] Cf. Bury (1892) 54.

[34] The preponderance of evidence suggests that Heracles' slaughter of his wife and children in a fit of madness (as dramatized by Euripides) was the traditional Theban version of the myth, and the version of our earliest literary sources in general. Cf. Pausanias 9.11.3, and the learned note of Dissen (1821) II:2, 509. It is simply incredible that Pindar could challenge the traditional version of the story here (as Bury (1892) 76, Farnell II, 355, and Thummer (1968) II, 79, contend that he does) without either developing his alternative version or even making his rejection of the traditional version explicit. The anti-traditionalist view is complicated even further by the consideration that what is alluded to here is a public ceremony well known to everyone in Thebes.

which slew them. And such also is the πυρσὸν ὕμνων (v.47) which Pindar lights for Melissus, warranting everlasting fame for his race even after the disaster which befell them at Plataea.

V.73f. identifies the second day of the Heracles-festival as that of athletic competition. This is the day on which athletes like Melissus can display their *areta* and win glory for their race, taking the paradigmatic athlete Heracles as a model. It is thus appropriate that these verses should build up to Melissus' personal catalogue of victories (vv.75-78), and that the poem should conclude with praise of his trainer:

> κυβερνατῆρος οἰακοστρόφου
> γνώμᾳ πεπιθὼν πολυβούλῳ. σὺν Ὀρσέᾳ δέ νιν
> κωμάξομαι τερπνὰν ἐπιστάζων χάριν.
>
> (*I*.4.78-80)

The athletic trainer represents for Pindar the synthesis of *physis* and *technē*, of physical prowess (insofar as he is himself an athlete) and technical skill (insofar as he is a trainer).[35] The intellectual, technical aspect is especially emphasized here (as it has been throughout the poem), with γνώμᾳ πολυβούλῳ (we have already noted the polymorphic flexibility which characterizes *technē*) and the steersman-image (governing a ship is a paradigmatic *technē*—compare Heracles in vv. 61-63). The trainer-praise is especially significant in that it usually comes at the end of the poem;[36] the trainer offers a climactic synthesis not only of *physis* and *technē*, but also of subject and object, since he is like the poet in his role as an elder advisor to the (usually young)[37] victor, but like the victor in his own identity as an athlete. It is thus entirely appropriate that Pindar brings Orseas into the celebration at the very end.[38] Melissus' victory is equally a product of the trainer's *technē* and material for the poet's *technē*. Orseas' *technē* has helped produce the *ergon*; Pindar's will help produce the *logos*.

The primary emphasis of *I*.4 is on *physis* and *technē* as strength and cunning; nature and nurture are secondary here, although nevertheless implied. The positive valuation of cunning suggests that birth alone is not sufficient for the highest excellence. But *O*.9 more particularly shifts its attention to birth and discipline, and thus gives a somewhat different

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[35] On trainer-praise in Pindar, cf. Thummer (1968) I, 35f.

[36] Cf. *N*.4.93-96, *N*.5.48f., *N*.6.64-66, *I*.5.59-63, and Pavese (1978) 281f.

[37] *O*.8, *O*.10, *N*.4, *N*.6, *I*.5 are all for boy-victors. *I*.4 alone is for an adult, but the trainer-praise is immediately preceded by a reference to his boyhood-victory (v.77f.).

[38] The subject/object-identification of Orseas is furthered by the ambiguity of σὺν Ὀρσέᾳ; it is unclear whether Orseas accompanies Melissus as a *laudandus* being celebrated, or Pindar as a *laudator* celebrating. On *laudandi* who become *laudatores*, see p.153f. *infra*.

perspective to the dialectic of *physis* and *technē*. Critics have generally found *O*.9 amenable to the *Grundgedanke*-approach; they have therefore located the poem's meaning either at v.28 ("men are born good and wise according to the god")[39] or v.100 ("everything is mightiest by nature"),[40] and at any rate see both gnomes as expressing the same concept. But our study up to this point should make us suspicious of such attempts at reduction. The valuation of *phya* which these gnomes may imply must be examined within the broader context in which these statements occur.

The first passage in question is transitional, moving from praise of the poet's art to the first myth:

ἀγγελίαν πέμψω
ταύταν, εἰ σύν τινι μοιριδίῳ παλάμᾳ
ἐξαίρετον Χαρίτων νέμομαι κᾶπον·
κεῖναι γὰρ ὤπασαν τὰ τέρπν'· ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες
ἐγένοντ'·

(*O*.9.25-29)

The argument is clear: even craft or skill (παλάμᾳ) is determined by fate (μοιριδίῳ), i.e., it is a matter of divine cooperation, as witness Pindar's *technē* and its assistance by the Graces. V.28 generalizes this thought by saying that men ἐγένοντ' both ἀγαθοί and σοφοί only with the cooperation of a god (κατὰ δαίμον'). There are three terms that are problematic in this statement. To begin with, ἀγαθοί and σοφοί have generally been referred to "victors" and "poets" respectively.[41] But ἀγαθοί is almost a code word for "aristocrats" in general,[42] of whom Pindar certainly considered himself one. And σοφοί, although it quite often does refer specifically to poets, commonly refers to *laudandi* as well.[43] It is true that this gnome does bring poet and victor, subject and object, together. However, it does so not through the specialized meanings of the words ἀγαθοὶ and σοφοί, but indeed through their ambiguity. Both victor and poet are both ἀγαθοί and σοφοί; in this way their nature is similar.

The other problematic word is ἐγένοντ'. Predicatively, this can either mean "they are born..." or "they become..." This ambiguity is in fact crucial for the entire poem: if we interpret ἐγένοντ' the first way, we are talking about nature, whereas if we construe it the second way, we are

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[39] Cf. Rauchenstein 141; Bossler 194; Mezger 478; Puech (1919) 416.
[40] Cf. Gildersleeve (1885) 202.
[41] Cf. Dissen (1847) 124; Bossler 197; de Jongh 472; Mezger 478; Wilamowitz (1922) 351.
[42] Cf. *P*.2.81,96, *P*.3.71,83, *P*.4.285, *P*.10.71, *N*.7.63, *I*.1.5, *I*.7.26. The word also has this sense in self-consciously aristocratic writers like Theognis and the Old Oligarch.
[43] Cf. *O*.3.44, *O*.5.18, *O*.14.7, *P*.1.42, *P*.4.217,295, *P*.5.12,115, *N*.7.17, *I*.2.12.

dealing with nurture. The enjambment of ἐγένοντ' as an isolated word into the next triad makes it especially emphatic; Pindar no doubt wishes to highlight it as a word of enormous semantic weight. In favor of the first interpretation (which many critics have tacitly favored) this gnome is connected with such statements as σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ (*O*.2.86) and τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν in v.100 of the present ode. But in favor of the second interpretation one could cite Simonides' famous poem on the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός (fr.542 PMG), which defines ἀγαθός as "faring well" (v.17 πράξας εὖ) and therefore the result of divine dispensation after a man's birth (v.14 θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας; compare the discussion after quoting v.17 in Plato, *Protagoras* 345C "best in the highest degree are men whom the gods love"). The fact is that the gods are necessary for nurture as well as nature, for "becoming" as well as birth; as we have observed, they are the source for noble *technai* as well as noble seed. The ambiguity is well parallelled by *P*.1.41f.; ἐκ θεῶν γὰρ μαχαναὶ πᾶσαι βροτέαις ἀρεταῖς/καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ χερσὶ βιαταὶ περίγλωσσοί τ' ἔφυν. The gods are responsible for both *physis* (ἔφυν) and *technē* (μαχαναί). In fact, *technē* must have some basis in *physis*, since men are born with the capacity to be σοφοί (and therefore with a capacity for *technē* and its μαχαναί). But at the same time, *physis* can find its fulfillment in *areta* only through these μαχαναί. Thus, this passage and *O*.9.28f. intend neither to subordinate *technē* to *physis* or the opposite, but to subordinate them both to the *daimōn*. Both external virtues (ἀγαθοί) and internal virtues (σοφοί) of both poet and athlete derive from a combination of both birth and learning with divine supervision.

The poem's three myths proceed to illustrate the ambivalence of the introductory passage. Critics have generally been too concerned with the innovative mythology and abrupt break-off of the Heracles-story to speculate about its relevance in the first place. But those who have done so conclude that it illustrates the power of god-given *phya*, since Heracles was able to fight the gods only because himself engendered by the greatest god of all.[44] This conclusion conveniently ignores that Heracles' *phya* alone was not sufficient here—that he also required the coaching of the goddess Athena.[45] The divine role in Heracles' career is therefore not

[44] Cf. Gildersleeve (1885) 202; Mezger 473; Carey (1980) 151f.

[45] For Athena's assistance of Heracles at Pylos, cf. Pausanias 6.25.2 (who is a good authority on ancient tradition), and Σ*Iliad* 11.690b Erbse, which reports that both Athena and Zeus were allies to Heracles in this battle. It is true that Pindar does not specifically mention Athena's assistance here (neither does he mention Zeus' paternity), but this may in fact be precisely what he is hinting at when he breaks off by refusing to talk about war and battle among the immortals (v.40f.). De Jongh 473f., appears to be alone in recognizing this. Heracles was not at this time immortal; "war among immortals" would thus make more sense if referring to Athena's participation. The point of "hush-passages" (cf. *O*.13.91, *N*.5.16-18) is not to negate what has already been said, but to step back from

only one of nature, but also of nurture—maintaining him with the proper support and guidance even after his birth. The fight moreover illustrates the importance of *technē* in addition to *physis*; neither Poseidon, Apollo, nor Hades are particularly gods of *technē*, whereas Athena—the daughter of Metis, born from Zeus' head Ἁφαίστου τέχναισιν (*O*.7.35-37)—definitely is.[46] We have seen Heracles before as a representative of civilization and *technē*.[47] In this context we also note the importance for each figure of his hand-held implement, his tool of combat: Heracles has his σκύταλον (v.30), Poseidon his τριόδοντος (v.30), Apollo his ἀργυρέῳ τόξῳ (v.32), Hades his ῥάβδον (v.33). Bare strength is not sufficient for either god or hero.

But why does Pindar choose this rather peculiar version of the myth? And moreover why does Pindar choose a myth that he must shut off by means of a "hush-passage?" There were certainly plenty of other stories available in the Heracles-saga which equally well illustrate both Heracles' divine parentage and assistance by a god. The first question is not particularly difficult; tradition has Heracles battling with several gods at Pylos, whose identies vary with the source.[48] Both Poseidon and Hades are among these, and although Apollo is not, he could easily have been confused with Ares or even intentionally substituted for the war-god on account of his "silver bow" (providing an effective parallel to the implements of the other figures).[49] These various battles are so similar in nature that a poet would not see any difficulty in merging them together,[50] like a catalogue of athletic victories.

The second question is more challenging. As we have noted in our discussion of *N*.3.26-31 and *N*.5.16-18,[51] "hush-passages" are not introduced casually or as the result of genuine embarrassment; rather, they are poetic assertions which reflect, subjectively, the underlying structural

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saying whatever comes next, leaving it only implied. Clearly, the implication here is that Heracles was able to fight the gods at Pylos only because he was aided by a god. But propriety made it inadvisable for Pindar to spell this out.

[46] On Athena as a "technical" goddess, and most specifically on her contrast with Poseidon as a patroness of horsemanship and shipbuilding, cf. Detienne-Vernant 187-258. Also, cf. n.6 *supra*.

[47] See our analysis of *I*.4.56ff. and n.30 *supra*.

[48] Σ*O*.9.43, 44a,b,c, 48 Drachmann, pits Heracles against Poseidon at Pylos; *Iliad* 5.395-402, Pausanias 6.25.2f., and Ps.-Apollodorus 2.7.3 pit him against Hades; Hesiod, *Scutum* 359-367 opposes him to Ares; Tzetzes (= ΣLycophron 39) says that he fought with Hera at Pylos.

[49] Pindar's freedom in manipulating details of the traditional mythology to suit a paradigmatic context is well known. Indeed, it can be argued that this freedom is characteristic of early Greek poetic tradition in general. On mythological innovation in Homer, cf. Willcock 142-154.

[50] Σ*O*.9.43, 44a, 48 Drachmann.

[51] Cf. pp.35 and 104f. *supra*.

concerns of the ode in question. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Pindar may have similar grounds for expressing himself this way in *O.*9.

> ἀπό μοι λόγον
> τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥῖψον·
> ἐπεὶ τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεούς
> ἐχθρὰ σοφία, καὶ τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρὸν
> μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει.
> μὴ νῦν λαλάγει τὰ τοιαῦτ'· ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν
> χωρὶς ἀθανάτων· φέροις δὲ Πρωτογενείας
> ἄστει γλῶσσαν,
>
> (*O.*9.35-42)

As we have noted, Pindar refuses to proceed with the story because he would then have to introduce Athena's aid, and possibly even the fact that the gods opposing Heracles were wounded.[52] Such details would of course damage the dignity of the gods. Pindar does not deny the truth of anything which has been said;[53] he merely deems it inappropriate (παρὰ καιρόν) to become overly explicit here.[54]

It may be that Pindar's reason for introducing a myth which would require a "hush-passage" was specifically because he wished to make a statement about σοφία. The gnome of v.28 shows us men who are σοφοί in accordance with the gods, whereas the ἐχθρὰ σοφία of v.38 provides the negative foil of men who turn their *sophia* against the gods. Poets who malign the gods are as guilty as heroes who challenge them. Pindar's polemic is therefore against godless technicism, especially in poetry—a rationalistic valuation of the human intellect independent of any theological guidelines.[55]

Pindar's fusion of nature and nurture is reflected by the other myths as well. Opus was engendered by Zeus (vv.57-59), but his divine nature would have never received a chance for full expression were it not for

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[52] Cf. *Il.* 5.395-402; Hesiod, *Scutum* 359-367; ΣLycophron 39.

[53] Farnell II, 69, regards the question of vv.29-35 as potential rather than contrary to fact, and therefore thinks that vv.35-40 reject the truth of the myth (on the grounds that for any mortal to fight the gods would be contrary to the introductory gnome of v.28f.). But when Pindar does reject the truth of a story, he does so quite explicitly and even vehemently, denouncing it as ψεῦδος (cf. *O.*1.23-32, *N.*7.20-24). The self-address here is much more in the style of self-rebukes for digression (cf. *P.*10.51f., *P.*11.39f., *N.*3.26f.) and "hush-passages" (cf. *O.*13.91, *N.*5.16-18), which characteristically emphasize the persona of the poet. Farnell's interpretation leaves us with a rather curious sort of compositional logic. It is Pindar's technique to use myths which will illustrate his point, not to find myths which are contrary to his point and then reject them.

[54] The concept of καιρός in Pindar is more a quantitative distinction (knowing where to act and where to cut things off) than anything to do with truth or falsehood. Cf. p.22 n.33 *supra*.

[55] On ἄθεος and its rationalistic dimensions in the archaic period, cf. Fahr 10-30.

Zeus' engineering his adoption by King Locrus (vv.59-66).[56] The adoption implies that *physis*, although important, is not alone sufficient for development of the child's *areta*, but that the child must also be trained through upbringing in the proper environment. Divine agency consists not only in giving birth (nature) but moreover in assuring good fortune for the divine child even after birth (nurture).[57]

We also see the *physis/technē* opposition in the Patroclus-myth which follows. Commentators have generally explained the presence of Patroclus and Achilles here as an occasional allusion to the friendship of Epharmostus and Lampromachus,[58] and thus have seen no unity between this and the preceding myths. But surely we can find here the same emphasis upon nature (v.69f.—Patroclus the son of Menoetius the son of Actor and Aegina) supplemented by art: when Achilles recognizes Patroclus' native courage in the battle with Telephus (vv.71-73), he enjoins Patroclus always to stand at his side (vv.76-79), under his tutelage (on Achilles as Patroclus' tutor, cf. *O.*10.16-19).[59] There may also be an allusion here to Patroclus' disobedience of Achilles' instructions in *Il.*16.83-96, and his resultant conflict with a god (like Heracles' in vv.30-35); but since Pindar does not want to talk about conflicts with the gods, he does not continue this myth.

Just as birth and training are equally important both in war (as illustrated by Heracles and Patroclus) and government (as illustrated by Opus), so they are in athletics. As we observed in our study of *I.*4, *mētis* and *technē* are especially important in the wrestler's art: Epharmostus overcomes men ὀξυρεπεῖ δόλῳ (v.91). But his capacities for athletic performance are determined by his inherited nature as well: he does καλλιστά in virtue of himself being καλός (v.94).

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[56] Compare the Ζηνὸς τέχναις (v.52) which terminate the flood, thus allowing Deucalion and Pyrrha (also of divine race—the Ἰαπετιονίδος φύτλας of v.55) to reestablish humanity and human culture. On Zeus as the supreme god of *technē*, cf. Detienne-Vernant 57-130.

[57] We should compare the myth of Iamus in *O.*6, where it is through the δαιμόνων βουλαῖσιν (*O.*6.46) that the child is nurtured even after being exposed.

[58] Cf. Boeckh (1821) II:2, 192; Rauchenstein 143; Schmidt 373; Bossler 201. But vv.83-85 give no evidence that Lampromachus was a "friend," nor do we have any parallel in the epinicians for mention of a friend's victories. It is much more likely that Lampromachus was a kinsman of some sort—probably the victor's brother—and would have been known as such by the ode's audience. Cf. Σ*O.*9.123a, 125c Drachmann. For an apt analogy to *O.*9.83-85, cf. *I.*6.57f., where the victor's brother Pytheas and his uncle Euthymenes are introduced without any specific identification (we know that they were relatives from other odes). Assuming that Lampromachus and Epharmostus were related, Achilles and Patroclus would not be a fitting parallel.

[59] It seems that Pindar appeals to a different version of the story than that found in Homer, which associates Patroclus with Achilles from childhood (*Il.* 23.83-92), and also states that Patroclus was the older of the two and therefore Achilles' advisor (*Il.* 11.786-789).

The poet too must combine talent and training, *physis* and *technē*. But this dialectic applies in a different sense to his poetry also. In the midst of his narration about Deucalion and Pyrrha and the establishment of the Locrian nobility, Pindar interjects a subjective exhortation:

ἔγειρ' ἐπέων σφιν οἶμον λιγύν,
αἴνει δὲ παλαιὸν μὲν οἶνον, ἄνθεα δ' ὕμνων
νεωτέρων.

(*O*.9.47-49)

The scholia[60] explain this as a response to Simonides' criticism of Pindar's use of myth (fr.602 PMG). If so (and even if not), the metaphors here must have something to do with Pindar's manipulation of myth. The substance of the myths may be old (and like wine, the older the better), but their form in the poet's retelling should be new (like the flowers which rise anew every spring).[61] Wine is generally associated with poetic inspiration (cause), flowers with poetic fruition (effect). The substance/form-dichotomy is merely a variation upon *physis*/*technē*: the substance of a myth is a given *physis*, inherited from generation to generation, while the new form of each version is a product of each poet's *technē*.[62] This emphasis upon artful form (= the delight of rhetoric) we have seen already in v.27f. with the allusion to the Graces and their "delights."[63] Within the present context, vv.47-49 may be an apologetic interruption in which the poet concedes (and even makes a virtue of the fact) that the theme may be well-worn and traditional, but promises that his retelling of it will be novel (in its focus and selection of detail).

It is with the dialectical background of the poem as a whole in mind that we must approach its conclusion:

τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν· πολλοὶ δὲ διδακταῖς
ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος
ὤρουσαν ἀρέσθαι·
ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ σεσιγαμένον
οὐ σκαιότερον χρῆμ' ἕκαστον· ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι
ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαίτεραι,
μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει
μελέτα· σοφίαι μὲν

[60] Σ*O*.9.75b, d Drachmann.

[61] On the ancient and modern in Pindar, cf. Bundy (1972) 87f.; Bernardini (1967) 88f; Crotty (1982) 82f.

[62] For the same dialectic, cf. v.65f. ὑπέρφατον ἄνδρα μορφᾷ τε καὶ ἔργοισι (of Opus), and v.94 καλὸς κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις (of Epharmostus). The inherited element always comes first, but its productive expression may in the end be more consequential; this relation unifies poet, victor, and mythical *laudandi*.

[63] On the Graces as the principle of form (as opposed to the Muses, who are the principles of substance and its memory), cf. Bundy (1972) 79 n.95.

αἰπειναί· τοῦτο δὲ προσφέρων ἄεθλον,
ὄρθιον ὤρυσαι
θαρσέων, τόνδ' ἀνέρα δαιμονίᾳ γεγάμεν
εὔχειρα, δεξιόγυιον, ὁρῶντ' ἀλκάν,
Αἶαν, τεόν τ' ἐν δαιτί, 'Ιλιάδα, νικῶν ἐπεστεφάνωσε βωμόν.

(*O*.9.100-112)

This follows immediately upon the victory-catalogue; the emphasis upon *physis* is thus predictable. Those who try to win fame with purely learned, extrinsic virtues cannot possibly compete with those, such as Epharmostus, who in addition to being well-trained are also superior by inborn talent. Those born without talent are not favored by destiny or the gods.[64] But none of this implies that good birth alone is sufficient for virtue, or that heredity is the sole area of divine concern. The gnomes which follow vv.100-102 qualify them. ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ σεσιγαμένον implies the inadequacy of mere *phya* as of mere learning. In addition to praising *phya*, this passage puts just as much emphasis upon the necessity of discipline (μελέτα), craft (σοφίαι), and nurture (θρέψει); the γάρ of v.104 fits in much better with what precedes if we do not take vv.100-102 as a simple rejection of *technē*. The loftiness of the σοφίαι implies their difficulty:[65] the implication of vv.100-102 therefore may have been not that learning is useless, but that few (only those endowed with φυᾷ) succeed at it. As we have observed before, *sophia* can be attained only as the mediation of *physis* and *technē*, nature and nurture, talent and discipline.

The summary priamel ἄλλαι ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαίτεραι describes the diversity of human activity quantitatively, while the folowing μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει does so qualitatively. All of this is merely a way of saying that the preceding statements about *physis* and *technē* apply to any occupation—including the poet's own as well as the athlete's.[66] σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί introduces a general statement about *sophia* which is evidenced in the corresponding δέ-clause by τοῦτο δὲ προσφέρων ἄεθλον. The ἄεθλον is an arena for *sophia*, whether we take it as the poet's "prize" (= the epinician) for the victor's achievement or as the athletic "contest" itself.[67] This ambiguity promotes the subject/object-identification which we have come to expect in Pindar as a device of poetic closure. The athlete's valorous look is complemented by the poet's daring (ὄρθιον ὤρυσαι

[64] This is clearly just the negative form of the positive statements in vv.28f. and 110f. about noble nature as a result of divine grace.

[65] Lattimore (1946) 232, is right in denying that this passage is a unilateral valorization of *phya*. He aptly cites as parallels to σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί statements on the loftiness of *Aretē*, such as Hesiod, *Op*.289-292, and Simonides, fr.579 PMG.

[66] Cf. de Jongh 491, and Bernardini (1977) 122. On the poem's subject/object-integration which climaxes here, cf. Crotty (1975) 184f.

[67] For this latter sense of ἄεθλον (on analogy with ἄεθλος), cf. *O*.1.3, *N*.9.9.

θαρσέων; cf. v.82 τόλμα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφὴς δύναμις). Similarly, the *laudator*'s crowning of the athlete (to whose victory he owes the chance to write a song) is complemented by the athlete's crowning the altar of Ajax Oileides (to whose festival he owes the occasion for his own celebration).

2. Merit/Reward

In *P.*5, we see a series of collateral antitheses which are structured in a manner analogous to the dialectic of *physis* and *technē*. A similar relation of innate potential and acquired enhancement is reflected in the concepts of merit and reward. The Pindaric terms here, as presented in the first two lines of *P.*5, are ἀρετά and πλοῦτος. Merit is a matter of individual character, while reward is the extrinsic determination of society; as such, ἀρετά and πλοῦτος (like *physis* and *technē*) become metonyms for nature and culture. Virtue (at least in Pindar's pre-ethnographic view) exists prior to and independent of a social recognition, as in the case of the virtuous but unrecognized Ajax. Money, on the other hand, has no intrinsic worth, but exists only as socially recognized medium of exchange, and thus as a medium of social recognition. For Pindar, the reward is not privileged as a *telos* or goal, but is, like *technē*, presented as an external adornment or supplement to internal virtues.

The *areta*/*ploutos*-antithesis opens the poem, and can thus serve as our *foyer virtuel*:[68]

> Ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής,
> ὅταν τις ἀρετᾷ κεκραμένον καθαρᾷ
> βροτήσιος ἀνὴρ πότμου παραδόντος αὐτὸν ἀνάγῃ
> πολύφιλον ἑπέταν.
> ὦ θεόμορ' Ἀρκεσίλα,
> σύ τοί νιν κλυτᾶς
> αἰῶνος ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων ἄπο
> σὺν εὐδοξίᾳ μετανίσεαι
> ἕκατι χρυσαρμάτου Κάστορος·
>
> (*P.*5.1-9)

The modifiers are revealing. ἀρετᾷ by itself is καθαρᾷ: by stating that virtue is "pure," the text implies not only that it is faultless, but also that it is antecedent to all mediation, i.e., that it is significant in its own right without being contingent on something *allotrion*. πλοῦτος, on the other hand, is significant only "whenever mixed": wealth is properly a

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[68] Critics have long identified the first three verses as the poem's *Grundgedanke* (cf. Boeckh (1821) II:2, 295; Dissen (1847) 268-270; Mezger 224; Gildersleeve (1885) 305f.).

mediated (i.e., contingent) entity. This is to say that merit (*areta*) must precede the reward (*ploutos*), but the reward considerably enriches and augments the status of the original merit.[69] *Ploutos* without *areta* is only artifice—as insubstantial and unimpressive as learning without talent. But so long as it is founded upon *areta*, *ploutos* is εὐρυσθενής, which is to say that it will expand the power of native virtue, just as *technē* realizes the potential of *physis*. But this mutually contributory dialectic of *areta* and *ploutos* is made possible only through the active mediation of divinity (πότμου παραδόντος). This is the same mediating role played by the κατὰ δαίμον' in *O*.9.28.[70]

The same relation is expressed by vv.5-9. κλυτᾶς αἰῶνος ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων ἄπο expresses the high position to which Arcesilas was born.[71] This position is not static, but a dynamic, evolving potency: the flight of stairs-image signals that Arcesilas' inherited qualities and position are merely the first steps in an ascent which can extend even further, through the potential for amassing *ploutos* and the resulting glory.[72] The ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων is almost oxymoronic: although Arcesilas' inborn virtues are lofty, they are not nearly so lofty as whatever they may lead to. The potency imaged here can be fulfilled only by further striving (μετανίσεαι)—ascent beyond the merely *oikeion* inheritance into the realm of the distant and *allotrion*, crystallized by *ploutos*. What is more, Arcesilas obtains *ploutos* σὺν εὐδοξίᾳ; *ploutos* and the very act of creating it expand the reputation (and thus impact) of the king's *areta*. But again, it is only through divine mediation that θεόμορ' Arcesilas is able to develop his inherited nature with the resources of *technē* and thus enhance his nature with the reward of *ploutos*; it is only ἕκατι χρυσαρμάτου Κάστορος, the god of both horsemanship (-αρμάτου) and of commerce (χρυσ-)[73]—both being *technai* which can yield generous monetary return.

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[69] For the common Pindaric identification of *ploutos* and *olbos* as divine rewards for human merit, cf. *O*.2.10f.,53, *P*.1.48-50, *P*.3.108-110, *P*.12.28f., *N*.1.66-71, *N*.7.58f., *N*.9.44f., *I*.1.18-22, *I*.3.4-6, *I*.4.58f., *Threnos* 7.7, fr.119.3f.

[70] On the "mediating" role of divinity, see our discussion of the near/far infrastructure on p.17 *supra*. The gods maintain equipoise and balance between contraries, ensuring that neither the merits nor the rewards outweigh the other, that an amount of talent be complemented by the appropriate amount of training, and that man's pursuit of the distant be balanced by a maintenance of the present.

[71] Mezger 225, Gildersleeve (1885) 307.

[72] This is surely a more cogent reading than the scholiastic (Σ*P*.5.7 Drachmann) interpretation that v.7 means ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ βίου. What point would be served by saying that Arcesilas pursued wealth since he was an infant?

[73] Cf. Mezger 226, Gildersleeve (1885) 307. The Dioscuri as guardians of ships (alluded to in the following v.10f.) were thus also commercial gods, especially for a seafaring people like the Cyreneans. In fact, their stellar image was depicted on Cyrenean coinage (cf. Bernhard *apud* Boeckh (1821) II:2, 284).

The development of the first strophe has on the whole been abstract and metaphorical. The antistrophe becomes more precise in defining Arcesilas' virtues and their fulfillment:

σοφοὶ δέ τοι κάλλιον
φέροντι καὶ τὰν θεόσδοτον δύναμιν.
σὲ δ' ἐρχόμενον ἐν δίκᾳ πολὺς ὄλβος ἀμφινέμεται·
τὸ μέν, ὅτι βασιλεὺς
ἐσσὶ μεγαλᾶν πολίων,
ἔχει συγγενὴς
ὀφθαλμὸς αἰδοιότατον γέρας
τεᾷ τοῦτο μειγνύμενον φρενί·
μάκαρ δὲ καὶ νῦν, κλεεννᾶς ὅτι
εὖχος ἤδη παρὰ Πυθιάδος ἵπποις ἑλὼν
δέδεξαι τόνδε κῶμον ἀνέρων,
Ἀπολλώνιον ἄθυρμα·

(*P.*5.12-23)

The θεόσδοτον δύναμιν (note again the divine mediation) is surely equivalent to the πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής which Arcesilas wins πότμου παραδόντος. *Dunamis* consists of his royal position and its effective use. σοφοί on the other hand qualifies those who receive such rewards: those who are of a wise character[74] know better how to bear the boon of god-given power, which implies that the wise are the ones who should properly receive it. This gnome is applied specifically to Arcesilas in the next line. σὲ δ' ἐρχόμενον ἐν δίκᾳ can almost be considered a definition of *sophos*. The πολὺς ὄλβος which surrounds the just Arcesilas is surely a reward, like the god-given power of the preceding line.

The rest of the antistrophe defines more exactly the sources and quality of Arcesilas' *olbos*. On the one hand (μέν) it consists in his kingship, which is itself defined by the statement that his συγγενὴς ὀφθαλμός (inherited virtue) has herein its illustrious reward, its αἰδοιότατον γέρας. As in the case of *ploutos* in v.2, this reward exists only in mixture (v.19 μειγνύμενον φρενί), i.e. as a mediated entity. The *olbos* of v.14 is defined on the other hand (δέ) by the present athletic victory. The athletic victory is itself a synthesis of merit (represented by the ἵπποις) and reward (represented by the present celebration—τόνδε κῶμον ἀνέρων). Both the athletic achievement and its celebration are due to the grace of Apollo: Ἀπολλώνιον ἄθυρμα refers most directly to the revel-song, but by itself could equally well designate the Pythian games and the εὖχος which Arcesilas takes there. Thus, both kingship and athletic victory represent a synthesis of merit

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[74] σοφοί here refers to inborn character (cf. *O.*2.86, *P.*1.42, *O.*9.28f. and our discussion above), especially in that it designates the "wise" rather than the "technically skilled."

and reward. And *olbos* is defined as the synthesis of kingship and victory, a dyad which is itself a version of merit and reward.[75]

The μέν/δέ antithesis of v.25f. provides the transition from the introductory dialectical chain of vv.1-23 to the praise of the charioteer Carrhotus in vv.26-53. Arcesilas must first of all παντὶ μὲν θεὸν αἴτιον ὑπερτιθέμεν (v.25), but among humans, he should especially love Carrhotus (v.26). Drachmann points to this antithesis as an example of Pindar's technique of superficial transition between sections, without any deeper unification or connection of thought.[76] But here, as in so many other places, Drachmann's failure to find underlying connections merely reflects his refusal to look for them; Pindar is bound to appear superficial if we interpret him only in terms of his line-to-line surface-rhetoric, as Drachmann and Bundy do. If we look at the statements in a somewhat broader context, their underlying connection of thought becomes apparent: the θεὸν αἴτιον-statement of v.25 not only sums up all the references to the necessary mediation of divinity in vv.1-24, but is equally germane to the Carrhotus-section which follows. Carrhotus' remarkable success in the chariot, like Arcesilas' *olbos*, must be due to the patronage of a god. What could be more relevant as an illustration of the θεὸν αἴτιον-gnome than Carrhotus' dedication of his chariot to Apollo? And moreover, it will be seen that the Carrhotus-section further amplifies the merit/reward-dialectic established in the first two strophes.

It is Carrhotus who binds the ἀρισθάρματον γέρας (v.30f.) around Arcesilas' brow. This prize is earned through a combination of *physis* and *technē*—Carrhotus' ability (v.27f.) and the technical workmanship of the vehicle, which is emphasized in the second strophe. The chariot is both sturdy (v.34 ἐντέων σθένος) and beautifully wrought (v.35f. χεριαρᾶν τεκτόνων δαίδαλ').[77] This mingling of nature and art is memorably expressed by the quaint parallel of the tree "statue" dedicated by the

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[75] The dialectical pyramid may be diagrammed thus:



[76] Drachmann (1891) 297.

[77] On the Cyreneans' fame as chariot-builders, cf. Athenaeus 3.100f. For decorated Cyrenean chariots as temple-dedications, cf. Pausanias 10.13.5, 10.15.6.

Cretan bowmen, next to which the chariot is placed (vv.39-42). This wonder partakes of nature in that it is a tree, but it partakes of art in that it is a crafted statue. But all of these things are dedicated to Apollo (vv.37-39), which implies that the synthesis of nature and art, merit and reward, could not have been possible without the god. Apollo is truly a benefactor (v.44 εὐεργέταν).[78]

Not only does Carrhotus reward Arcesilas (v.31) and Apollo (vv.34-39), but he is himself rewarded. His merit (illustrated by the "great toil" (v.47 μέγαν κάματον) which he has undergone) is followed by the appropriate reward of verbal memory (v.48. λόγων φερτάτων μναμήϊ'), provided in no small part by Pindar's verse. Pindar's use of the *ergon/logos*-polarity in general may be seen as a reflection of this merit/reward-infrastructure. The antithesis is echoed, with reference to Battus, in v.54f.: the "toils" (πόνων) of v.54 imply the same sort of merit as κάματον in v.47, and the Battid ὄλβος of v.55 is clearly the same sort of reward after toil as Carrhotus' verbal immortality.[79] The fact that this dialectic is featured throughout the poem particularly in such transitional passages—the critical points of thematic relation—highlights its structural significance.[80] Both Carrhotus and Battus are paradigmatic for the victor Arcesilas (like Carrhotus as an "athlete," related to Battus in ancestry and kingship), and thus take the place of the extended myth which we would normally expect in a poem of this length. Their merit and reward clearly reflect Arcesilas' *areta* and *ploutos*, so extensively described in the first two strophes.

As in the case of Carrhotus, Battus' nature can achieve its highest success only with the aid of Apollonian *technē*. Apollo's assistance in frightening away the lions, "so that he might not prove unavailing in his oracles"

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[78] Apollo's aid would be especially important if we accept the reasonable supposition of the scholia (cf. Σ*P*.5.45a, 64, 66 Drachmann) that vv.49-53 refer to a massive chariot-accident from wich Carrhotus' chariot escaped. On this hypothesis, Carrhotus' dedication of his chariot to Apollo would be analogous to the Roman practice of hanging up one's sea-garments in the temple of whatever god saved one from shipwreck (cf. Horace, *C*.1.5.14-16; Vergil, *Aen*. 12.768f.; Diodorus, *AP* 6.245.3-5). Critics are divided over whether the εὐεργέταν should be referred to Apollo or Carrhotus. If we interpret v.43f. according to what precedes, we would suppose Apollo, but if we interpret the statement according to what follows, we would suppose Carrhotus. The ambiguity may be significant; it reflects v.25f. (introducing this section), which tells us that we should hold the gods ultimately responsible for everything, but among men, we should thank Carrhotus. It is well known that the Greeks allowed divine and human causality to coexist without contradiction. Cf. Lesky *passim*.

[79] Drachmann (1891) 297, notes the parallel, but again considers it nothing more than a transitional artifice.

[80] Cf. Bundy (1972) 59 n.58: "Beginnings, middles, and ends: the meaning of literature resides in its transitions; for it is these which establish the relation between subject and object in the idea."

(v.62) leads to a list of his *technai* in vv.63-69, including medicine, poetry, government (v.67 εὐνομίαν), and finally, prophecy.[81] All of these *technai* can be thought of as divine gifts to man; especially notable is the role of poetry, already foreshadowed in the verbal memory of Carrhotus (vv.47-49), which is itself a reward for his good deeds.[82] Apollo's patronage and arts benefit not only Battus and his descendents, but equally the Heracleidae (vv.69-72) and Pindar's own ancestors—the Aegidae (vv.72-76).[83] All three races were involved in migrations and the establishment of a new home, which will, after much toil eventually prosper with divine grace.

So too were the Antenoridae of vv.82-85, the original Trojan settlers of Cyrene, who, having seen their former homeland destroyed, founded a new one, and are now revered by the later settlers as indigenous heroes (v.85f.).[84] Just as Battus founded sacrifices for the Antenoridae, expanded the sacred precincts of the gods, and cut out a road to the temple of Apollo,[85] now he and his descendents are honored with special tombs and hero-cults. The dead kings see their merit rewarded:

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[81] Note the ring-form (with μαντεύμασιν introducing the catalogue in v.62 and μαντήϊον concluding it in v.69).

[82] Poetry is of course the subjective complement of the other *technai*. We have noted before the parallelism of poetry to medicine (cf. p.26 and 76 *supra*), and prophecy (cf. p.54 n.120 *supra*). The relation of poetry to εὐνομία should be evident from our analyses of *P.*1 and *P.*8: both poetry and government seek to balance oppositions—*peras* and *apeirōn*, *malthakos* and *trachus*, and so forth. In fact, prophecy and medicine (and poetry) are also skills associated with the king—the supreme governor; cf. Duchemin (1959) 379, 387f., who argues for a close parallelism of poet and king as divine intermediaries. On this argument, the Apollonian skills here are of equal subjective and objective relevance—hence, the application to the Aegidae as well as the Battidae.

[83] We need not see the allusion to Pindar's ancestors as an embarrassing subjective intrusion, nor need we explain it away as a choric first person (cf. Σ*P.*5.96a Drachmann) or a reference to Thebes in general (cf. Bornemann (1884) 79-85). Like most subjective material, it serves to establish a parallel (and thus identity of interest) with the objective program.

[84] For the idea of good fortune after bad fortune, we can refer back to v.10 εὐδίαν μετὰ χειμέριον ὄμβρον (afforded Arcesilas). We are also reminded of Carrhotus' πεδὰ μέγαν κάματον λόγων φερτάτων μναμήϊ' (vv.47-49) and the whole merit/reward-dialectic which we have been discussing.

[85] The σκυρωτὰν ὁδόν (v.93) hewn out of solid rock (v.90 εὐθύτομον) is a fusion of nature and art, just like the tree "statue" described earlier (vv.40-42); it is significant that both are dedicated to Apollo. The road-symbolism is rich in overtones here. Most directly, we think of the road of migration which has brought Battus (like the Antenoridae before him) to Cyrene. Beyond this, we can see here the road of life and accomplishment in general (cf. Becker 50-68), punctuated by the Battid tombs beside it (which remind us of life's finitude). But we can also see herein the immortalizing road of poetry (cf. Becker 68-85; Bernardini (1967) 87f.), especially if this ode was performed as a processional along the very road in question, as some scholars have reasonably supposed (cf. Mezger 223; Wilamowitz (1922) 379; Farnell II, 168).

βασιλέες ἱεροὶ
ἐντί, μεγάλαν δ' ἀρετὰν
δρόσῳ μαλθακᾷ
ῥανθεῖσαν ὕμνων ὑπὸ χεύμασιν
ἀκούοντί ποι χθονίᾳ φρενί,
σφὸν ὄλβον υἱῷ τε κοινὰν χάριν
ἔνδικόν τ' Ἀρκεσίλᾳ· τὸν ἐν ἀοιδᾷ νέων
πρέπει χρυσάορα Φοῖβον ἀπύειν,
ἔχοντα Πυθωνόθεν
τὸ καλλίνικον λυτήριον δαπανᾶν
μέλος χαρίεν.

(*P*.5.97-107)

Their ἀρετάν is rewarded through the gentle dew of poetry (compare Carrhotus' "memories of the best words" in v.48f.), which shows them their ὄλβον, crystallized in the present good fortune of their scion Arcesilas. This manifestation of *olbos* is made possible through the mediation of Apollo, by according Arcesilas his Pythian victory. In requital for this, it is fitting that Apollo be hymned in song, just as Arcesilas himself has been hymned in the καλλίνικον χαρίεν and as Arcesilas' ancestors have benefitted from the song which does glory to their race (vv.98-100). In fact, all three songs mentioned here are actually different aspects of the present ode, which celebrates god (Apollo), hero (Battus), and man (Arcesilas).[86]

This passage obviously focuses upon the praise of Arcesilas (who comes at the end of the Battid line), and vv.107-117 are thus concerned with detailing his praiseworthy qualities. As we might expect in an ideal *laudandus*, these represent the fusion of *physis* and *technē*. First we see his inborn qualities—his νόον γλῶσσάν τε (v.110f.), and his θάρσος and σθένος (vv.111-113). The first pair is more concerned with intellect, the second with might. But Arcesilas' patronage of *technē* is defined by v.114f., where he is both ἔν τε Μοίσαισι ποτανός and also a ἁρματηλάτας σοφός;[87] we have noted already the parallelism of poetry and athletics as *technai*. The ἐπιχωρίων καλῶν ἔσοδοι of v.116 respond to the κλυτᾶς αἰῶνος ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων in v.6f; Arcesilas has ascended the road from inborn ability to technical accomplishment and fulfillment. Herein may lie also the symbolism of the "paved road" in v.93.

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[86] It is equally hymn, history, and epinician. For this fundamental tripartite structure of the Pindaric ode, cf. *O*.2.2 τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδήσομεν;

[87] Of course, Arcesilas himself is not actually a charioteer (any more than he is a poet). Carrhotus is his charioteer. Arcesilas is properly speaking a patron of chariot-racing, just as he is a patron of poetry. He is therefore interested in *technē* and personally enriched by it, even though not necessarily himself a technician.

Fig. 5. The antithetical structure of *Pythian* 5

physis	divine grace --->	*technē*
talent		training
potential		enhancement
merit		reward
intrinsic		extrinsic
oikeion		*allotrion*
nature		culture
2 ἀρετᾷ καθαρᾷ	πότμου παραδόντος --->	πλοῦτος
6-7 κλυτᾶς αἰῶνος ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων ἄπο	ἕκατι Κάστορος --->	8 νιν σὺν εὐδοξίᾳ μετανίσεαι
12 σόφοι	θεόσδοτον --->	13 δύναμιν
14 σὲ δ' ἐρχόμενον ἐν δίκᾳ		14 πολὺς ὄλβος
17-18 συγγενὴς ὀφθαλμός		18 αἰδοιότατον γέρας
21 ἵπποις	'Απολλώνιον ἄθυρμα --->	22 τόνδε κῶμον ἀνδρῶν
26-31 Κάρρωτον	θεὸν αἴτιον --->	31 ἀρισθάρματον γέρας
26-31 charioteer's ability	νᾶπος θεοῦ --->	32-36 chariot's construction
42 μονόδροπον φυτόν	τέγει Παρνασσίῳ --->	40 ἀνδριάντι
47 μέγαν κάματον	ἡνίοχοι Χάριτες --->	48-49 λόγων φερτάτων μναμήι'
54 πόνων		55 ὄλβος
57-62, 69-81 Battus, Heracleidae, Aegidae	'Απόλλων --->	63-69 Apollo's arts
73-75 ἀπὸ Σπάρτας... γεγενναμένοι...Αἰγεῖδαι	οὐ θεῶν ἄτερ --->	72-73 τὸ δ' ἐμὸν...κλέος
85 τὸ δ' ἐλάσιππον ἔθνος		86 δέκονται θυσίαισιν
90-93 native rock	'Απολλωνίαις πομπαῖς --->	90-93 εὐθύτομον...σκυρωτὰν ὁδόν
98 μεγάλαν δ' ἀρετάν	Φοῖβον --->	102 σφὸν ὄλβον
110-113 Arcesilas' inborn qualities		114f. his enrichment by art
114 ἀπὸ ματρὸς φίλας	Μοίσαισι --->	114 ἐν Μοίσαισι ποτανός
119 ἔργοισιν	Κρονίδαι μάκαρες --->	119 βουλαῖς
124 Βάττου γένει	Διὸς νόος --->	124 τοῦτο γέρας

The poem concludes with a prayer for the continuation of Arcesilas' *olbos*, for the continued balance of merit and reward. The gods are asked to grant this continuation "in deeds and in counsels" (v.119 ἐπ' ἔργοισιν

ἀμφί τε βουλαῖς), both in *erga* and *logoi*, both in *physis* and *technē*. The continuation of Arcesilas' *olbos* could best be displayed by a victory at Olympia: this would be a γέρας (v.124) for the whole Βάττου γένει, significant in that it would come by grace of the king of the gods.

To sum up, *P.*5 exhibits a remarkable unity, when viewed from the standpoint of its dialectical logic. We have observed how the polarity of merit and reward is linked to that of nature and art, and how both reflect that of potential and enhancement. Although the first term of each opposition may be ontologically prior, both terms are in the final reckoning equally important and mutually necessary; only in synthesis do they attain true meaning. Our analysis of *O.*9, along with the semantics of φυά and τέχνα, leaves us convinced that the talent/training-dialectic is equally important both to poet and athlete, subject and object. We have at the same time seen the broader relevance of *physis*/*technē* as an expression of the nature/culture-opposition in general. But even though both *physis* and *technē* apply to both subject and object, we have perceived in all three poems analyzed an unmistakeable tendency to associate *physis* (and merit) especially with the *laudandus*, *technē* (and reward) especially with the *laudator*. This confrontation brings us to the next stage in our inquiry—a more precise determination of Pindar's poetics of the subject/object-relation.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SUBJECT/OBJECT RELATION

We have observed throughout our study that the polarities tend to surface with both subjective and objective applications, often within the same text. This parallelism suggests an ultimate identity of interest between subject and object, *laudator* and *laudandus*. It may therefore be useful at this juncture to map out some of the strategies—structural, rhetorical, and thematic—through which the text unites the interests of subject and object. This examination may help us resolve the age-old problem of conflicting subjective and objective programs. The "conflict" may be no conflict at all, but merely another case of dialectic—a coincidence of opposites—in which subject and object, self and other, "I" and "thou" ultimately merge into a higher unity of interest. In fact subject/object may be for Pindar the dialectic which itself intersects all other dialectics.

1. Myth

It has long been recognized that Pindar uses his myths, among other ends, to point out an idealized paradigm of behaviour, either positive or negative, to the *laudandus*.[1] It has less often been recognized that he also uses myth to provide a paradigm for the activity of the *laudator*. But what is especially interesting, and what has not been recognized at all, is the possibility that Pindar uses the same myth to refer simultaneously to the activities of both *laudator* and *laudandus*. The virtues recommended (or the vices criticized) by a myth may, in different ways, be equally applicable to both.[2]

We have already observed the ambiguity of the infant Heracles-myth in *N.*1.[3] Heracles is, of course, the paradigmatic athlete—the doer of deeds for the benefit of all humanity, whether he is strangling serpents or slaying the great beasts of land and sea (vv.62-66). As such, he embodies the objective ideal of athletics as a form of public service, enhancing the glory and reputation of the fatherland. But the *laudator* is also engaged in

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[1] See Schadewaldt, 309.

[2] Pindar's sophisticated exploitation of lexical and syntactical ambiguities has often been noted by critics. Cf. Bury (1888), 185-208; Devereux, 289-298; Renehan, 217-226; Kromer (1975), 437f.; Lozza, 163-177. The following pages will attempt to demonstrate that this practice also extends to the reference of larger blocks of material, such as pivotal myths, prayers, gnomes, metaphors, and first-person statements.

[3] See pp.55-57 *supra*.

such public service. And as we observed in our discussion of the *oikeion/allotrion* polarity in this poem, Heracles is the *allotrion* son who rescues the *oikeion* Iphicles (v.53f.), and so resembles the foreign *xenos* Pindar who, on behalf of his host Chromius, brings poetic water against the smoke of envy (vv.19-25). And like the poet, Heracles enters a foreign *domos* and praises his hospitable reception there (vv.70-72).

We have observed a similar relation in *O*.3,[4] where Heracles again serves as the paradigmatic athlete, importing the olive (and thus the olive-wreath) to Olympia. But Heracles accomplishes this only "having persuaded the host of the Hyperboreans with his discourse" (v.16), only through the persuasive power of language—a quality equally necessary to athlete-kings and poets.[5] We have perceived the same ambiguity in the Jason of *P*.4 (another ode for a king): his "gentle words" are paradigmatic both for the poet's gentle words reconciling Arcesilas to Damophilus, and the gentle hand (v.271) which Arcesilas himself is exhorted to apply to the breach.[6]

But perhaps the most impressive case of subject/object-ambiguity in the reference of a Pindaric myth may be the Ixion-myth of *P*.2. Critics have divided on the question of whether Ixion is an admonitory paradigm for Hieron[7] or for the poet.[8] Detailed examination of the manner in which the myth is introduced and concluded will demonstrate that the ingratitude which Ixion exemplifies is a potential danger for both poets and kings, and thus that the myth is a foil for the virtues of both Pindar and Hieron.

The myth is introduced as the climactic term of a priamel which itself illustrates an opening summary priamel:

ἄλλοις δέ τις ἐτέλεσσεν ἄλλος ἀνὴρ
εὐαχέα βασιλεῦσιν ὕμνον ἄποιν' ἀρετᾶς.
κελαδέοντι μὲν ἀμφὶ Κινύραν πολλάκις
φᾶμαι Κυπρίων, τὸν ὁ χρυσοχαῖτα προφρόνως ἐφίλησ' Ἀπόλλων,
ἱερέα κτίλον Ἀφροδίτας· ἄγει δὲ χάρις
φίλων ποίνιμος ἀντὶ ἔργων ὀπιζομένα·
σὲ δ', ὦ Δεινομένειε παῖ, Ζεφυρία πρὸ δόμων

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[4] See pp.16-18 *supra*.

[5] On verbal capacity as a requirement for kings as well as poets, see Hesiod, *Th*. 81-97, and Duchemin (1959), 380-382.

[6] See pp.96-98 *supra*.

[7] For this view, cf. Boeckh (1821), II:2, 241-243; Croiset, 83-96; Legrand, 473; Oates, 379ff.; Martin, XXIII; Rankin, 251; Gantz, 20f. Numerous other commentators have seen the myth as an objective allusion, but not to Hieron—rather, to some opponent of Hieron (Anaxilas of Rhegium, or the Locrians, or the anti-tyrannical faction at Syracuse).

[8] For this view, cf. Thiersch, I, 176f.; Schmidt, 195; Mezger, 64; Schadewaldt, 328-330; Bowra (1953), 85f.; Thummer (1968), I, 120; Lloyd-Jones (1973), 121f.

Λοχρὶς παρθένος ἀπύει, πολεμίων χαμάτων ἐξ ἀμαχάνων
διὰ τεὰν δύναμιν δρακεῖσ' ἀσφαλές.
θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖς 'Ιξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα βροτοῖς
λέγειν ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ
παντᾷ κυλινδόμενον·
τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς ἐποιχομένους τίνεσθαι.

(*P*.2.13-24)

The introductory *exempla* of the Cyprian φᾶμαι praising Cinyras and the Locrian maiden praising Hieron instantiate, or at least parallel, the εὐαχέα βασιλεῦσιν ὕμνον ἄποιν' ἀρετᾶς in v.14, which is a generalized expression of the purpose of the present ode. Cinyras is a figure from the mythical past, the Locrian maiden from the historical present;[9] Cinyras is an objective foil (for Hieron), the Locrian maiden a subjective foil (for Pindar). The praise of Cinyras is introduced with a μέν in v.15, the Locrian maiden's praise with a δέ in v.18, and Ixion with another δέ in v.21; clearly, Ixion and his ingratitude (= praise denied) climaxes this series with a negative foil.[10] As such, Ixion seems to be introduced primarily as a subjective paradigm.

But let us remember that Cinyras was an objective foil, and that Ixion was also a king; it is therefore possible that Ixion may have some value as an objective paradigm too. This supposition is in fact supported by a closer examination of the Cinyras-allusion. The allusion puts equal emphasis on two facts—Cinyras' celebration in legend after his death, and the favor which he received from the gods (Apollo and Aphrodite) during his life. The gnome which follows in v.17 can be taken as referring to either: the χάρις ὀπιζομένα in return for beneficent deeds can be that of the Cypriots for Cinyras' good deeds, or that of Cinyras himself for the gods' benefaction to him. The Cypriots requite Cinyras with celebration and φᾶμαι, while Cinyras requited the gods in his capacity as a loyal servant (ἱερέα κτίλον 'Αφροδίτας). ὀπίζομαι has connotations of awe and reverance, and is thus especially appropriate to a mortal's regard for divinity (cf. *I*.3.5), but is also used of ordinary men's regard for a hero of almost godlike stature (cf. *P*.4.86, of Jason).

One suspects that the ambiguity here is significant. Not only should poets express their gratitude to kings in an εὐαχέα ὕμνον but kings should also express their gratitude to the gods (the highest kings). And commissioning hymns is one of the best ways of doing so: it is no accident that these verses immediately follow upon a section of hymnic praise (vv.7-12)

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[9] On the allusion to Hieron's intervention on behalf of the Locrians against Anaxilas of Rhegium, see Σ*P*.1.99a, *P*.2.36,38, Drachmann, and the excellent article of Woodbury (1978), 285-299.

[10] On the rhetorical structure of this priamel, see Woodbury (1978), 285.

which catalogues the gods (Artemis, Hermes, Poseidon) who have ratified Hieron's chariot-victory. The proportion poet:king::king:god[11] suggests that epinician praise of kings is merely a lower version of hymnic praise for gods.[12]

The ambiguity is supported by details of the myth as well. Ixion whirling on his wheel says: τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς ἐποιχομένους τίνεσθαι. This is generally taken to mean that guests should requite their host[13] with kindly exchange (something which Ixion failed to do); as such, the statement would parallel Pindar's obligation of praise for his *xenos* and benefactor Hieron, and thus support the subjective interpretation of the myth.[14] This interpretation is entirely consistent with the gnomes of v.13f. and v.17. Ixion's status as a subjective foil is supported by the tautometric responsion of ἀνήρ in vv.13, 29, and 37. The ἀνήρ of both v.29 and 37 is Ixion: in both cases, his mortal frailty is emphasized, either as a παθὼν ἐοικότ' ἀνήρ (v.29), or as an ἄϊδρις ἀνήρ (v.37). He is counterpoised to the ἀνήρ of v.13, who is an encomiastic poet, but one not guilty of Ixion's *hybris* and ingratitude. Ixion is a figure of the evil artisan, who commits his abominations "not without art" (v.32 οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας); this puts him in direct contrast with the good *technē* of poetry. Furthermore, Ixion's "message" (v.41 ἀγγελίαν) may be a foil for Pindar's ἀγγελίαν in v.4. But Ixion is the one who receives the ἀγγελίαν and therefore could equally well be paradigmatic for Hieron, who receives Pindar's ἀγγελίαν in v.4.

Ixion's ingratitude is toward the gods, and as such the myth may well be an ἀγγελία about a king's obligation to render unto the gods due requital for his prosperity. The εὐεργέταν of v.24 can be a god just as well as a mortal benefactor.[15] And the ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς with which the divine benefactor is to be requited remind us of Hieron's ἀγαναῖσιν χερσί in v.8; the *malthakos* characterizes both athletic victory and the thanksgiving to the gods afterwards. There are further recollections of Hieron: one may compare the μεγαλοκευθέεσσιν θαλάμοις (v.33) in which Ixion commits his crime with Μεγαλοπόλιες Syracuse (v.1)—Hieron's domain. One may also contrast the "fourspoked bond" (v.42 τετραχνάμον δέσμον) in which Ixion is tortured with the "four-horse chariot" (v.4 τετραορίας) by which Hieron rides to triumph.

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[11] The proportion is typical of the three-term homologies common to the logic of this period. See Fraenkel (1938), 309-337.

[12] On which, see p.130 n.86.

[13] For εὐεργέτας as "host," cf. *P*.4.30 and *I*.6.70.

[14] On the *xenos*-relationship as an ideal figuration of the subject/object-relation, see our discussion in section (6) below. Ixion's attempt to seduce the wife of his host is the ultimate violation of *xenia* akin to Paris' seduction of Helen.

The emphasis on gratitude specifically toward divine benefactors is highlighted by the gnomes which close the myth:

θεὸς ἅπαν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται,
θεός, ὃ καὶ πτερόεντ' αἰετὸν κίχε, καὶ θαλασσαῖον παραμείβεται
δελφῖνα, καὶ ὑψιφρόνων τιν' ἔκαμψε βροτῶν,
ἑτέροισι δὲ κῦδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ'· ἐμὲ δὲ χρεὼν
φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν.
εἶδον γὰρ ἑκὰς ἐὼν τὰ πόλλ' ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ
ψογερὸν Ἀρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν
πιαινόμενον· τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχᾳ πότμου σοφίας ἄριστον.

(*P*.2.49-56)

It is perhaps significant that the myth both begins with the word θεῶν (v.21) and is cut off with θεός (v.49).[16] V.50f. continues the ambiguity which we have noted up to this point. Divine power overtakes all—even the eagle who is king in the air, the dolphin who is king in the sea, and man who is king on land. The eagle in Pindar is associated with both royalty and poetry, and could hence stand as a figure for either king or poet.[17] So, too, the dolphin was regarded in antiquity as the king of the fishes.[18] But we are also familiar with the dolphin's musical associations, as in the Arion-story.[19] The priamel is concluded by a positive cap in v.52 (ἑτέροισι δὲ κῦδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ') which returns us to the divine beneficence of vv.24-26. All success, whether king's or poet's, objective or subjective, is ultimately dependent on the gods. It is therefore necessary for Hieron (and Pindar) to express his gratitude toward the gods. By illustrating divine power, the present poem—indeed, the present myth—fulfills this hymnic obligation.

The lines which follow have caused much controversy. If we take the myth subjectively, vv.52-56 form a self-exhortation in which Pindar warns himself against giving offense to Hieron,[20] and presents Archilochus as the negative foil of a poet who does give offense—who in fact feeds upon hatred. To offend Hieron would be a violation of *xenia* and an

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[15] For εὐεργέτας referring to a god, cf. *I*.1.53 and *P*.5.44 (which is actually ambiguous—cf. p.128 n.78 *supra*).

[16] The gods stand both at the beginning and end of any action. Men, on the other hand, are interchangeable—hence, the tautometric responsion of ἀνήρ.

[17] On the subject/object-ambiguity of the eagle-metaphor in Pindar, see our discussion on pp.149-152 *infra*.

[18] Cf. Oppian, *Halieutica* II.533-552, V.421, 441. Dolphins were generally considered to be the most intelligent, most human, and most powerful fish in the ancient world. For the dolphin's speed, and thus its aptness as a comparison to the athlete, cf. *P*.4.17, *N*.6.64, *I*.9.7, fr.234.2.

[19] For the dolphin's love of music, cf. fr.140b.15. Also cf. Herodotus I.23f.; Pliny, *NH* IX.24ff.; Aelian XI.12; Oppian, *Halieutica* V.448-457.

[20] Cf. Schadewaldt, 330; Bowra (1953), 86; Lloyd-Jones (1973), 122; Rankin, 251.

act of hybris comparable to Ixion's. But if we interpret the myth objectively, vv.52-56 could be taken as a first-person indefinite statement, in which case the lesson of these lines is equally applicable to the *laudandus*—that all men should flee from any statement which might malign the gods.[21] This reading follows logically from the remarks on divine power which have just been made in vv.49-52.[22]

The gnome of v.56 is also ambiguous. However we choose to translate this controversial line,[23] the σοφίας can evoke either wisdom in general (belonging to Hieron) or specifically poetic skill (belonging to Pindar); the word σοφία bears both meanings in Pindar. And although the wealth is primarily Hieron's (as we must infer from v.57f.), the gnome could also by implication refer to the poet's wealth, contrasted with Archilochus' ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ...πιαινόμενον.[24] Wealth is just as much a concern to poets as to kings, as we know from *I.*2 and other contexts.[25]

Drachmann has pointed out that the Ixion-myth opens and closes with rather different gnomes, and that while both are equally relevant to the myth told, their coexistence belies the presence of a single unifying conception behind the myth.[26] He took this to mean that Pindar was in-

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[21] For *kakagoria* in relation to the gods, cf. *O.*1.52f. ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστριμάργον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι·/ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους. Also, cf. *O.*9.37-39.

[22] A third possible interpretation of these lines has recently been advanced by Miller, 137f., who suggests that the κακαγοριᾶν do not refer to any sort of "slander," but to "poetic blame"; he thus contends that this passage merely constitutes a transition from the mythical foil to praise of the victor. This explicitly "Bundyist" interpretation can succeed, however, only by totally ignoring the question of the myth's relevance. However we construe its exact reference, it is clear that the κακαγοριᾶν of v.53 must have some relation to the myth's theme of ingratitude and to the διαβολιᾶν ὑποφάτιες (v.76) which are of such great thematic significance to the ode's last triad; this thematic development would not be possible unless the κακαγοριᾶν are accorded a much more negative valuation than Miller proposes (a negative valuation which seems also to be required by the particularly emphatic nature of the rejection expressed by v.52f.). The "hush-passage" of *O.*13.93-95 which Miller cites as his chief parallel is altogether different: as we have noted on p.119f. *supra*, Pindar's hush-passages do not devalue what has been said, but step back from saying whatever comes next in the story (such is clearly not the case here, as the Ixion-myth fills an entire triad and is quite complete). Miller also fails to explain the relation of vv.49-52 to the lines under discussion; if vv.52-56 are a break -off formula repudiating the negative nature of the myth, they should come directly after the myth, not after an intervening gnomic sequence (which Pindar certainly does not want to repudiate).

[23] For a review of possible interpretations of this line, see Gerber, 100-108; Miller, 141 n.24. I prefer to translate, "being wealthy with the aid of destiny is the best part of wisdom/poetic skill."

[24] Miller, 139f., argues that ἀμαχανίᾳ here refers specifically to "poverty of poetic inspiration" (on the basis of parallels including *P.*9.92, *P.*8.34, *N.*7.22, *I.*4.2, *Paean* 7b.17). The poetic associations of the word are certainly present here, but the presence of πιαινόμενον and τὸ πλουτεῖν in the immediate context makes it impossible to eliminate the word's association with material poverty also.

[25] On the ambiguity of *ploutos* in Pindar, see section (7) below.

[26] Drachmann (1891), 277.

capable of logical consistency, and that the gnomes, rather than telling us anything about the genesis of the myth, were developed later than the myth and inserted as justifications for it. According to this interpretation, Pindar chose the Ixion-myth for no particular reason (other than just to tell a story), and the gnomes are merely contrived *fabula docet*-passages, but have no relevance either to subject or object. But the fact there is no single *Grundgedanke* behind the myth (a conclusion which I share with Drachmann) does not mean that it is random and without motive. Rather, it signals a plurality of motives. It is true that v.17 and v.24 seem to signal one intention in introducing the myth, while vv.49-52 seem to signal a different intention in closing it. But our analysis has attempted to show that these two motives are fully consistent with each other, and even proportional: the necessity of poets giving praise (and avoiding ingratitude) to kings is merely a lower version of kings giving praise (and avoiding ingratitude) to gods. If we accept only the objective interpretation (kings-gods), we are hard pressed to explain the relevance of the Locrian maiden and the allusion to Archilochus; if we accept only the subjective interpretation (poets-kings), we find it difficult to account for the emphasis on Cinyras' service to the gods, the gnomes in vv.49-52 and the necessarily objective v.56. It is precisely the ambiguity of this myth which has made it so difficult to interpret for critics who are intent on finding a single unifying idea.

What is the rationale for this ambiguous style of expression? With some minor alterations in the gnomes, the poet could easily have excluded one or the other of these interpretations. As we have observed throughout our study, the *laudator* attempts to make himself paradigmatic for the *laudandus*; he teaches by his own example. Any lesson, particularly if addressed to so powerful a king as Hieron, must be an exercise in tact. The myth is clearly a contrastive foil to Hieron's virtues (since this is an ode of priase), but like all foils, at the same time implies that if Hieron did not continue in his virtue, he might become like Ixion; Pindar wishes to remind Hieron of the necessity of rendering thanks unto the gods, but also to avoid any umbrage which Hieron might take at the suggestion that he needs reminding. By making the lesson apply to himself as well as to the king, and by simultaneously protesting against any ingratitude or κακαγορία on his own part, Pindar immediately muffles the merest suggestion of offense in his admonition.

This subject/object-parallelism also applies to the second half of the poem: the youthful boldness and βουλαὶ πρεσβύτεραι of vv.63-67 refer not only to Hieron's prowess in war, but also to Pindar's symbolic "war" with the rhetorical opposition—the notorious flatterers who praise the king but whisper behind his back. They are negative subjective foils

parallel to Archilochus and Ixion.[27] But at the same time, there are also significant elements of objective admonition in this part of the poem, as in the famous γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών addressed to Hieron in v.72, or the admonitory remarks of v.88ff. on the necessity of not overstepping or acting contrary to the god's will. These remarks are particularly for Hieron's ear, since Pindar draws attention to them with a preface in vv.86-88, proclaiming his frankness and straightforwardness under any form of government. The cautionary implications of both these remarks, and of the Ixion-myth as interpreted objectively, are not at all inconsistent with statements which Pindar makes in other odes to Hieron, such as *O*.1.113f. (τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται/βασιλεῦσι. μηκέτι πάπταινε πόρσιον) or *P*.3.61f.,[28] 80-82, 84ff., 104-106.

There is another way that Pindar uses myth to unify the interests of subject and object, utilizing not a single ambiguous figure, but two associated figures, one of which represents the subject, the other the object. This kind of association relies especially upon the nationality of the figures involved. An example is *P*.9, where the long Cyrene-myth (whose objective relevance is obvious) is balanced by the story of the Theban Iolaus (representing the Theban Pindar); Iolaus is a "helper" (to Heracles), even as Pindar is (to the victor). The connection is more intimate in some of the Aeginetan odes: especially prominent is the myth of *I*.6, where the Theban Heracles prays and offers a libation for his Aeginetan host Telamon and Telamon's progeny, just as at the opening of the ode (vv.1-9) Pindar offered a prayer and libation for the race of his host (cf. v.70) Lampon. So also we find Heracles and Telamon accompanying each other in *N*.4.25-30 (another Aeginetan ode).[29] Indeed, Thebe and Aegina were sisters, both daughters of Asopus, and both favored of Zeus (cf. *I*.8.17-25).[30]

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[27] This is the general line of interpretation advanced by Thummer (1972), 299ff., and Lloyd-Jones (1973), 124-127.

[28] This statement, too is ambiguous. The φίλα ψυχά can be either Hieron or Pindar. Again, the subject/object-ambiguity serves to muffle any potential offense.

[29] On the identification of interest of poet and victor here, their mutual enemies, and hence the appropriateness of the fellow warriors Heracles and Telamon as their mythical representatives, see p.78-80 *supra*.

[30] This may be the reason for the allusion to the river Asopus at *N*.3.4; there is no need to assume, along with most commentators since Didymus, that this refers to some stream on Aegina which was also named "Asopus"—an assumption for which there is no external evidence. Cf. Farnell, II, 254. No more satisfying, however, is Farnell's own solution—that the chorus of youths is waiting for the Muse's voice on the banks of the Boeotian Asopus, and "as soon as they have obtained it, they will hurry back to honour the Muse in Aegina." Pindar is really not concerned with the literal geography of the chorus' location; the Asopus is here merely an idealized location, relevant because it mediates (is in a sense "halfway between") Thebes and Aegina—the respective homes of poet and victor.

2. Prayer

Poet and victor are also frequently brought together in prayers, or wishes for future prosperity. What is in the interests of the one is also in the interests of the other: if good fortune is granted the poet and his song, this will certainly redound to the greater fame and glory of the *laudandus* who is celebrated in that very song. And inversely, if the athlete is granted continued prosperity and more victories, he will be able to commission more poems. Often, this association of mutual interest will simply take the form of asking a deity to receive propitiously both the song and the victor.

So in the prayer to the eponymous nymph Acragas at the opening of *P.*12, Pindar asks her to receive στεφάνωμα τόδ' ἐκ Πυθῶνος εὐδόξῳ Μίδᾳ, and in the following verse, αὐτόν τέ νιν. So also in *O.*7.87-90, the poet prays to Zeus, τίμα μὲν ὕμνου τεθμὸν 'Ολυμπιονίκαν, and in the next verse, ἄνδρα τε πύξ ἀρετὰν εὑρόντα; the third colon synthesizes poet and victor with a reference to the *xenos*-relationship. Especially subtle is the interweaving of *O.*13.24-30, where the poet first prays to Zeus, ἀφθόνητος ἔπεσσιν γένοιο and next asks him, Ξενοφῶντος εὔθυνε δαίμονος οὖρον. He then returns to the subjective wish, asking Zeus to receive στεφάνων ἐγκώμιον τεθμόν; but this encomiastic custom is for the benefit of the victor (v.29), whose singular achievement of victory in both the stade and pentathlum on the same day has been attained by no previous mortal (according to the relative clause which follows).[31] What is noticeable about all these prayers is that they begin with a subjective wish (for the reception of the poem) and conclude with an objective wish (for the honor of the victor): clearly, the former implies the latter.

It is also common to find a prayer as a sort of *envoi* at the conclusion of a poem; here it is more common for the subjective wish to follow the objective wish. At the end of *O.*1, Pindar first wishes that Hieron should continue ὑψοῦ πατεῖν (v.115), and then that it should be his own lot, τοσσάδε νικαφόροις/ὁμιλεῖν πρόφαντον σοφίᾳ καθ' Ἕλλανας ἐόντα παντᾶ. Here, the exercise of the poet's art is clearly dependent on the continued athletic success of his patrons, and hence the subjective wish follows the objective wish for future victories (which is especially common at the end of poems). So also he prays at the end of *O.*6 that Poseidon may grant fair sailing to the victor, and then ἐμῶν δ' ὕμνων ἄεξ' εὐτερπὲς ἄνθος (v.105); if the flower of Pindar's poetry is to be increased, it is only with more victories, and thus more commissions. So, too, at the end of *I.*7, when Pin-

[31] This unparallelled achievement is just as much a potential source for divine jealousy as the poet's words; hence the prayer averting φθόνος θεῶν is objective as well as subjective.

dar prays to Apollo for a Pythian victory, he says ἄμμι δ'...πόρε (v.49); the first-person plural implies that the victory would be a boon for poet as well as victor. We can also note ambiguity in the prayer to Zeus which concludes *O*.13. The τύχαν τερπνῶν γλυκεῖαν (v.115) can either be more Oligaithid victories (which Pindar has already prayed for in vv.103-106) or more chances for the poetic celebration of victory; so too the counter-balancing αἰδῶ can be the modesty or restraint which is appropriate both to the victor and to the poet, who herewith concludes the long catalogue of victories, and indeed, the poem.[32]

Before leaving the topic of prayer, we should also mention *O*.14, which consists in its entirety of a prayer to the Graces. Here, the ambiguity is not so much expressed in the wish as in the identification of the goddesses' powers. They are invoked both as ἀοίδιμοι βασίλειαι (v.3) and as protectors of "comely Orchomenus" (v.3f.) along with the "ancient Minyae" (v.4). The Graces are patrons both of poetry and athletic achievement (v.7), responsible if a man is σοφός (= "skilled in poetry"),[33] καλός (= "physically endowed"),[34] or ἀγλαός (= "splendid," i.e., successful in athletics *and* celebrated by poetry).[35] They are necessary to the dances and feasts (v.9) of the gods, but are at the same time the preservers of πάντων ἔργων ἐν οὐράνῳ (v.9f.). It is made quite clear throughout the invocation that they are equally relevant to subject and object.

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[32] The dialectic of ambition and restraint has been built up throughout *O*.13, with both objective (cf. vv.6-10) and subjective applications (cf. vv.41-48, 91-98); this is also a primary concern of the myth on Bellerophon's taming of the winged Pegasus with the bridle. Bundy (1962), II,72, interprets αἰδῶ as passive (= "respect"), and thinks that we have here the conventional doublet of success and good repute for the victor. Cf. Σ*O*.13.163d Drachmann, and Farnell, II, 101 (both, however, take the prayer as referring to Pindar himself rather than the victor). But αἰδώς means "respect" in Pindar only with a dependent genitive—"respect for" something (*O*.7.44, *P*.4.218); absolutely, it almost always means "modesty" (cf. *P*.9.12, *N*.9.33, *Paean* 2.51).

[33] For the special associations of σοφός with poetic skill, cf. *O*.1.9,116, *O*.9.38, *P*.1.12, *P*.3.113, *P*.4.248, *P*.9.78, *P*.10.22, *N*.5.18, *N*.7.23, *I*.1.45, *I*.5.28, *I*.7.18, *I*.8.52, *Paean* 7B.20, *Paean* 18.3, *Dith.* 2.24, fr.35b. On the necessity of this specialized meaning in the present passage, cf. Verdenius (1979), 20f. It is difficult to see what the Graces would have to do with "wisdom" in the more general sense.

[34] For the special association of καλός with physical beauty, cf. *O*.3.1, *O*.8.19, *O*.9.94, *O*.10.103, *P*.2.40,72f., *P*.4.123, *P*.9.74,106, *N*.3.19, *N*.10.10, *I*.2.4, fr.169.50. The Graces are responsible for form, and thus physical beauty, whether in songs or men (see Bundy (1972), 79 n.95); their interests do not, however, carry over into the ethical sense of καλός, as has been suggested by Deichgräber, 32.

[35] Cf. *P*.3.73, *N*.3.69, *I*.1.64f. Verdenius (1979), 21, correctly rejects the interpretation of ἀγλαός as a mere synonym for καλός (= physical beauty), noting that Pindar often uses the noun ἀγλαΐα with specific reference to athletic victory. But brilliance and splendor also have something to do with the far-shining fame enhanced by poetry; cf. Bremmer, 292. Aglaia was in fact the name of the youngest of the Graces (v.13), married to the artisan Hephaestus (Hesiod, *Th.* 945f.).

3. Gnome

We have noted already several places where gnomes are used ambiguously, with potential relevance to either subject or object. Usually, these gnomes have been connected with birth and *sophia*, and are used to effect a transition—mapping this and other polarities either from the subjective onto the objective plane or from the objective onto the subjective plane. The transitional nature of the ambiguity is often evident from the fact that these gnomes are preceded by material of indisputably subjective import, while followed by material of indisputably objective import (or *vice versa*).

O.3.44f., which we studied in the context of the near/far polarity,[36] offers an especially clear illustration. τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον/κἀσόφοις is by itself ambiguous, playing upon the specialized and broader senses of σοφός. The passage building up to this gnome relates to Theron, who reaches the pillars of Heracles even from his home (v.43f.). In light of this, we at first read the gnome as objective. But immediately following the gnome, Pindar applies its precept subjectively with the first person: οὔ νιν διώξω. κεινὸς εἴην (v.45). So the poem concludes. Clearly, the too distant pursuit is just as much an excessively long poem as it is the possibility of Theron transcending his mortal lot.

So, too, have we noted the ambiguity of ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες/ἐγένοντ' (*O*.9.28f.).[37] The gnome is preceded by a subjective sequence (vv.21-28) in which the poet proclaims his dependence on the Graces and his μοιριδίῳ παλάμᾳ (v.26). But the gnome is followed immediately by the poem's three myths, whose reference is primarily objective. The statement is certainly of general relevance, relying again upon the ambiguity of σοφός.

We noted in connection with this passage the similar ambiguity of *P*.1.46f.: ἐκ θεῶν γὰρ μαχαναὶ πᾶσαι βροτεαῖς ἀρεταῖς,/καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ χερσὶ βιαταὶ περίγλωσσοί τ' ἔφυν. The gnome is preceded by an objective prayer, but is followed by an athletic metaphor referring to the poet's own *technē*. As before, σοφοί is ambiguous; so too is περίγλωσσοι (referring to the eloquence which is characteristic of both kings and poets),[38] and in light of the following javelin-metaphor, even χερσὶ βιαταί. *Physis* (ἔφυν) and *technē* (μαχαναί) are equally relevant to subject and object.

Analogous is *N*.1.26-28: πράσσει γὰρ ἔργῳ μὲν σθένος,/βουλαῖσι δὲ φρήν, ἐσσόμενον προιδεῖν/συγγενὲς οἷς ἕπεται.[39] The gnome is preceded by a

[36] See p.15f. *supra*.
[37] See p.117f. *supra*.
[38] See p.134 n.5 *supra*.
[39] For our analysis of the context, see pp.53-55 *supra*.

passage on the usefulness of friends with different τέχναι (v.25), who can come to the aid of their host, as if bringing water against the envious sting of smoke (v.24); the poet (vv.19-22) is certainly among these friends. But the gnome is followed by an objective application of what has preceded: σέο δ' ἀμφὶ τρόπῳ (v.29).[40] The foresight can very well be the prophetic capacity of the poet,[41] or the foresight of the victor who commissions the poet to be an ally against all envious reproach.[42]

We also note ambiguity in the gnome ἄμαχον δὲ κρύψαι τὸ συγγενὲς ἦθος (*O*.13.13). The gnome is preceded by a subjective statement (v.11f.) on the poet's τόλμα and the καλά which he has to narrate.[43] But it is followed in vv.14ff. by an address to the children of Aletes and description of their achievements. Hence, the "inborn character" can very well be that of the poet (who cannot restrain his inborn urge to sing praises of noble deeds) or of the Corinthians, whose noble deeds cannot be hidden.[44]

In general, rhetorical opposition is ambiguous: the envious are opposed both to the victor and to the victor's poetic celebration. Such ambiguity we have noted in the ἄλλος ἀνήρ of *N*.4.39-41 and the man ὃς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει... in *N*.3.40-42;[45] the latter is not only a hack poet, but is also posed against the Aeacid *phya* in the surrounding myths. Such is also the case with the crows and daws of *N*.3.80-82 and *O*.2.86-88.[46]

Deserving of special attention are gnomes which serve as summary priamels.[47] These, too, will often serve to effect a transition between subjective and objective concerns. ἐν ἄλλοισι δ' ἄλλοι μεγάλοι (*O*.1.113) provides an excellent illustration. The gnome is preceded in v.112f. by an athletic metaphor for poetry[48] and in v.110 by the poet's ὁδὸν λόγων. But it is immediately followed by the objective statement that τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται βασιλεῦσι (v.113f.). This statement in turn is followed by the ambiguous wish which we have already discussed in section (2). Clearly, Pindar is "great" in poetry, Hieron in kingship; Pindar's greatness in

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[40] But the τῶν τε καὶ τῶν χρήσιες of v.30 may refer to the usefulness of these traits in Chromius' friends (including Pindar) as much as in Chromius personally.

[41] See p.54 n.120 *supra*.

[42] Cf. *O*.2.56, *O*.7.43f., *O*.8.60, *P*.5.27f., *N*.7.17f., *I*.1.40.

[43] For the encomiastic implications of τόλμα, cf. Gundert 69; Bundy (1962) I,30f. It may be that the *Hybris* and *Koros* mentioned in v.10 are also meant to have subjective significance as foils to the poet's legitimate *tolma* (see p.86 n.42 *supra*), in addition to the objective application made clear by v.9.

[44] For the first interpretation, cf. Dissen (1847), 158; de Jongh, 532; Bundy (1962), I, 32, who compares *O*.11.19f. (which is, however, also a subject/object-ambiguity, as Bundy himself admits on p.29). For the latter interpretation, cf. Fennell (1893), 136; Farnell, II,90f. Mezger, 451, agrees with me that the line is ambiguous.

[45] On the first passage, see p.79f. *supra*; on the second, see p.40f. *supra*.

[46] See pp.149-152 *infra*.

[47] For this term, see Bundy (1962), I, 7f.

[48] For the subject/object-identification in such metaphors, see p.152f. *infra*.

poetry suits him for the celebration of Hieron's greatness (vv.100-112), just as Hieron's greatness provides a more ample theme (v.110 ὁδὸν λόγων) for the poet. Similar is the implication of the summary priamel τέχναι δ' ἑτέρων ἕτεραι in *N*.1.25; the host Chromius' virtues must be supplemented by the various skills of his guests (including the poet) which will help defend him against all opposition, rhetorical or otherwise.[49]

We have noted the analogous effect of *O*.9.104-107: ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι/ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαίτεραι,/μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει/μελέτα.[50] This summary priamel follows the famous birth/learning-antithesis of vv.100-104, which is itself preceded by the catalogue of victories (vv.83-99). The priamel is followed by the praise of *sophia* and the poet's proclamation of the victor in vv.107-112. The implication of the summary priamel must be (a) that different men have different amounts of ability in different areas, and (b) that their differing abilities should be applied in different pursuits: some may be good athletes, other may be good poets. The effect is therefore to apply the *physis*/*technē*-dichotomy of the surrounding gnomes subjectively as well as objectively.

4. The First Person

It has long been recognized that Pindar sometimes uses the first person to make general gnomic statements which can refer to all intelligent people—and the *laudandus* in particular—as well as to himself. This phenomenon, called by Young the "first-person indefinite,"[51] has not always been perceived in every instance, nor have its implications for the subject/object-identification always been understood. This use of the first person certainly corroborates our thesis that Pindar attempts to present his own persona, whether *qua* poet or *qua* private citizen, as paradigmatic for his *laudandi* and the virtuous behaviour to which he exhorts them.

The instance which Young points to is *P*.3.107-111:

σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις
ἔσσομαι. τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασὶν
δαίμον' ἀσκήσω κατ' ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν.
εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἁβρὸν ὀρέξαι,
ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.

The first person of these statements has nothing to do (at least directly) with Pindar *qua* poet. The general moral of vv.107-109 fits in quite clearly with the near/far polarity which has been built up throughout the poem. The condition ("If god should hand me wealth...") renders the

[49] See our discussion of the ambiguous *N*.1.26-28 immediately above.
[50] See p.123f. *supra*.
[51] See Young (1968), 58f., and the bibliographical references therein.

situation of the first person much closer to what is actually the situation of the *laudandus* Hieron; the apodosis of the condition ("...I should hope also to find glory"), especially in light of the *exempla* and gnomes which follow in vv.112-115, is particularly relevant as an exhortation to Hieron to spend his resources acquiring poetic immortality rather than the impossible goal of physical immortality. A similar exhortation to the *laudandus* is effected by the first-person statement of *N*.1.31f.: the whole point of the surrounding context is to encourage the acquisition of friends through liberal hospitality.[52]

In fact, wealth[53] is a common theme of these ambiguous first-person statements. As well as statements on the proper use of wealth, we also find the *recusatio* of wealth, as in *P*.11.50-54 or *N*.8.35-39.[54] The praise of "mean circumstances" in *P*.11.52 is certainly a reflection upon the modest prosperity of Thrasydaeus and his family (whose catalogue of victories has just been concluded), and an attempt to contrast it with the foil of greed and corruption (the "lot of tyrants" of v.53) embodied in the myth of the Pelopidae.[55] At the same time, we cannot altogether reject Wilamowitz' contention that these verses bear some personal relevance as Pindar's denial before his fellow Thebans of sycophancy and tyrannical sympathies (such as might be inferred from his association with the Sicilian tyrants).[56]

So also *N*.8.35-39 rejects excessive wealth in favor of good reputation after death—a goal to which Pindar often exhorts his *laudandi*.[57] But the subjective implications cannot be altogether read out of *N*.8, since what Pindar is actually refusing is inappropriate verbal conduct—the ἐχθρὰ πάρφασις of v.32f.—in favor of what is fitting, namely to praise the praiseworthy and blame the evil (v.39). The combination of this verbal discretion with the wealth- and fame-motifs effectively draws together Pindar's ideals of appropriate moderation for both subject and object.[58]

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[52] For the hortatory intent here, cf. Σ*N*.1.44, Drachmann, and our discussion on pp.52-55 *supra*.

[53] On the implications of which for the subject/object-identification, see section (7) below.

[54] Quite appropriately, both odes are for less prestigious clients from Thebes and Aegina (as compared with Syracusans like Hieron or Chromius, for whom the "tyrannical" display of wealth was no vice).

[55] For this interpretation, and the denial of personal relevance to vv.50-54, cf. Fraenkel (1975), 543 n.12, and Young (1968), 6-21.

[56] Wilamowitz (1922), 263.

[57] On the proper expenditure of wealth to acquire poetic immortality, cf. *O*.2.53ff., *O*.10.86-96, *P*.1.92-94, *P*.3.110f., *P*.6.47-49, *P*.10.67f., *N*.1.31f., *I*.1.67f., *I*.5.12f., and pp.158-160 *infra*.

[58] So also the ἀρετά which is increased in v.40 may be that of either poet or victor. Cf. Carey (1976), 35.

The limitative *O*.3.45 could also be interpreted as a first-person indefinite, but again (as we observed in our discussion of this passage in the previous section), it does have definite subjective implications, since the poet concludes the ode there.

The unreal condition of *N*.10.39-41 serves the same function as many of these first-person indefinite statements: ἀξιωθείην κεν, ἐὼν Θρασύκλου/'Αντία τε σύγγονος, Ἄργεϊ μὴ κρύπτειν φάος/ὀμμάτων. The poet in effect places himself in the position of the victor Theaeus, and in this way identifies their interests. The vigorous personal intervention augments immediacy, presence, and thus rhetorical credibility.

One other type of first-person statement deserves to be dealt with—namely, first-person plural statements. I count ten instances of the first-person plural in the epinicians (*O*.9.106, *O*.10.78ff., *N*.4.37f., *N*.6.1-6, *N*.7.5, *N*.11.44f., *I*.1.52, *I*.7.42,49, *I*.8.10),[59] and all of them can be said to encompass poet and victor. Some of them (*O*.10.78f., *N*.4.37f., *I*.1.52, *I*.7.49) may refer exclusively, or at least primarily, to poet and victor; this is especially true of prayers and thanksgiving. The other statements may properly be classed "first-person indefinite."

It may be profitable to look in some detail at the concluding section of *I*.7, which combines manipulation of the first-person with several other devices to effect subject/object-integration:

ἔτλαν δὲ πένθος οὐ φατόν· ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι
Γαιάοχος εὐδίαν ὄπασσεν
ἐκ χειμῶνος. ἀείσομαι χαίταν στεφάνοισιν ἁρμόζων. ὁ δ' ἀθανάτων
μὴ θρασσέτω φθόνος.

ὅ τι τερπνὸν ἐπάμερον διώκων
ἕκαλος ἔπειμι γῆρας ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον
αἰῶνα. θνᾴσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες·
δαίμων δ' ἄϊσος· τὰ μακρὰ δ' εἴ τις
παπταίνει, βραχὺς ἐξικέσθαι χαλκόπεδον θεῶν ἕδραν· ὅ τοι πτερόεις
ἔρριψε Πάγασος

δεσπόταν ἐθέλοντ' ἐς οὐρανοῦ σταθμοὺς
ἐλθεῖν μεθ' ὁμάγυριν Βελλεροφόνταν
Ζηνός. τὸ δὲ πὰρ δίκαν
γλυκὺ πικροτάτα μένει τελευτά.
ἄμμι δ', χρυσέᾳ κόμᾳ θάλλων, πόρε, Λοξία,
τεαῖσιν ἁμίλλαισιν
εὐανθέα καὶ Πυθόϊ στέφανον.

(*I*.7.37-51)

The poet has just finished describing the death in battle of Strepsiades' uncle (of the same name) and many other noble Thebans. He contrasts

[59] I leave aside its occurrences in direct speech (as, for example, in *P*.4).

with their violent death the present εὐδίαν; this fair weather provided by Poseidon must refer to the Isthmian victory of the younger Strepsiades, who rehabilitates his family's fortunes after the storm of bereavement by war.[60] But the εὐδίαν is also the poet's (a theme for celebration).[61] The "I" here is almost certainly an indefinite first-person in which poet and victor merge. But the "I" of ἀείσομαι is clearly the poet, although he is likened to the victor through his crown.[62] The wish of vv.40-42 is certainly a first-person indefinite;[63] the wish to reach full maturity is just as relevant to the victor (whose namesake uncle failed to do so) as the poet. As with the ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι... of v.37, the dead uncle is here used as a foil.

The θνᾴσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες of v.42 broadens the first-person indefinite into a plural; any doubts which we may have had about the universal relevance of the wish immediately preceding are herewith diminished through gnomic generalization. The obvious generality of v.42 leads us to suspect that the following *brachus/makros* gnome and its illustrative myth are equally relevant to both subject and object. We have observed in Chapter One that the *brachus/makros* polarity in general reflects both on subject (the writing of the poem) and object (the code of behaviour to which the victor is exhorted). The gnome which concludes the Bellerophon-example confirms this ambiguity; the word δίκα is inherently ambiguous in Pindar, referring either to objective ethical behaviour or, subjectively, to encomiastic propriety.[64] The bitter/sweet opposition reminds us of *N*.7.52f., which also serves as a break-off formula; too much praise (= sweetness) may stimulate galling *phthonos*. Pindar heeds the advice of limitation himself, and thus closes the poem with a short prayer, the ambiguity of which we have already noted in section (2) above. The ἄμμι (v.49) whom Apollo will benefit with a Pythian victory can be none other than the victor and poet; this final "we" provides the climax to all the other ambivalent first-persons which have built up to it.

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[60] Compare the μετὰ χειμέριον ποικίλα χθὼν of *I*.4.19f., which is an image for Melissus' rehabilitation, through athletic success, of his family's losses in war.

[61] Not only is the εὐδίαν ambiguous in its reference, but so is the suffering which precedes it. ἔτλαν could be first-person singular (see Young (1971), 23f.) as well as third-person plural. The ambiguity provides a neat transition and identification of interest. Poet and victor are both Thebans, and thus equally affected by Thebes' travails in war.

[62] Cf. p.149 *infra*.

[63] Cf. Young (1971), 28-30.

[64] For δίκα as a term of encomiastic propriety, cf. Gundert, 68, and Bundy (1962), II, 61 n.69. The implication of the ambiguity in the present context is that it would be πὰρ δίκαν or hybristic, either for Strepsiades to think that he (or his uncle) could live forever, or for the poet to praise Strepsiades in anything more than the terms which befit a mortal. All praise, like all desire for the distant, must be limited by the consciousness of mortality, lest it evoke the ἀθανάτων φθόνος averted in v.39.

5. Metaphor

We noted in our discussion of *I*.7.39 the use of the crown-metaphor in reference to the poet; usually, the crown belongs to the athlete, as in v.51 of the same poem. But poets are crowned as well as athletes, and the honor which attaches to poetic achievements is not altogether unlike the glories of athletic achievement. Use of such ambivalent metaphors may therefore confront us with still another poetic device for the equation of subject and object.

We have an apt analogue for the parallel of victor's crown and poet's crown in *O*.3 where v.6 describes the poet's crown (in terms very similar to *I*.7.39) and vv.11-13 describe the crowning of the victor; in fact, the poem's myth (which follows) is concerned with Heracles' importation of the olive in order to provide victory wreaths. Yet the two crowns in *I*.7 may not merely be parallel, but also ambiguous. Although the primary reference of *I*.7.39 must be the poet's crown, it could refer to his crowning the athlete in song;[65] this explains the following gnome on the "envy of the immortals." And similarly, although the crown of v.51 must refer primarily to the crown which Strepsiades would win with a Pythian victory, the ἄμμι δ'...πόρε which opens the prayer suggests that it may also be the crown with which the poet would celebrate this victory. The ambiguity is foregrounded in v.23f., which refers to the "mutual garland" (κοινὸν θάλος) which Strepsiades shares with his namesake uncle; but this crown is provided by the ἰοπλόκοισι Μοίσαις, who themselves wear violet-crowns in their hair. *O*.1.8f. may be similarly ambiguous, although it is impossible to say with any certainty.[66] The crown is not only the objective substance of praise for the victor, but it is also the poet's subjective qualification for bestowing praise.

A similar ambiguity can be perceived in Pindar's use of the eagle-metaphor. It has long been assumed that the eagle must refer to the poet in passages such as *O*.2.87f., *N*.3.80-82, and *N*.5.21. But one recent critic[67] has proposed, not implausibly, that it always refers to the victor.

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[65] Translators have taken this phrase both ways. The poet crowns himself for Sandys, 495; Farnell, I, 276; Puech (1958), IV, 70. The victor is crowned in Lattimore (1959), 146.

[66] The ambiguity depends on whether we take μητίεσσι as a locative or instrumental dative. Most critics have taken it as the former, but Nisetich (1975), 65-67, argues for the latter interpretation. Although he demonstrates that crowning the victor is more common, we cannot, in light of parallels like *O*.3.6 and *I*.7.39, altogether write off the possibility that it is the poet who is crowned. Cf. Slater (1969a), 43. The ambiguity might still be present even if we insist on taking the dative as locative, since σοφῶν is ambiguous ("poets or "wise" victors who commission poems). As we shall see later in this section, the proem of *O*.1 is just as much subjective as objective in its concern.

[67] Stoneman, 188-197. In response, cf. Benardini (1977), 123-126.

An examination of the eagle's general associations, and of the specific passages in question, will reveal that neither view is altogether wrong—or altogether correct.

The eagle incontrovertibly refers to the royal victor Arcesilas in *P.*5.112. It is also associated with royalty in *P.*4.4, *P.*1.6 (where it sleeps on the scepter of Zeus), *P.*2.50, *O.*13.21 (= οἰωνῶν βασιλέα), *I.*6.50 (= ἀρχὸν οἰωνῶν). Duchemin notes that the eagle's status as herald to Zeus is parallel to the poet's mediatory role between gods and men,[68] but she elsewhere attributes this mediatory role to kings as well.[69] The eagle was associated with immortality in funerary iconography of this period,[70] but this could equally reflect on either the immortalizing power of the poet or the immortalization of the victor. Metaphors of flight and wings often refer to poetry (*P.*8.23, *N.*7.22, *I.*5.63, *Paean* 7B. 13, not to mention the familiar "winged words" of Homer); but in *I.*1.64., the *laudandus* is raised aloft by the wings of poetry.[71]

Let us now examine the specific passages in question. We have already seen *N.*3.80-82;[72] we have observed how the near/far contrast of the short-sighted jackdaws and the far-swooping eagle (v.81 τηλόθε μεταμαιόμενος) picks up the ὀψέ περ which immediately precedes, whether we interpret this as literal lateness of the ode as a whole or merely as a metaphor for Pindar's technique of digression. Distance—especially in the form of digression—allows the poet to gain perspective on his theme (praise of the victor), and thus to "catch" it all the more surely. We have observed a similar valuation of temporal distance in our study of the early/late opposition. The daws are, on this assumption, hack poets who merely grind out epinician poetry without taking any risks, digressive or otherwise.

But the far-swooping eagle could also very well be the victor Aristocleides. The eagle's prowess in hunting is not unlike his ἀεθλοφόρου λήματος described in the verse which immediately follows: the eagle's δαφοινὸν ἄγραν could very well be metaphorical for the prize of victory which the athlete has seized. And as we have observed in our study of this ode, the notion of distance is just as relevant objectively as subjectively, even as intrinsic to athletic achievement as to poetic ambition. V.84 tells us that the victor's φάος of fame shines from far-away places like Nemea,

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[68] Duchemin (1972), 403.

[69] Duchemin (1959), 381, 388.

[70] See Wuilleumier, 127. For the general association of eagles with longevity and even indestructability, see Thompson, 10.

[71] Stoneman, 189, attempts to argue that the primary association of flight is with the *laudandus*, and that the *laudator*'s association with flight is secondary. But the passages just cited clearly suggest the contrary.

[72] See p.46f. *supra*.

Epidauris, and Megara, just as his ancestors' τηλαυγὲς φέγγος did so at the beginning of the triad (v.64).

If we interpret the eagle-metaphor as exclusively objective, we cannot explain its connection with what precedes;[73] if we take it as exclusively subjective, we cannot explain its relation to what follows. Clearly, like many of the prayers and gnomes which we have studied, the ambiguity of the metaphor serves a transitional purpose, connecting the subjective passage which precedes with the objective conclusion which follows. The eagle-metaphor maps the ode's near/far polarity onto both subject and object. The contrast of preeminence (eagle) and mediocrity (daws) is surely relevant to athletics every bit as much as to poetic competition.

Similarly ambiguous is *O.*2.86-88. Only here the ambiguity is not so much conditioned by the context as internal to the words themselves:

πολλά μοι ὑπ' ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη
ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας
φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν· ἐς δὲ τὸ πὰν ἑρμανέων
χατίζει. σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ· μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι
παγγλωσσίᾳ κόρακες ὣς ἄκραντα γαρύετον
Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον·
ἔπεχε νῦν σκοπῷ τόξον, ἄγε θυμέ· τίνα βάλλομεν
ἐκ μαλθακᾶς αὖτε φρενὸς εὐκλέας ὀϊστοὺς ἱέντες;

(*O.*2.83-90)

Here again we are confronted with the ambiguity of the word σοφός. It can be either the poet who knows many things by nature (in which case the πολλά of v.86 are equivalent to the πολλὰ ὠκέα βέλη of v.83), or the poet's audience—namely, Theron (in which case v.86 is a definition of the συνετοῖσιν to whom the arrows speak). It is reasonable to suppose that the παγγλωσσίᾳ of the crows has something to do with τὸ πάν of v.85, but it is not clear whether the crows are themselves part of τὸ πάν (in which case they are an objective foil = democratic elements opposed to Theron), or merely speak to τὸ πάν (in which case, they are a subjective foil—poets who, like Bacchylides, tried to write in a lucid style which is accessible to the masses). Their παγγλωσσίᾳ may be envious slander against the eagle (= *laudandus*), or it may be encomiastic excess which comes off poorly in comparison with the eagle (= *laudator*),[74] who presumably knows how to come to the mark (like the bowman) and avoid

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[73] Stoneman, 194, is reduced to saying, "there is no need to assume a connection of thought at all." But surely interpretations which afford the Pindaric text consistency and logic are preferable to those which do not.

[74] παγγλωσσίᾳ (= "saying everything") can very well be either a qualitative fault (indiscriminate speech, or slander) or quantitative fault (saying too much, or encomiastic excess). In fact the latter fault may engender the former.

κόρος οὐ δίχᾳ συναντόμενος (v.95f.).[75] As we observed in our discussion of *physis* and *technē*, poet and victor are bound together in a common aristocracy of birth; those who have merely learned, whether in the realm of athletics or poetry, stand as inferior foils to them.

The third passage to be considered is *N*.5.19-21:

> εἰ δ' ὄλβον ἢ χειρῶν βίαν ἢ σιδαρίταν ἐπαινῆσαι πόλεμον δεδόκηται, μακρά μοι
> αὐτόθεν ἅλμαθ' ὑποσκάπτοι τις· ἔχω γονάτων ὁρμὰν ἐλαφράν·
> καὶ πέραν πόντοιο πάλλοντ' αἰετοί.

Here again, as in *N*.3.80-82, we see the eagle associated with the near/far polarity. And as in *N*.3, the opposition may have either subjective or objective applications. The far-reaching flight of the eagle may be a generalized extension of the long leap which the poet is about to take. Or it may be that the soaring achievements of the *laudandi* (both the victor and the Aeacids) are what necessitates the poet's long leap, and that these athletic (and martial) achievements constitute the "long props" which someone digs for Pindar.[76] As before, the image expresses an ideal of preeminence which encompasses both subject and object.[77]

The same integration of subjective and objective virtues can also be effected by metaphors which are not ambiguous, but "reciprocal"—i.e., metaphors which either depict the *laudator* in the role of the *laudandus* or the *laudandus* in the role of the *laudator*. Particularly common among these are Pindar's familiar athletic metaphors for poetry. We have observed two of these already in our discussion of the eagle-metaphor—namely, the broad jump-metaphor of *N*.5.20 and the bow-metaphor surrounding the eagle-passage in *O*.2. It may be surmised that, in addition to their other functions, these athletic metaphors further serve to unify the activities of subject and object, and thus possess the same ultimate goal as the ambiguous eagle-metaphor.[78]

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[75] On the encomiastic reference of this phrase, cf. Gundert, 67; Bundy (1962), I, 29 n.71; Bundy (1972), 87-89.

[76] Stoneman, 195, argues that the κείνοις of v.22 must refer to the eagles, and hence that the eagles are *laudandi*. But the word κεῖνος designates a distant antecedent, and thus more likely looks back to the Aeacids of vv.7-16. Cf. Fogelmark, 73-75. Even on Stoneman's reading, it is still the Aeacids who are ultimately referred to.

[77] The same may also be said of Bacchylides' imitation of the eagle-metaphor in 5.16-30. The eagle which wanders over the entire expanse of the sky (vv. 16f., 24-26) is brought in as illustration of the μυρία κέλευθος (v.31) open to the poet for praising Hieron; but the many paths are not only the many subjective strategies of praise, but also the many objective realms of achievement which may provide topical matter for the poet's praise of Hieron.

[78] We find the chariot as a metaphor for poetry at *O*.1.110f., *O*.6.22-28, *O*.9.80-82, *P*.10.65, *N*.1.7, *I*.2.1f., *I*.5.38, *I*.8.67-69. We find the bow at *O*.1.111f., *O*.2.83-91, *O*.9.5-12, *P*.1.12, *N*.3.65, *N*.6.27f., *I*.2.3, *I*.5.46-48, the javelin at *O*.13.93-95, *P*.1.43-45, *N*.1.18, *N*.7.66, *N*.9.55, *I*.2.35, the broadjump at *N*.3.41f. and *N*.5.20, wrestling at *P*.2.61 and *N*.4.93-96, the footrace at *O*.8.54 and *N*.8.19, the pentathlum at *N*.7.71-73.

Simpson[79] has studied some of the specific functions of the bow- and chariot-metaphors in particular; we have also had occasion to comment on specific contexts in the course of our study of individual odes. But the capacity of these metaphors for subject/object identification must be emphasized when accounting for Pindar's undeniable predilection for them. The pentathlum-metaphor is found in an ode for a pentathlete (*N.*7), the most developed wrestling-metaphor in an ode for a wrestler (*N.*4), the most developed footrace-metaphor in an ode for a runner (*N.*8), and half of the chariot-metaphors are in odes for equestrian victors (*O.*1, *O.*6, *N.*1, *I.*2), although this last metaphor is sufficiently common that it may have been topical for Pindar. To become more specific, we can probably say that the chariot-metaphor parallels the poet's force and aristocratic bearing to the athlete's; the path of song is equated with the victor's road of accomplishment.[80] Similarly, the bow- and javelin-metaphors parallel the poet's precision and sense of quantitative measure with the athlete's; these metaphors especially mediate near and far, *brachus* and *makros*.[81] The wrestling-metaphor reflects on his polymorphic perseverance. But the exact implications of each metaphor may vary according to the context.

The inverse of these athletic metaphors are those in which the *laudandus* is represented as himself bestowing praise—i.e., as a *laudator*. The victor's achievements will redound to the greater glory of his fatherland and its heroes. He is thus represented as "singing" about his fatherland (*O.*5.11) or "crowning" its institutions (*O.*9.112, *P.*2.6); these expressions may be metonymic extensions of the fact that he has commissioned an epinician ode which will include praise of his city and its institutions. It may also be a *laudandus* other than the victor who does the praising: in *I.*7.32, the deceased uncle Strepsiades "praises" or "approves" (αἰνέων combines both senses) the actions of Meleager and Hector by following their examples and standing as a bulwark in defense of his city. And in *N.*1.71f., Heracles "praises" his life in Olympus. Characterization of the *laudandus* as a musician (*P.*4.296, *P.*5.114) or comparison of him with musicians (*N.*2.1-5) may serve a similar function. Causing oneself to be praised is equivalent to praising all the broader entities with which one's

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[79] Simpson, 437-473. On athletic metaphors in general, cf. Rauchenstein, 114; Dornseiff, 58.

[80] Cf. *N.*7.51, and p.129 n.85 *supra*.

[81] An apt illustration is *I.*2.35-37: μακρὰ διχσχήσαις ἀκοντίσσαιμι τοσοῦθ', ὅσον ὀργὰν/Ξεινοκράτης ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων γλυκεῖαν/ἔσχεν. The poet's striving for distance and preeminence among competitors is in exact proportion to that of the *laudandus*. But at the same time, both poet and athlete must observe *kairos*, and not allow their energy to shoot out of bounds. For the athletic relevance of *kairos*, cf. v.22 above in the same poem, and Detienne-Vernant, 15f.

glory is connected; transformation of the *laudandus* into a *laudator* implies the progression from the *idion* to the *koinon*. Similarly, fostering music is not unlike creating music oneself.

Before we leave the subject of metaphor, we should discuss the confrontation of subjective and objective metaphors. The most salient case thereof is the famous opening of *O*.1:

> Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
> ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου·
> εἰ δ' ἄεθλα γαρύεν
> ἔλδεαι, φίλον ἦτορ,
> μηκέθ' ἁλίου σκόπει
> ἄλλο θαλπνότερον ἐν ἁμέρᾳ φαεννὸν ἄστρον ἐρήμας δι' αἰθέρος,
> μηδ' Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον αὐδάσομεν·
> ὅθεν ὁ πολύφατος ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται
> σοφῶν μητίεσσι, κελαδεῖν
> Κρόνου παῖδ' ἐς ἀφνεὰν ἱκομένους
> μάκαιραν Ἱέρωνος ἑστίαν,

(*O*.1.1-11)

We have already discussed the relevance of water and gold as metaphors for subject and object in the parallel-passage of *O*.3.42.[82] But *O*.3.42 is clearly derived from the present text, so it is here that the case must be made to stand or fail. Finley argues convincingly on the basis of numerous passages that water in Pindar often stands as a symbol for poetry[83]—in its fluid, polymorphic, gently flowing, refreshing, even regenerative aspects. Finley goes on to identify gold and the sun as symbols respectively for the glory of the heroes and of the gods,[84] but this part of his argument is extremely vague and much less demonstrable, depending as it does on the general associations of "brightness" rather than on any specific connotations of gold and sun. Such an interpretation renders the metaphors too abstract and amorphous: metaphors, if they are metaphors, should refer to something specific and relevant to the context. I would submit that we need not look so far afield as Finley does: gold, as the context indicates, represents wealth (μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου), while the sun, as the context again indicates, represents the athletic contest (ἄεθλα).[85] Both associations are natural. Gold is the substance of wealth; the sun sees all (cf. *O*.7.61-63) and is conspicuous to all, just as the athletic contest provides an arena which will be seen by all. This inter-

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[82] Cf. p.14f. *supra*.
[83] Finley, 52f. Add to his list of parallels *N*.1.24, *N*.3.6f.,79.
[84] Finley, 53-55.
[85] For the association of the sun with the heat of athletic toil, cf. *O*.3.24, *O*.13.37, *N*.7.73.

pretation is preferable either to the vagueness of much imagistic criticism or the belief that we are merely dealing with a random priamel of superlatives.[86]

The basic antithesis is that of water (μέν) and gold (δέ), poetry and wealth, subject and object. Water (= poetry) is pure, elemental, and absolute; poetry, like water, can never be destroyed. It is therefore ἄριστον. Gold, on the other hand, is a product of convention, and is meaningful only in terms of comparison—quantitative or qualitative—with other forms of wealth. Hence gold is described in terms which are comparative rather than superlative. It is also fitting that the statement about water is short and simple (three words), while that about gold is much more complex and articulated; gold is not only compared with other forms of wealth, but also undergoes comparison by means of a simile. Gold is conspicuous among other forms of wealth like fire at night. Fire is another primal element, and thus is set off against water. Fire shines (like the glory of the victor), but water reflects (like the words of the poet—cf. *N.*7.14). Thus, even though pure and elemental, water can be a mediating entity between earth and sky (in the form of rain or steam), even as poetry mediates between the object's earthly mortality and heavenly glory.

The image of the sun at day amplifies that of fire at night. The Sun is unquestionably brighter than any fire. And while a fire is merely one fire among many, there is only one Sun, for it is the ultimate fire. Even thus, a fortune of wealth such as Hieron's is merely one among many, while equestrian victory at Olympia is the pinnacle of success—the one end to which wealth can be devoted which will make that wealth preeminent above all other. We are dealing with parallel synecdoches, on the levels of both image and referent.

Olympia in effect mediates subject and object. The contest provides both a destination for the king's "gold" and a source for the poet's "water." Thus the final sentence of the strophe returns us to the subject/object-confrontation—only this time made explicit, rather than metaphorical as in v.1. The πολύφατος ὕμνος and σοφῶν μητίεσσι identify the subjective pole (however we take the ἀμφιβάλλεται), even as Zeus and Hieron are the objective *laudandi.*[87] As Zeus is preeminent among gods, so is Hieron among men.[88]

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[86] Cf. Fraenkel (1975), 471f., who identifies water as the supreme element of vegatative life, fire as the supreme element of spiritual life, and gold as the greatest of material possessions.

[87] The verb κελαδεῖν is effectively placed at the midpoint between the sentence's subjective and objective poles.

[88] We can diagram thus the proem's logical sequence of interlocking antithesis, synec-

6. *Xenia*

Generosity and liberality as a host is one of the most common categories of praise in Pindar's epinicians.[89] Thus, glory is to be Theron's for surpassing all men with his "tables of hospitality," or ξεινίαις τραπέζαις (*O*.3.39-41; cf. *O*.2.6). So also the ξενίαν τράπεζαν of Xenocrates is praised in *I*.2.39f. The praise of *xenia* extends to clans (the Cleonymids of *I*.4.8) and entire nations (Locris in *O*.11.17; Aegina in *O*.8.25-27, *N*.3.2f., *N*.4.12f., *N*.5.8, *I*.9.5f.). Zeus is the protector of *xenia* (*O*.8.21, *N*.5.33, *N*.11.8f.). Mythical figures illustrate both the positive practice of *xenia* (Opus in *O*.9.67ff., Pylades and Strophius in *P*.11.16 and 34) and its violation or perversion (Tantalus and Oenomaus in *O*.1, Augeas in *O*.10.39, Ixion in *P*.2, Ischys in *P*.3, Antaeus in *I*.4.59f., Laomedon in fr.104a).[90]

But in addition to being a general category of praise, *xenia* may have a special reference to the subject/object-relation.[91] The poet enjoys the *xenia* of the victor who has commissioned the poem, and possibly invited him into his home in order to organize and train the victory-chorus. And in a more extended sense, the poet enjoys hospitality in the form of the victor's largesse and lavish expenditure for poetic celebration. Thus *xenia* may become a metaphor for the patronage of poetry, as in *P*.10.64f.:

πέποιθα ξενίᾳ προσανέϊ Θώραχος, ὅσπερ ἐμὰν ποιπνύων χάριν
τόδ' ἔζευξεν ἅρμα Πιερίδων τετράορον,
φιλέων φιλέοντ', ἄγων ἄγοντα προφρόνως.

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doche, and analogy (with the arrow denoting antithesis, a colon synecdoche, a double colon explicit analogy, an equals sign implicit analogy):

water <---------------> gold: forms of wealth::
fire: things of night =
sun: things of day::
Olympia: athletic contests =
hymnos <---------------> Zeus: gods =
Hieron: men.
subject <---------------> object

[89] For the basis of this positive valuation of *xenia* and its reciprocating obligations, cf. Homer, *Il.* 6.215-226, *Od.* 17.418, 19.332-334; Herodotus 7.237.3; and Ahrens, 63.

[90] *P*.4 is a special case, featuring a series of both positive and negative paradigms. The myth opens with the *xenia* of Eurypylus (vv.28-37). Pelias' lack of hospitality for his *xenos* Jason (v.97) contrasts with Jason's hosting and feasting of his relatives (vv.127-131). Medea's *xenia* (v.233) for the Argonauts contrasts with her father's lack of it. It is only fitting that the poem should conclude (vv.294-299) with a description of Damophilus' sympotic virtues and enjoyment of *xenia*. Arcesilas is thus left with the choice of being hospitable to him (like Eurypylus, Jason, Medea, and Pindar) or inhospitable (like Pelias and Aeetes).

[91] On the special *philotēs* of poet and victor, see Crotty (1982), 76ff.; von der Mühll, 168-172; Nisetich (1977), 134.

So at the opening of *N*.9 the *laudandus'* reception of the victory-revel is characterized as an act of *xenia*:

> Κωμάσομεν παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος Σεκυωνόθε, Μοῖσαι,
> τὰν νεοκτίσταν ἐς Αἴτναν, ἔνθ' ἀναπεπταμέναι ξείνων νενίκανται θύραι,
> ὄλβιον ἐς Χρομίου δῶμ'.
>
> (*N*.9.1-3)

We should remember that quite often the victory-celebration may have taken place at some kind of banquet; all celebration, in fact, is inherently festive. Hence, the sympotic imagery of the ξενίαν τράπεζαν is just as relevant to the audience's relation with the *laudandus* as to the poet's.[92]

This *xenia* of the host-victor in turn engenders certain obligations on those who are benefitted by it. *Xenia* is essentially a two-way, reciprocal relationship. Indeed, the word ξένος itself is ambiguous, designating both "host" and "guest"; the benefactee may in turn win the opportunity to become a benefactor, and *vice versa*. These reciprocal obligations have special relevance to the relationship of subject and object. Positively, the poet must requite the hospitality of a *laudandus* (even if only a relative of the victor) by mentioning it in his song: such is the case with the προξενίᾳ of Lampromachus,[93] which Pindar "honors" in *O*.9.83f. This honoring of the host also entails defending him against any hypothetical opposition or slander (cf. *O*.10.3-6, the Muse's defense against ψευδέων ἐνιπὰν ἀλιτόξενον). As we have observed, the same obligations apply to all guests of the *laudandus*, including, we can assume, those witnessing the present victory-celebration. The audience and poet are grouped together as "noble men" (ἐσλοί), who are both cheered when their host fares well (*O*.4.6f.) and ready to defend him when he is in need of help (*N*.1.19ff.).[94]

We have already seen the obligations of *xenia* figure in myth. *I*.6 showed us the guest Heracles requiting his host Telamon (in a sympotic setting) through prayer, libation, and prophecy on his behalf; we observed that this pair clearly figures the Theban Pindar requiting his Aeginetan host Lampon. So also in *P*.2 we saw the negative consequences of failing to requite *xenoi* properly, and we noted that this lesson had equal relevance to subject and object.

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[92] On the community of shared values which binds together poet, victor, and audience, see the important essay of Gentili (1965), 70-88.

[93] There is no need to assume, with Σ*O*.9.123c Drachmann, that this προξενίᾳ refers to any official consular post (nor need we assume this in *N*.7.65). The word cannot possibly have this meaning in *Parth*.2.41, but rather in all three instances probably refers to a generally friendly disposition toward foreigners. Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1973), 135; Pavese (1978), 677.

[94] On this passage, see our analysis on pp.51-55 *supra*. Σ*N*.1.29a Drachmann, sees the ἁρμόδιον δεῖπνον offered by this ἀνδρὸς φιλοξείνου as metaphorical for the poetic fee.

The obligations of the τράπεζα are also a theme of *O.*1. The poet's requital of Hieron's hospitality is introduced in vv.14-17:

ἀγλαΐζεται δὲ καὶ
μουσικᾶς ἐν ἀώτῳ,
οἷα παίζομεν φίλαν
ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ θαμὰ τράπεζαν.

This praise of *xenia* is made still more explicit toward the end of the poem:

πέποιθα δὲ ξένον
μή τιν' ἀμφότερα καλῶν τε ἴδριν ἐόντα καὶ δύναμιν κυριώτερον
τῶν γε νῦν κλυταῖσι δαιδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς.

(*O.*1.103-105)

The intervening myth presents Tantalus as a negative paradigm of hospitality—"hospitality" which is carried to excess and reckless of the gods. Tantalus attempts to give his ἀλίκεσσι συμπόταις (v.61) the nectar and ambrosia which is properly the food only of immortals, just as in the rejected version of the myth he attempted to serve the gods themselves an unholy dish (vv.48-51); both are hybristic perversions of the proper conduct for a host.[95] But Tantalus' perversion of *xenia* is a foil to the maintenance of hospitality and festivity by Pelops, in his role as cupbearer to the gods.[96] And of course, Pelops is a paradigm for Hieron.[97]

But as we have observed above, the *xenos*-relationship is fundamentally reciprocal: the *xenos* as guest may become *xenos* as host. In Pindar's epinicians, this reciprocation expresses the subject's return of benefaction to the object. We have already observed how *N.*4.23 characterizes Thebes as a ξένιον ἄστυ to the victor Timasarchus, and how this requites the δίκᾳ ξεναρκέϊ (v.12) of Aegina mentioned a few lines earlier.[98] So also, at the end of *P.*4, we find Pindar playing host to the *laudandus* Damophilus (v.299), thus qualifying his praise of Damophilus' sympotic virtues in vv.294-296.

7. *Ploutos*

Another general category of praise in Pindar's epinicians is the victor's wealth or prosperity.[99] Wealth is what renders *xenia* possible; it is a

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[95] The parallelism may in fact be the reason for relating in such explicit detail the rejected version: it is made clear that even the old version of the story illustrates the same sort of behavior on the part of Tantalus.

[96] This is surely, in at least part, the meaning of τοῦτ' ἐπὶ χρέος in v.45; cf. Kakridis, 466.

[97] Cf. Mezger, 96f.

[98] See p.78 *supra*. We also noted the subject/object-identification promoted by the following myth concerning Theban Heracles and Aeginetan Telamon.

[99] On the general praise of wealth as a god-given reward for virtue, see p.125 n.69 *supra*.

material crystallization of the contractual relation between subject and object. The clear implication of what Pindar says about wealth is that it is best exhibited—in expenditure for athletic training, in liberal entertainment and festivity, and preeminently, in poetic commissions. Celebration in an epinician, particularly if written by a poet of Pindar's stature and ability, was the ultimate status-symbol in early fifth-century Greece, and involved no small amount of expense.[100]

Wealth by itself, like all other god-given entities, is not sufficient as a grounds for praise, but must be matched by its proper utilization, just as *physis* must be augmented by *technē* (= the proper use of one's nature). *P.*6.47-49 praises the victor for not squandering his wealth in youthful profligacy, but investing in the σοφίαν of the Pierides. *P.*1.88-94 exhorts Hieron to liberal expenditure on behalf of his future fame, and dissuades him from the course of εὐτράπλοις κέρδεσιν. The proper use of wealth consists in a sense of *kairos*, being neither profligate nor miserly, but spending just enough to ensure one's good repute both now and in generations to come.

We have noted *P.*3.110f. already in our discussion of the first-person indefinite: it clearly implies that the proper use of πλοῦτον ἅβρον is to find κλέος ὑψηλόν, since otherwise such wealth would merely be idle (and transitory) luxury. The preceding gnomes (v.105f. ὄλβος οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται σῶς) emphasize the inadequacy of wealth by itself, while the following *exempla* and gnomes (cf.v.114f.) imply that the abiding fame which wealth can buy is best achieved through poetic celebration.

Another of the first-person indefinite statements which we noted was *N.*1.31f.; the poet does not like πολὺν ἐν μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν, but prefers to benefit his friends and thus combine his good fortune (εὖ παθεῖν) with good reputation (εὖ ἀκοῦσαι). Clearly this statement praises Chromius' liberality as a host (cf. vv.19-24) and exhorts him to continue. Here, the acquisition of good repute is not only a matter of commissioning poems, but of εὐεργεσία in general—i.e. distributing one's bounty to friends (including those present at this epinician celebration) through hospitality.[101] Fame depends not only on the poet (who is merely a mediator or mouthpiece), but pre-eminently on the audience. The same must also be the implication of *I.*1.67f., which criticizes the man who cultivates "hidden wealth" (πλοῦτον κρυφαῖον) and shows contempt for his fellows (ἄλλοισι δ' ἐμπίπτων γελᾷ),[102] and who is therefore not remembered fondly after his death (ψυχὰν 'Αΐδᾳ τελέων...δόξας ἄνευθεν).

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[100] The normal fee for a Pindaric epinician may have been as much as 1000 drachmae. See Gzella, 192-194.

[101] On εὐεργεσία as the proper use of wealth, see Bundy (1962), II, 86-91.

[102] For this interpretation of ἄλλοισι, see Bundy (1962), II, 85.

This hypothetical figure is certainly a foil for the victor Herodotus, who rather than hoarding his wealth, freely expends it on athletic competition (cf.v.42 δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις) and epinician celebration. As Pindar says in *P.*10.67f. (in a context of victor-praise), gold is conspicuous only "in the test" (ἐν βασάνῳ); hidden wealth is as good as non-existent, since it does not conduce to the greater glory of the *laudandus*, and therefore will not last beyond its possessor's death. Pindar advocates externalization of wealth as of talent and virtue; externalization renders *koinon*, and of public benefit, what would otherwise be *idion*. And fame is the ultimate consequence of this externalization.

The acquisition of fame (especially poetic fame) through wealth may also be the point of *O.*2.53-56: ὁ μὰν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος φερεῖ τῶν τε καὶ τῶν καιρόν.... The τῶν τε καὶ τῶν is a familiar summary priamel (cf. *P.*5.55, *P.*7.18, *N.*1.30, *I.*4.35, *I.*5.52, *Paean* 6.132), implying that of the various uses to which wealth lends itself, there may be one which is especially favored. This may be defined by the protasis which follows: εἴ γέ νιν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι.... Wealth is truly an ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος and ἐτυμώτατον ἀνδρὶ φέγγος, if one uses it virtuously and in a manner which is conscious of the future—i.e., if one uses it in such a way as to insure future fame.[103] On this analysis, the whole Isle of the Blest-myth which follows, far from being Pindar's declaration of belief in the Orphico-Pythagorean afterlife, may be an elaborate metaphor for poetic immortality. Otherwise, it is difficult to see why Pindar should place so much emphasis on the idea of wealth when introducing the myth. As the poet states in *N.*9.45-47, the pinnacle of human achievement is not to possess wealth alone, but to take "glory" along wealth. The best lot of all is both εὖ παθεῖν and εὖ ἀκούειν.[104]

Expenditure of money on a poem in order to secure future fame is thus in effect an investment—an outlay of capital which will yield future return. Hence, it is appropriate that we see the poem presented as a "treasury of hymns" (*P.*6.7f. ὕμνων θησαυρός) for the victor and his city, deposited in the Pythian shrine of Apollo. Similarly, the Graces are presented in *O.*14.9f. as πάντων ταμίαι ἔργων, "stewards" or "treasurers of all deeds."[105]

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[103] I favor Boeckh's emendation of εἰ δέ in v.56 to εἴ γέ. The γε is mildly resumptive (after the interruption caused by the participial clause and appositives of vv.54-56), and thus allows us to refer the protasis back to the preceding lines, with which it clearly belongs in thought. εἰ δέ is simply ungrammatical, leaving neither any apodosis nor even a likely implied apodosis.

[104] For the doublet, see p.109f. *supra*.

[105] The Graces (= artistic form) preserve grand exploits, but they do not produce them. Hence, we should assign ταμίας here its technical meaning of "treasurer" rather than the watered-down "mistress" of Slater (1969a), 484.

Particularly in view of the large amount of money involved in commissioning a poem, *ploutos* is a characteristic of the poet as well as of the victor. The first-person indefinite statements concerning wealth, which we noted above (*P*.3.110f., *P*.11.50-53, *N*.1.31f.), are not altogether so irrelevant to the first-person as is sometimes imagined. We have also noted[106] the manifold ambiguities of *P*.2.56, in which the wealth complemented by *sophia* is either Hieron's wealth augmented by the poet's *sophia*, or Hieron's wealth augmented by his own *sophia* (which knows to commission poems), or the poet's wealth and *sophia*.

Pindar refers quite openly to the monetary basis of his vocation. Like all crafts, it may be given over to greed or *kerdos* (*P*.3.54 ἀλλὰ κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται).[107] But it may also observe due measure and *kairos*. *P*.11.41-45 is explicit about the poet's contractual obligation of praise in return for the victor's payment. Indeed, the whole χρέος-motif, which we noted in reference to *O*.10.8,[108] surely has its basis in this contractual relationship between subject and object; if the victor has advanced the payment, the poem is literally a debt.

But the most salient illustration of the financial basis of Pindar's activity is the famous opening of *I*.2:

> Οἱ μὲν πάλαι, ὦ Θρασύβουλε, φῶτες, οἳ χρυσαμπύκων
> ἐς δίφρον Μοισᾶν ἔβαινον κλυτᾷ φόρμιγγι συναντόμενοι,
> ῥίμφα παιδείους ἐτόξευον μελιγάρυας ὕμνους,
> ὅστις ἐὼν καλὸς εἶχεν Ἀφροδίτας
> εὐθρόνου μνάστειραν ἀδίσταν ὀπώραν.
>
> ἁ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδής πω τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις·
> οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖαι μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας
> ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί.
> νῦν δ' ἐφίητι τὸ τὠργείου φυλάξαι
> ῥῆμ' ἀλαθείας ἐτᾶς ἄγχιστα βαῖνον,
>
> ''χρήματα χρήματ' ἀνήρ'' ὃς φᾶ κτεάνων θ' ἅμα λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων.
>
> (*I*.2.1-11)

The tone of this passage is self-deprecatory and ironic, which has caused considerable confusion for some interpreters. Pindar is not wishing for a return to the ''good old days.'' What we have learned so far about Pindar's positive valuation of wealth, especially as a means of winning fame through poetic celebration, must prevent us from taking too seriously this

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[106] See p.138 *supra*.

[107] Cf. *P*.2.78, *N*.7.17f., *N*.11.47. But *kerdos* can also be a positive quality, both subjectively (*O*.1.53, *N*.5.16f.) and objectively (*P*.8.13f., *I*.1.50f., *I*.5.26f.).

[108] See p.61 *supra*, and Schadewaldt, 278 n.1.

apparent deprecation of the "prostitute Muse."[109] Pindar actually views the present system of commissions as preferable, since monetary exchange objectifies the whole poetic process, and creates an external criterion of pleasure (the victor's) in addition to the poet's own subjective fancies (= *erōs*). Money provides an objective standard of valuation (χρήματα χρήματ' ἀνήρ), and thus forces the subject to mediate his own *erōs* with the demands of the object: money renders the poetic act *koinon*, where before it was merely *idion*.[110] But the humorous, ironic tone which Pindar assumes in the present passage disarms any crassness in this proposition.[111]

The opening reflections on the mercantile basis of poetry merely form part of the broader praise of *xenia* prominent throughout the rest of the poem. Xenocrates' ξενίαν τραπέζαν (v.39f.) and the largesse which it implies causes his fame to stretch from the Nile to the Phasis (v.41f.). Pindar can also refer to Xenocrates' son Thrasybulus as ξεῖνον ἐμόν (v.48) and exhort him to the same kind of display and public celebration (v.44f.). Even the charioteer Nicomachus is characterized by *xenia* in his frequent visits to the Elean heralds at Olympia (cf. v.24 φιλόξενον ἔργον). Money is, in fact, the means of winning friends; it is the man who has lost both money and friends who learns most clearly the lesson that χρήματα χρήματ' ἀνήρ.

Xenia and *ploutos* are thus both mediating terms which characterize the subject/object-relation. *Ploutos* is something of interest to both victor and poet; its transfer is a visible token of their mutual recognition and trust. The conduct of neither victor nor poet should be characterized by niggardliness (= *kerdos*), whether in monetary payment or in praise. Both must pay off their mutual debts according to a sense of due measure and *kairos*; the obligations of *xenia* are equal and reciprocal.

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[109] For the same conclusion, and a survey of past scholarly opinion, see Woodbury (1968), 527-542.

[110] This objectification of the poetic act also involves exposure to a broader public audience. In this sense the working Muse is superior to the romantic Muse; cf. Nisetich (1977), 141.

[111] The same flippancy is characteristic of *P.*11.41-45.

CONCLUSION

> "The strands of a garland disappear and emerge again into view, tracing a complex pattern of parallels and contrasts: just as the fibres of Pindar's poem, though far apart and distributed over its length, require to be perceived together... Pindar elects to create this ornate tapestry because he wants to represent reality and nothing else; it is no concern of his to trace an orderly process pedantically from beginning to end, nor does he mean to 'get somewhere', to develop an idea or a programme. The very structure of his poetic designs confirms the message of his senses that all things are inextricably woven into a whole; the literary form which he uses is a faithful mirror of the world which he sees."
>
> —Bruno Snell[1]

We have analyzed a wide variety of polar relations in this study. These often take the form of ambiguities, in which a single element simultaneously combines two opposed qualities or significations: the land of the Hyperboreans is in a sense both accessible and inaccessible to men, or the eagle is a metaphor for both poet and athlete. Or the element may entail different qualities at different times (*mētis* is sometimes deceitful manipulation, other times constructive craft), or to different audiences (the lyre is gentle to Ares and the eagle of Zeus, but harsh to all who are not beloved of Zeus). Aside from these doublings, reminiscent of Heraclitus' coincidence of opposites, we have also seen polarities which are clearly disjunctive in their original forms (*brachus/makros*, *oikeion/allotrion*, *alatheia/pseudos*), but which undergo radical shifts in meaning through the semantic ambivalence of both poles. We have seen polar terms which supplement and complement each other (*physis* and *technē*, gentleness toward friends and harshness toward enemies). We have also seen terms which are linked by progression or transformation (near/far, merit/reward). What we observe in all of these is the destabilization of the polar oppositions into which the archaic mind categorized its world: the poles, even while being pushed apart by the very fact of their opposition, are at the same time pulled together by their mutual participation in a mediating third element (whether subject or object). Even while maintaining their difference, the poles become like each other. The Pindaric universe is thus a vision of reality as paradox.

The agonistic character of Greek society and the antithetical nature of its thought in the archaic and classical periods are well known. Equally important is the symbolic (analogical) character of Greek institutions and

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[1] Snell (1960), 82f.

beliefs. Events in heaven are like events on earth, events in the present repeat events in the past. The archaic view of the world is based on a sense of the ultimate connectedness and interdependence of all things. The polarities and analogies of the pre-Socratic philosophers formulate this view theoretically; the polarities and analogies of poetic texts like Pindar's express this world-view concretely.

Our version of structural analysis is an attempt to recapture this conceptual framework and the process of its textual concretization. Far from merely applying extraneous 20*th*-century critical dogma, the methodology articulated here is specifically designed to penetrate the logical forms characteristic of archaic Greek thought. This approach to reading is nothing other than the necessary completion of the medieval Trivium. Philology has thoroughly analyzed the *grammar* of the Pindaric text, while the conventionalizing criticism of Schadewaldt and Bundy has provided the theory and terminology for the analysis of the text's *rhetoric*. New instruments of analysis are needed to offer an appropriate theory and terminology for the third and most profound level of study—the text's *logic*. This vital study has heretofore been shunned, whether due to its inherent complexity or its problematic lack of clear-cut final answers. But the logical depths of the text, uncertain as they are, must be explored.

Structural analysis may offer a refreshing and energizing direction for future criticism, not just in Pindaric scholarship, but throughout the study of classical antiquity. Teleological approaches must eventually reach their *telos*, beyond which point they cease to be productive. The grammar and surface-rhetoric of archaic poetic texts are quickly exhaustible, and have in fact been substantially exhausted. If criticism is to continue as a viable and dynamic scholarly activity, it must turn its attention to the generative deep-structures behind the text. Once the obvious has been stated and even restated, it becomes necessary to illuminate what is not obvious, to render explicit what is implicit, to unravel the variegated fabric of mental-conceptual-verbal relations which constitute the text and each sentence, phrase, and word within the text. Webs of connotation, implication, and association branch out indefinitely in every direction; it remains for generations of future critics to chart their way through this ever more complex hermeneutic labyrinth. The survival of criticism (and through it, the survival of literature itself) depends on the existence of an open text, rather than a definitively closed teleological text.

Contemporary semiotic theory reminds us that meaning resides in the complex and shifting interaction of signifier and signified. On the more broadly metalinguistic level, this translates the relation between form and

concept, rhetoric and ideology. If past methodologies of Pindaric criticism have proven inadequate, it is because they have isolated the signifiers and signifieds in themselves. *Grundgedanke*-criticism treats the signified concept; historical criticism concerns itself with the signified ideology. This valorization of the signified has led critics to single out partial elements of the text and to privilege these as the poem's/poet's "meaning"—a reductionism of which we have observed the dangers. Critics in the tradition of Drachmann, Schadewaldt, and Bundy have gone to the opposite extreme—that of formalism. But the signifier by itself is just as empty as the signified: critical dependence on form and rhetoric too often reveals a failure to grasp the force and signification of a text—its interiority.

The methodology of the present study, with its dual emphasis on connotation and metalanguage (language about language), is designed precisely as an attempt to grasp this interiority—the dynamic tension which enfolds signifier and signified, form and concept, rhetoric and ideology. It is in this way that we can rehabilitate the notion of "meaning" in its unreduced richness and plurality.

Pindar surely deserves to be considered the greatest lyric poet of antiquity, and among the greatest in the Western tradition. But he is seldom read by non-classicists, and not often read even by most classicists. Pindaric criticism has bequeathed us a poet who is either uninteresting or inaccessible to most readers. We see a Pindar who is either the overblown merchant of trite verities depicted by *Grundgedanke*-criticism, or the cantankerous and quarrelsome (not to mention obscurantist) Boeotian of historical criticism, or the skillful but impersonal artist of formalist criticism. It has been the ambition of the present study to propose a methodology of reading which opens up to analysis the very tissues of the poet's intellectual vitality, and which thus makes him both interesting and accessible.

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